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"For  I  dipt  into  the  future,  far  a*  human  eye  could  see, 
Saw  the  Vision  of  the  world,  and  all  the  wonder  that  would  be} 
Saw  the  heavens  fill  with  commerce,  argosies  of  magic  sails, 
Pilots  of  the  purple  twilight,  dropping  down  with  costly  bales; 
Heard  the  heavens  fill  with  shouting,  and  there  rain'd  a  ghastly  dew 
From  tho  nations'  airy  navies  grappling  in  the  central  blue; 
Far  along  the  world-wide  whisper  of  the  south-wind  rushing  warm, 
With  the  standards  of  the  peoples  plunging  thro'  the  thunder-storm; 
Till  the  war-drum  throbb'd  no  longer,  and  the  battle-flags  were  furl'd 
In  the  Parliament  of  man,  the  Federation  of  the  world. 
There  the  common  sense  of  most  shall  hold  a  fretful  realm  in  »we, 
And  tb«  kindly  earth  shall  dumber,  lapt  in  universal  law." 

TBNKYIO.N;  Lcckthy  Halt. 










??-.  ie.  <i 


First  Edition,  1903 

Second  Impression,  February  191$ 

Third  „  February  1917 


THIS  translation  of  Kant's  essay  on  Perpetual 
Peacf  was  undertaken  by  Miss  Mary  Campbell 
Smith  at  the  suggestion  of  the  late  Professor 
Ritchie  of  St.  Andrews,  who  had  promised  to  write 
for  it  a  preface,  indicating  the  value  of  Kant's 
work  in  relation  to  recent  discussions  regarding  the 
possibility  of  "making  wars  to  cease."  In  view 
of  the  general  interest  which  these  discussions  have 
aroused  and  of  the  vague  thinking  and  aspiration 
which  have  too  often  characterised  them,  it  seemed 
to  Professor  Ritchie  that  a  translation  of  this  wise 
and  sagacious  essay  would  be  both  opportune  and 
valuable.  *  His  untimely  death  has  prevented  the 
fulfilment  of  his  promise,  and  I  have  been  asked, 
in  his  stead,  to  introduce  the  translator's  work. 

This  is,  I  think,  the  only  complete  translation 
into  English  of  Kant's  essay,  including  all  the  notes 
as  well  as  the  text,  and  the  translator  has  added 
a  full  historical  Introduction,  along  with  numerous 
notes  of  her  own,  so  as  (in  Professor  Ritchie's  words) 
"to  meet  the  needs  (i)  of  the  student  of  Political 

*  Cf.   his   Studies  in   Political  and  Social  Ethics,  pp.  169,   170, 

vi  Preface 

Science  who  wishes  to  understand  the  relation  of 
Kant's  theories  to  those  of  Grotius,  Hobbes,  Locke, 
Rousseau  etc.,  and  (2)  of  the  general  reader  who 
wishes  to  understand  the  significance  of  Kant's 
proposals  in  connection  with  the  ideals  of  Peace 
Congresses,  and  with  the  development  of  International 
Law  from  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages  to  the  Hague 

Although  it  is  more  than  100  years  since  Kant's 
essay  was  written,  its  substantial  value  is  practically 
unimpaired.  Anyone  who  is  acquainted  with  the 
general  character  of  the  mind  of  Kant  will  expect 
to  find  in  him  sound  common-sense,  clear  recogni- 
tion of  the  essential  facts  of  the  case  and  a  remark- 
able power  of  analytically  exhibiting  the  conditions 
on  which  the  facts  necessarily  depend.  These 
characteristics  are  manifest  in  the  essay  on  Perpetual 
Peace.  Kant  is  not  pessimist  enough  to  believe 
that  a  perpetual  peace  is  an  unrealisable  dream  or 
a  consummation  devoutly  to  be  feared,  nor  is  he 
optimist  enough  to  fancy  that  it  is  an  ideal  which 
could  easily  be  realised  if  men  would  but  turn 
their  hearts  to  one  another.  For  Kant  perpetual 
peace  is  an  ideal,  not  merely  as  a  speculative 
Utopian  idea,  with  which  in  fancy  we  may  play, 
but  as  a  moral  principle,  which  ought  to  be,  and 
therefore  can  be,  realised.  Yet  he  makes  it  perfectly 
clear  that  we  cannot  hope  to  approach  the  realisation 

Preface  vii 

of  it  unless  we  honestly  face  political  facts  and  get 
a  firm  grasp  of  the  indispensable  conditions  of  a 
lasting  peace.  To  strive  after  the  ideal  in  contempt 
or  in  ignorance  of  these  conditions  is  a  labour  that 
must  inevitably  be  either  fruitless  or  destructive  of 
its  own  ends.  Thus  Kant  demonstrates  the  hope- 
lessness of  any  attempt  to  secure  perpetual  peace 
between  independent  nations.  Such  nations  may 
make  treaties;  but  these  are  binding  only  for  so 
long  as  it  is  not  to  the  interest  of  either  party  to 
denounce  them.  To  enforce  them  is  impossible 
while  the  nations  remain  independent.  "There  is," 
as  Professor  Ritchie  put  it  (Studies  in  Political  and 
Social  Ethics,  p.  169),  "only  one  way  in  which  war 
between  independent '"nations  can  be  prevented; 
and  that  is  by  the  nations  ceasing  to  be  indepen- 
dent." But  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  the 
•establishment  of  a  despotism,  whether  autocratic 
or  democratic.  On  the  other  hand,  Kant  maintains 
that  just  as  peace  between  individuals  within  a 
state  can  only  be  permanently  secured  by  the 
institution  of  a  "republican"  (that  is  to  say,  a 
representative)  government,  so  the  only  real  guarantee 
-of  a  permanent  peace  between  nations  is  the 
•establishment  of  a  federation  of  free  "republican" 
states.  Such  a  federation  he  regards  as  practically 
possible. '  "  For  if  Fortune  ordains  that  a  powerful 
and  enlightened  people  should  form  a  republic — 

viii  Preface 

which  by  its  very  nature  is  inclined  to  perpetual 
peace— this  would  serve  as  a  centre  of  federal 
union  for  other  states  wishing  to  join,  and  thus 
secure  ^conditions  of  freedom  among  the  states  in 
accordance  with  the  idea  of  the  law  of  nations. 
Gradually,  through  different  unions  of  this  kiudr 
the  federation  would  extend  further  and  further. '" 
Readers  who  are  acquainted  with  the  general 
philosophy  of  Kant  will  find  many  traces  of  its 
influence  in  the  essay  on  Perpetual  Peace.  Those 
who  have  no  knowledge  of  his  philosophy  may 
find  some  of  his  forms  of  statement  rather  difficult 
to  understand,  and  it  may  therefore  not  be  out  of 
place  for  me  to  indicate  very  briefly  the  meaning^ 
of  some  terms  which  he  frequently  uses,  especially*  < 
in  the  Supplements  and  Appendices.  Thus  at  the 
beginning  of  the  First  Supplement,  Kant  draws  a 
distinction  between  the  mechanical  and  the  teleo- 
logical  view  of  things,  between  "nature  "  and  " Provi-1 
dence",  which  depends  upon  his  main  philosophical 
position.  According  to  Kant,  pure  reason  has  two- 
aspects,  theoretical  and  practical.  As  concerning", 
knowledge,  strictly  so  called,  the  a  priori  principles 
of  reason  (e.g.  substance  and  attribute,  cause  and' 
effect  etc.)  are  valid  only  within  the  realm  of' 
possible  sense-experience.  Such  ideas,  for  instance, 
cannot  be  extended  to  God,  since  He  is  not  a 
possible  object  of  sense-experience.  They  are  limited 

Preface  he 


to  the  world  of  phenomena.  This  world  of  pheno- 
mena ("nature"  or  the  world  of  sense-experience) 
is  a  purely  mechanical  system.  But  in  order  to 
understand  fully  the  phenomenal  world,  the  pure 
theoretical  reason  must  postulate  certain  ideas  (the 
ideas  of  the  soul,  the  world  and  God),  the  objects 
of  which  transcend  sense-experience.  These  ideas 
are  not  theoretically  valid,  but  their  validity  is-' 
practically  established  by  the  pure  practical  reason/ 
which  does  not  yield  speculative  truth,  but  pre-' 
scribes  its  principles  "  dogmatically  "  in  the  form  of 
imperatives  to  the  will.  ~  The  will  is  itself  practical 
reason,  and  thus  it  imposes  its  imperatives  upon. 
itself.  The  fundamental  imperative  of  the  practical 
reason  is  stated  by  Kant  in  Appendix  I.  (p.  175): — 
"  Act  so  that  thou  canst  will  that  thy  maxim  should 
be  a  universal  law,  be  the  end  of  thy  action  what 
it  will."  If  the  end  of  perpetual  peace  is  a  duty, 
it  must  be  necessarily  deduced  from  this  general 
law.  And  Kant  does  regard  it  as  a  duty.  "We 
must  desire  perpetual  peace  not  only  as  a  material 
good,  but  also  as  a  state  of  things  resulting  fromr 
our  recognition  of  the  precepts  of  duty "  (loc.  cit.). 
This  is  further  expressed  in  the  maxim  (p.  177): — 
"  Seek  ye  first  the  kingdom  of  pure  practical  reason 
and  its  righteousness,  and  the  object  of  your 
endeavour,  the  blessing  of  perpetual  peace,  will  be 
added  unto  you."  The  distinction  between  the 

X  Preface 

moral  politician  and  the  political  moralist,  which  is 
developed  in  Appendix  I.,  is  an  application  of  the 
general  distinction  between  duty  and  expediency, 
which  is  a  prominent  feature  of  the  Kantian  ethics. 
Methods  of  .expediency,  omitting  all  reference  to 
the  pure  practical  reason,  can  only  bring  about 
re-arrangements  of  circumstances  in  the  mechanical 
course  of  nature.  They  can  never  guarantee  the 
attainment  of  their  end:  they  can  never  make  it 
more  than  a  speculative  ideal,  which  may  or  may 
not  be  practicable.  But  if  the  end  can  be  shown 
to  be  a  duty,  we  have,  from  Kant's  point  of  view, 
the  only  reasonable  ground  for  a  conviction  that 
it  is  realisable.  We  cannot,  indeed,  theoretically 
know  that  it  is  realisable.  "Reason  is  not  suffi- 
ciently enlightened  to  survey  the  series  of  predeter- 
mining causes  which  would  make  it  possible  for 
us  to  predict  with  certainty  the  good  or  bad 
results  of  human  action,  as  they  follow  from  the 
mechanical  laws  of  nature;  although  we  may  hope 
that  things  will  turn  out  as  we  should  desire"  (p. 
163).  On  the  other  hand,  since  the  idea  of  perpetual, 
peace  is  a  moral  ideal,  an  "idea  of  duty  ",  we  are 
-entitled  to  believe  that  it  is  practicable.  -  "Nature 
guarantees  the  coming  of  perpetual  peace,  through 
the  natural  course  of  human  propensities ;  not  indeed 
with  sufficient  certainty  to  enable  us  to  prophesy 
the  future  of  this  ideal  theoretically,  but  yet  clearly 

Preface  x? 

enough  for  practical  purposes  "  (p.  157).  One  might 
extend  this  discussion  indefinitely;  but  what  has 
been  said  may  'suffice  for  general  guidance. 

The  "wise  and  sagacious"  thought  of  Kant  is 
not  expressed  in  a  simple  style,  and  the  translation 
has  consequently  been  a  very  difficult  piece  of 
work.  But  the  translator  has  shown  great  skill  in 
manipulating  the  involutions,  parentheses  and 
prodigious  sentences  of  the  original.  In  this  she  has 
had  the  valuable  help  of  Mr.  David  Morrison,  M.A.r 
who  revised  the  whole  translation  with  the  greatest 
care  and  to  whom  she  owes  the  solution  of  a 
number  of  difficulties.  Her  work  will  have  its 
fitting  reward  if  it  succeeds  in  familiarising  the 
English-speaking  student  of  politics  with  a  political 
essay  of  enduring  value,  written  by  one  of  the 
master  thinkers  of  modern  times. 


University  of  Glasgow,  May  1903. 












PERPETUAL  PEACE -  .  .  l6l 


INDEX 197 


THIS  is  an  age  of  unions.  Not  merely  in  the 
economic  sphere,  in  the  working  world  of  unworthy 
ends  and  few  ideals  do  we  find  great  practical 
organizations;  but  law,  medicine,  science,  art, 
trade,  commerce,  politics  and  political  economy — 
we  might  add  philanthropy — standing  institutions, 
mighty  forces  in  our  social  and  intellectual  life,  all 
have  helped  to  swell  the  number  of  our  nineteenth 
century  Conferences  and  Congresses.-^  It  is  an  age 
of  Peace  Movements  and  Peace  Societies,  of  peace- 
loving  monarchs  and  peace-seeking  diplomats.  This 
is  not  to  say  that  we  are  preparing  for  the  millen- 
nium. Men  are  working  together,  there  is  a  new- 
born solidarity  of  interest,  but  rivalries  between 
nation  and  nation,  the  bitterne^s^  and  hatreds  in- 
separable from  competition  are  not  less  keen;  pre- 
judice and  misunderstanding  not  less  frequent; 
subordinate  conflicting  interests  are  not  fewer,  are 
perhaps,  in  view  of  changing  political  conditions 
and  an  ever-growing  international  commerce,  multi- 
plying with  every  year.  The  talisman  is,  perhaps, 
self-interest,  but,  none  the  less,  the  spirit  of  union  is 
there;  it  is  impossible  to  ignore" a  clearly  marked 


Perpetual  Peace 

tendency  towards  international  federation,  towards 
political  peace.  This  slow  movement  was  not  born 
with  Peace  Societies ;  its  consummation  lies  perhaps 
far  off  in  the  ages  to  come.  History  at  best  moves 
slowly.  But  something  of  its  past  progress  we  shall 
do  well  to  know.  No  political  idea  seems  to  have 
so  great  a  future  before  it  as  this  idea  of  a  fede- 
ration of  the  world.  It  is  bound  to  realise  itself 
some  day ;  let  us  consider  what  are  the  chances  that 
this  day  come  quickly,  what  that  it  be  long  delayed. 
What  obstacles  lie  in  the  way,  and  how  may  they 
be  removed?  What  historical  grounds  have  we  for 
hoping  that  they  may  ever  be  removed?  What, 
in  a.  word,  is  the  origin  and  history  of  the  idea  of 
a  perpetual  peace  between  nations,  and  what  would 
be  the  advantage,  what  is  the  prospect  of  realis- 
ing it? 

The  international  relations  of  states  find  their 
expression,  we  are  told,  in  war  and  peace.  What 
has  been  the  part  played  by  these  great  coun- 
teracting forces  in  the  history  of  nations?  What 
has  it  been  in  pre-historic  times,  in  the  life  of  man 
in  what  is  called  the  "state  of  nature"?  "It  is  no 
easy  enterprise,"  says  Rousseau,  in  more  than 
usually  careful  language,  "  to  disentangle  that  which 
is  original  from  that  which  is  artificial  in  the  actual 
state  of  man,  and  to  make  ourselves  well  acquainted 
with  a  state  which  no  longer  exists,  which  perhaps 

Translator's  Introduction 

never  has  existed  and  which  probably  never  will 
exist  in  the  future."  (Preface  to  the  Discourse  on 
the  Causes  of  Inequality,  1753,  publ.  1754.)  This 
is  a  difficulty  which  Rousseau  surmounts  only  too 
easily.  A  knowledge  of  history,  a"  scientific  spirit 
may  fail  him:  an  imagination  ever  ready  to  pour 
forth  detail  never  does.  Man  lived,  says  he,  "  without 
industry,  without  speech,  without  habitation,  without 
war,  without  connection  of  any  kind,  without  any 
need  of  his  fellows  or  without  any  desire  to  harm 
them  ....  sufficing  to  himself."  *  (Discourse  on  the 
Sciences  and  Arts,  1750.)  Nothing,  we  are  now 
certain,  is  less  probable.  We  cannot  paint  the  life 
of  man  at  this  stage  of  his  development  with  any 
definiteness,  but  the  conclusion  is  forced  upon  us 
that  our  race  had  no  golden  age,  f  no  peaceful 
beginning,  that  this  early  state  was  indeed,  as 

*  For  the  inconsistency  between  the  views  expressed  by  Rousseau 
on  this  subject  in  the  Discourses  and  in  the  Contrat  Social  (Cf.  I. 
Chs.  VI.,  VHL)  see  Ritchie's  Natural  Right,  Ch.  Ill,  pp.  48,  49 ; 
Caird's  essay  on  Rousseau  in  his  Essays  on  Literature  and 
Philosophy,  Vol.1.;  and  Morley's  Rousseau,  Vol.  I.,  Ch.  V.;  Vol. 
II.,  Ch.  XII. 

f  The  theory  that  the  golden  age  -was  identical  with  the  state 
of  nature,  Professor  D.  G.  Ritchie  ascribes  to  Locke  (see  Natural 
Right,  Ch.  H.,  p.  42).  Locke,  he  says,  "has  an  idea  of  a  golden 
age"  existing  even  after  government  has  come  into  existence — a 
time  when  people  did  not  need  "to  examine  the  original  and 
rights  of  government."  \Crutt  Government,  II.,  §  ill.]  A  little 
confusion  on  the  part  of  his  readers  (perhaps  in  his  own  mind) 
makes  it  possible  to  regard  the  state  of  nature  as  itself  the  golden 

Perpetual  Peace 

Hobbes    held,    a   state    of  war,    of  incessant   war 
between  individuals,  families  and,  finally,  tribes. 

The  Early  Conditions  of  Society. 

For  the  barbarian,  war  is  the  rule;  peace  the 
exception.  His  gods,  like  those  of  Greece,  are  war- 
like gods;  his  spirit,  at  death,  flees  to  some  Val- 
halla. For  him  life  is  one  long  battle;  his  arms 
go  with  him  even  to  the  grave.  Food  and  the 
means  of  existence  he  seeks  through  plunder  and 
violence.  Here  right  is  with  might;  the  battle  is 
to  the  strong.  Nature  has  given  all  an  equal  claim 
to  all  things,  but  not  everyone  can  have  them. 
This  state  of  fearful  insecurity  is  bound  to  come 
to  an  end.  "Government,"  says  Locke,  (On  Civil 
Government,  Chap.  VIII.,  §  105)  "is  hardly  to  be 

age,  and  the  way  is  prepared  for  the  favourite  theory  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century: — 

"Nor  think  in  nature's  state  they  blindly  trod; 

The  state  of  nature  was  the  reign  of  God: 

Self-love  and  social  at  her  birth  began, 

Union  the  bond  of  all  things  and  of  man. 

Pride  then  was  not,  nor  arts  that  pride  to  aid} 

Man  walk'd  with  beast,  joint  tenant  of  the  shade; 

The  same  his  table,  and  the  same  his  bed; 

No  murder  cloath'd  him,  and  no  murder  fed." 

[Essay  on  Man,  HI.,  147  seg.] 

In  these  lines  of  Pope's  the  state  of  nature  is  identified  with 
the  golden  age  of  the  Greek  and  Latin  poets;  and  "the  reign  of 
God"  i$  an  equivalent  for  Locke's  words,  "has  a  law  of  nature 
to  govern  it." 

Translator's  Introduction  5 

avoided  amongst  men  that  live  together."  *  A  con- 
stant dread  of  attack  and  a  growing  consciousness 
of  the  necessity  of  presenting  a  united  front  against 
it  result  in  the  choice  of  some  leader — the  head  of 
a  family  perhaps — who  acts,  it  may  be,  only  as  cap- 
tain of  the  hosts,  as  did  Joshua  in  Israel,  or  who 
may  discharge  the  simple  duties  of  a  primitive 
governor  or  king,  f  Peace  within  is  found  to  be 
strength  without  The  civil  state  is  established,  so 
that  "if  there  needs  must  be  war,  it  may  not  yet 

*  Cf.  Republic,  II.  369.  "A  state,"  says  Socrates,  "arises  out 
of  the  needs  of  mankind :  no  one  is  self-sufficing,  but  all  of  us 
have  many  wants." 

t  See  Hume's  account  of  the  origin  of  government  ( Treatise,  III., 
Part  H,  Sect.  VIII.).  There  are,  he  says,  American  tribes  "  where 
men  live  in  concord  and  amity  among  themselves  without  any 
established  government;  and  never  pay  submission  to  any  of  their 
fellows,  except  in  time  of  war,  when  their  captain  enjoys  a  shadow 
of  authority,  which  he  loses  after  their  return  from  the  field,  and 
the  establishment  of  peace  with  the  neighbouring  tribet.  This 
authority,  however,  instructs  them  in  the  advantages  of  govern- 
ment, and  teaches  them  to  have  recourse  to  it,  when  either  by 
the  pillage  of  war,  by  commerce,  or  by  any  fortuitous  inventions, 
their  riches  and  possessions  have  become  so  considerable  as  to 
make  them  forget,  on  every  emergence,  the  interest  they  have 

in  the  preservation  of  peace   and  justice Camps    are   the 

true  mothers  of  cities;  and  as  war  cannot  be  administered,  by 
reason  of  the  suddenness  of  every  exigency,  without  some  autho- 
rity in  a  single  person,  the  same  kind  of  authority  naturally 
takes  place  in  that  civil  government,  which  succeeds  the  military." 
Cf.  Cowper:  The  Winter  Morning  Walk:— 

" .     .          f .  .     .     and  ere  long, 

When  man  was  multiplied  and  spread  abroad 
In  tribes  and  clans,  and  had  begun  to  call 
These  meadows  and  that  range  of  bill*  his  own, 

Perpetual  Peace 

be  against  all  men,  nor  yet  without  some  helps." 
(Hobbes:  On  Liberty,  Chap.  I.,  §  13.)  This  found- 
ation of  the  state  is  the  first  establishment  in 
history  of  a  peace  institution.  It  changes  the  cha- 
racter of  warfare,  it  gives  it  method  and  system; 
but  it  does  not  bring  peace  in  its  train.  We  have 
now,  indeed,  no  longer  a  wholesale  war  of  all 
against  all,  a  constant  irregular  raid  and  plunder 
of  one  individual  by  another;  but  we  have  the 
systematic,  deliberate  war  of  community  against 
community,  of  nation  against  nation.  * 

War  in  Classical  Times. 

In    early    times,    there    were   no    friendly    neigh- 
bouring  nations:   beyond ^the  boundaries  of  every 

The  tasted  sweets  of  property  begat 

Desire  of  more; 

Thus  \vars  began  on  earth.     These  fought  for  spoil, 

And  those  in  self-defence.     Savage  at  first 

The  onset,  and  irregular.     At  length 

One  eminent  above  the  rest,  for  strength, 

For  stratagem,  or  courage,  or  for  all, 

Was  chosen  leader.     Him  they  served  in  war, 

And  him  in  peace  for  sake  of  warlike  deeds 

Rev'renced  no  less   . 

Thus  kings  were  first  invented." 

*  "  Among  uncivilised  nations,  there  is  but  one  profession 
honourable,  that  of  arms.  All  the  ingenuity  and  vigour  of  the 
human  mind  are  exerted  in  acquiring  military  skill  or  address." 
Cf.  Robertson's  History  of  Charles  V.,  (IVcrh,  1813,  vol.  V.)  Sect 
I.  vii. 

Translator's  Introduction 

nation's  territory,  lay  the  land  of  a  deadly  foe. 
This  was  the  way  of  thinking,  even  of  so  highly 
cultured  a  people  as  the  Greeks,  who  believed  that 
a  law  of  nature  had  made  every  outsider,  every 
barbarian  their  inferior  and  their  enemy.  *  Their 
treaties  of  peace,  at  the  time  of  the  Persian  War, 
were  frankly  of  the  kind  denounced  by  Kant,  mere 
armistices  concluded  for  the  purpose  of  renewing 
their  fighting  strength.  The  ancient  world  is  a 
world  of  perpetual  war  in  which  defeat  meant 
annihilation.  In  the  East  no  right  was  recognised 
in  the  enemy;  and  even  in  Greece  and  Rome  the 
fate  of  the  unarmed  was  death  or  slavery,  f  The 

*  Similarly  we  find  that  the  original  meaning  of  the  Latin 
word  "Aosfis"  was  "a  stranger." 

t  In  Aristotle  we  find  the  high-water  mark  of  Greek  thinking 
on  this  subject.  "The  object  of  military  training,"  says  he, 
(Politics,  Bk.  IV.  Ch.  XIV.,  Welldon's  translation — in  older  editions 
Bk.  VII.)  "should  be  not  to  enslave  persons  who  do  not  deserve 
slavery,  but  firstly  to  secure  ourselves  against  becoming  the  slaves 
of  others;  secondly,  to  seek  imperial  power  not  with  a  view  to  a 
universal  despotic  authority,  but  for  the  benefit  of  the  subjects  whom 
we  rule,  and  thirdly,  to  exercise  despotic  power  over  those  who  are 
deserving  to  be  slaves.  That  the  legislator  should  rather  make  it 
his  object  so  to  order  his  legislation  upon  military  and  other 
matters  as  to  promote  leisure  and  peace  is  a  theory  borne  out  by 

the  facts  of  history." (loc.  cit.  Ch.  XV.).  ^War,  as  we 

have  remarked  several  times,  has  its  end  in  peace." 

Aristotle  strongly  condemns  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Cretans  for 
regarding  war  and  conquest  as  the  sole  ends  to  which  all  law  and 
education  should  be  directed.  Also  in  non-Greek  tribes  like  the 
Scythians,  Persians,  Thracians  and  Celts  he  says,  only  military 

8  Perpetual  Peace 

barbaric  or  non-Grecian  states  had,  according  to 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  no  claim  upon  humanity,  no 

power  is  admired  by  the  people  and  encouraged  by  the  state. 
"There  was  formerly  too  a  law  in  Macedonia  that  any  one  who 
had  never  slain  an  enemy  should  wear  the  halter  about  his  neck." 
Among  the  Iberians  too,  a  military  people,  "  it  is  the  custom  to  set 
around  the  tomb  of  a  deceased  warrior  a  number  of  obelisks 

corresponding  to  the  number  of  enemies  he  has  killed 

Yet  .  .  it  may  well  appear  to  be  a  startling  paradox  that  it  should 
be  the  function  of  a  Statesman  to  succeed  in  devising  the  means 
of  rule  and  mastery  over  neighbouring  peoples  whether  with  or 
against  their  own  will.  How  can  such  action  be  worthy  of  a 
statesman  or  legislator,  when  it  has  not  even  the  sanction  of  law  ? " 
(op.  «'/.,  IV.  Ch.  2.) 

We  see  that  Aristotle  disapproves  of  a  glorification  of  war  for 
its  own  sake,  and  regards  it  as  justifiable  only  in  certain  circum- 
stances. Methods  of  warfare  adopted  and^approved  in  the  East 
would  not  have  been  possible  in  Greece/  An  act  of  treachery, 
for  example,  such  as  that  of  Jael,  (Judges  IV.  17)  which  was 
extolled  in  songs  of  praise  by  the  Jews,  (loc.  cit.  V.  24)  the  Greek 
people  would  have  been  inclined  to  repudiate.  The  stories  of 
Roman  history,  the  behaviour  of  Fabricius,  for  instance,  or  Regulus 
and  the  honourable  conduct  of  prisoners  on  various  occasions 
released  on  parole,  show  that  this  consciousness  of  certain  principles 
of  honour  in  warfare  was  still  more  highly  developed  in  Rome. 

Socrates  in  the  Republic  (V.  469,  470)  gives  expression  to  a 
feeling  which  was  gradually  gaining  ground  in  Greece,  that  war 
between  Hellenic  tribes  was  much  more  serious  than  war  between 
Greeks  and  barbarians.  In  such  civil  warfare,  he  considered,  the 
defeated  ought  not  to  be  reduced  to  slavery,  nor  the  slain  despoiled, 
nor  Hellenic  territory  devastated.  For  any  difference  between 
Greek  and  Greek  is  to  "be  regarded  by  them  as  discord  only — a 

quarrel  among  friends,  which  is  not  to  be  called  war" "  Our 

citizens  [*'.*.  in  the  ideal  republic]  should  thus  deal  with  their 
Hellenic  enemies;  and  with  barbarians  as  the  Hellenes  now  deal 
with  one  another."  (V.  471.) 

The  views  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  on  this  and  other  questions 
were  in  advance  of  the  custom  and  practice  of  th«ir  time. 

Translator's  Introduction 

rights   in   fact   of  any   kind.     Among  the  Romans 
things   were    little   better.     According  to  Mr.  T.  J. 
Lawrence  —see  his  Principles  of  International  Law, 
III.,  §§  21,  22— they  were  worse.    For  Rome  stood 
alone    in    the    world :    she   was   bound   by   ties   of 
kinship  to  no  other  state.    She  was,  in  other  words, 
free    from    a    sense    of   obligation   to   other   races. 
War,  according  to  Roman  ideas,  was  made  by  the 
gods,    apart   altogether   from  the  quarrels  of  rulers 
or  races.     To   disobey   the    sacred   command,    ex- 
pressed   in    signs   and    auguries   would   have    been 
to   hold    in   disrespect  the  law  and  religion  of  the 
land.     When,   in   the  hour  of  victory,  the  Romans 
refrained    from    pressing ,  their    rights    against    the 
conquered — rights  recognised  by  all  Roman  jurists — 
it    was    from    no    spirit    of   leniency,    but    in    the 
pursuit  of  a  prudent  and  far-sighted  policy,  aiming 
at   the  growth  of  Roman  supremacy  and  the  esta- 
blishment   of   a    world-embracing   empire,   shutting 
out   all   war    as    it   blotted   out  natural  boundaries, 
reducing    all   rights   to   the   one   right   of  imperial 
citizenship.     There  was  no  real  jus  belli,  even  here 
in   the    cradle  of  international  law ;  the  only  limits 
to   the   fury   of  war  were  of  a  religious  character. 
The   treatment   of  a  defeated  enemy  among  the 
Jews    rested    upon   a   similar   religious   foundation. 
In  the  East,  we  find  a  special  cruelty  in  the  conduct 
of  war.     The  wars  of  the  Jews  and  Assyrians  were 

io  Perpetual  Peace 

wars  of  extermination.  The  whole  of  the  Old 
Testament,  it  has  been  said,  resounds  with  the  clash 
of  arms.  *  "  An  eye  for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a 
tooth!"  was  the  command  of  Jehovah  to  his  chosen 
people.  Vengeance  was  bound  up  in  their  very 
idea  of  the  Creator.  The  Jews,  unlike  the  followers 
of  Mahomet,  attempted,  and  were  commanded  to 
attempt  no  violent  conversion  f ;  they  were  then  too 
weak  a  nation;  but  they  fought,  and  fought  with 
success  against  the  heathen  of  neighbouring  lands, 
the  Lord  of  Hosts  leading  them  forth  to  battle. 
The  God  of  Israel  stood  to  his  chosen  people 
in  a  unique  and  peculiarly  -  .logical  relation.  He 
had  made  a  covenant  with  them;  and,  in  return 
for  their  obedience  and  allegiance,  cared  for  their 
interests  and  advanced  their  national  prosperity. 
The  blood  of  this  elect  people  could  not  be 
suffered  to  intermix  with  that  of  idolaters.  Canaan 
must  be  cleared  of  the  heathen,  on  the  coming 

*  "The  Lord  is  a  man  of  war,"  said  Moses  (Exodus  XV.  3). 
Cf.  Psalms  XXIV.  8.  He  is  "mighty  in  battle." 

f  This  was  bound  up  with  the  very  essence  of  Islam ;  the  devout 
Mussulman  could  suffer  the  existence  of  no  unbeliever.  Tolerance 
or  indifference  was  an  attitude  which  his  faith  made  impossible. 
"When  ye  encounter  the  unbelievers,"  quoth  the  prophet  (Koran, 
ch.  47),  "strike  off  their  heads,  until  ye  have  made  a  great  slaughter 

among  them Verily  if  God  pleased  he  could  take  vengeance 

on  them  without  your  assistance;  but  he  commandeth  you  to  fight 
his  battles." 

The  propagation  of  the  faith  by  the  sword  was  not  only 
commanded  by  the  Mohammedan  religion :  it  was  that  religion  itself. 

Translator's  Introduction  1 1 

of  the  children  of  Israel  to  their  promised  land; 
and  mercy  to  the  conquered  enemy,  even  to 
women,  children  or  animals  was  held  by  the 
Hebrew  prophets  to  be  treachery  to  Jehovah.  (Sam. 
XV.;  Josh.  VI.  21.) 

Hence  the  attitude  of  the  Jews  to  neighbouring 
nations  *  was  still  more  hostile  than  that  of  the 
Greeks.  The  cause  of  this  difference  is  bound  up 
with  the  transition  from  polytheism  to  monotheism. 
The  most  devout  worshipper  of  the  national  gods 
of  ancient  times  could  endure  to  see  other  gods 
than  his  worshipped  in  the  next  town  or  by  a 
neighbouring  nation.  There  was  no  reason  why 
all  should  not  exist  side  by  side.  Religious  conflicts 
in  polytheistic  countries,  when  they  arose,  were  due 
not  to  the  rivalry  of  conflicting  faiths,  but  to  an 
occasional  attempt  to  put  one  god  above  the  others 
in  importance.  There  could  be  no  interest  here  in 
the  propagation  of  belief  through  the  sword.  But, 
under  the  Jews,  these  relations  were  entirely  altered. 
Jehovah,  their  Creator,  became  the  one  invisible 
God.  Such  an  one  can  suffer  no  others  near  him ; 
their  existence  is  a  continual  insult  to  him.  Mono- 
theism is,  in  its  very  nature,  a  religion  of  intolerance. 
Its  spirit  among  the  Jews  was  warlike :  it  commanded 

*  See  Acts  X.  28:—" Ye  know  that  it  is  an  unlawful  thing  for 
a  man  that  is  a  Jew  to  keep  company,  or  come  unto  one  of 
another  nation." 

12  Perpetual  Peace 

•      i   i  i         •!  ..I 

the  subjugation  of  other  nations,  but  its  instrument 
was  rather  extermination  than  conversion. 

The  Attitude  of  Christianity  and  the  Early 
Church  to   War. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  peace  of  nations, 
we  may  say  that  the  Christian  faith,  compared 
with  other  prominent  monotheistic  religious  systems, 
occupies  an  intermediate  position  between  two  ex- 
tremes— the  fanaticism  of  Islam,  and  to  a  less  extent 
of  Judaism,  and  the  relatively  passive  attitude  of 
the  Buddhist  who  thought  himself  bound  to  propa- 
gate his  religion,  but  held  himself  justified  only  in 
the  employment  of  peaceful  means.  Christianity, 
oh  the  other  hand,  contains  no  warlike  principles  : 
it  can  in  no  sense  be  called  a  religion  of  the  sword, 
but  circumstances  gave  the  history  of  the  Church, 
after  the  first  few  centuries  of  its  existence,  a 
character  which  cannot  be  called  peace-loving. 

This  apparent  contradiction  between  the  spirit 
of  the  new  religion  and  its  practical  attitude  to  war 
has  led  to  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
actual  teaching  of  Christ.,  The  New  Testament 
seems,  at  a  superficial  glance,  to  furnish  support 
as  readily  to  the  champions  of  war  as  to  its 
denouncers.  The  Messiah  is  the  Prince  of  Peace 
(/>.  IX.  6,  7 ;  Heb.  VI.),  and  here  lies  the  way  of 

Translator  s  Introduction  13 

righteousness  (Rom.  III.  19):  but  Christ  came  not 
to  bring  peace,  but  a  sword  (Matth.  X.  34).  Such 
statements  may  be  given  the  meaning  which  we 
wish  them  to  bear — the  quoting  of  Scripture  is 
ever  an  unsatisfactory  form  of  evidence;  but  there 
is  no  direct  statement  in  the  New  Testament  in 
favour  of  war,  no  saying  of  Christ  which,  fairly 
interpreted,  could  be  understood  to  regard  this 
proof  of  human  imperfection  as  less  condemnable 
than  any  other.  *  .When  men  shall  be  without  sin, 
nation  shall  rise  up  against  nation  no  more.  But 
man  the  individual  can  attain  peace  only  when 
he  has  overcome  the  world,  when,  in  the  struggle 
with  his  lower  self,  he  has  come  forth  victorious. 
This  is  the  spiritual  sword  which  Christ  brought 
into  the  world —strife,  not  with  the  unbeliever,  but 
with  the  lower  self:  meekness  and  the  spirit  of 
the  Word  of  God  are  the  weapons  with  which  man 
must  fight  for  the  Faith. 

An  elect  people  there  was  no  longer:  Israel 
had  rejected  its  Messiah.  Instead  there  was  a 
complete  brotherhood  of  all  men,  the  bond  and 
the  free,  as  children  of  one  God.  The  aim  of  the 
Church  was  a  world-empire,  bound  together  by 
a  universal  religion.  In  this  sense,  as  sowing 
the  first  seeds  of  a  universal  peace,  we  may  speak 

*  Neither,  however,  is  th«r«  iajr  which  regards  the  soldier  as  * 

14  Perpetual  Peace 

of  Christianity  as  a  re-establishment  of  peace  among 

The  later  attitude  of  Christians  to  war,  however, 
by  no  means  corresponds  to  the  earliest  tenets  of 
the  Church.  Without  doubt,  certain  sects,  from 
the  beginning  of  our  era  and  through  the  ages  up 
to  the  present  time,  held,  like  the  Mennonites  and 
Quakers  in  our  day,  that  the  divine  command, 
"Love  your  enemies,"  could  not  be  reconciled 
with  the  profession  of  a  soldier.  The  early  Chris- 
tians were  reproached  under  the  Roman  Emperors, 
before  the  time  of  Constautine,  with  avoiding  the 
citizen's  duty  of  military  service.  *  "  To  those 
enemies  of  our  faith,' Vv  wrote  Origen  (Contra 
Celsum,  VIII.,  Ch.  LXXIIL,  Anti-Nicene  Christian 
Library),  "  who  require  us  to  bear  arms  for  the 
commonwealth,  and  to  slay  men,  we  can  reply : 
'Do  not  those  who  are  priests  at  certain  shrines, 
and  those  who  attend  on  certain  gods,  as  you 
account  them,  keep  their  hands  free  from  blood, 
that  they  may  with  hands  unstained  and  free  from 
human  blood  offer  the  appointed  sacrifices  to  your 

*  In  the  early  centuries  of  our  era  Christians  seem  to  have 
occasionally  refused  to  serve  in  the  army  from  religious  scruples. 
But  soldiers  were  not  always  required  to  change  their  profession 
after  baptism.  And  in  Acts  X.,  for  example,  nothing  is  said  to 
indicate  that  the  centurion,  Cornelius,  would  have  to  leave  the 
Roman  army.  See  TertUllian :  Dt  Corona  (Anti-Nicene  Christian 
Library),  p.  348, 

Translator  s  Introduction 

gods;  and  even  when  war  is  upon  you,  you  never 
enlist  the  priests  in  the  army.  If  that,  then,  is  a 
laudable  custom,  how  much  more  so,  that  while 
others  are  engaged  in  battle,  these  too  should 
engage  as  the  priests  and  ministers  of  God,  keeping 
their  hands  pure,  and  wrestling  in  prayers  to  God 
on  behalf  of  those  who  are  fighting  in  a  righteous 
cause,  and  for  the  king  who  reigns  righteously, 
that  whatever  is  opposed  to  those  who  act  right- 
eously may  be  destroyed  1'  ....  And  we  do  take 
our  part  in  public  affairs,  when  along  with  righteous 
prayers  we  join  self-denying  exercises  and  medita- 
tions, which  teach  us  to  despise  pleasures,  and  not 
to  be  led  away  by  them.  And  none  fight  better  for 
the  king  than  we  do.  We  do  not  indeed  fight 
under  him,  although  he  require  it;  but  we  fight 
on  his  behalf,  forming  a  special  army — an  army  of 
piety — by  offering  our  prayers  to  God."  The  Fathers 
of  the  Church,  Justin  Martyr,  Clement  of  Alexandria, 
Tertullian,  Ambrose  and  the  rest  gave  the  same 
testimony  against  war.  The  pagan  rites  connected 
with  the  taking  of  the  military  oath  had  no  doubt 
some  influence  in  determining  the  feeling  of  the 
pious  with  regard  tox  this  life  of  bloodshed;  but 
the  reasons  lay  deeper.  "  Shall  it  be  held  lawful," 
asked  Tertullian,  (De  Corona,  p.  347)  "to  make 
an  occupation  of  the  sword,  when  the  Lord 
proclaims  that  he  who  uses  the  sword  shall  perish 

1 6  Perpetual  Peace 

by  the  sword?  And  shall  the  son  of  peace  take 
part  in  the  battle  when  it  does  not  become 
him  even  to  sue  at  law?  And  shall  he  apply 
the  chain,  and  the  prison,  and  the  torture,  and  the 
punishment,  who  is  not  the  avenger  even  of  his 
own  wrongs?" 

The  doctrine  of  the  Church  developed  early  in 
the  opposite  direction.  It  was  its  righting  spirit 
and  not  a  love  of  peace  that  made  Christianity  a 
state  religion  under  Constantine.  Nor  was  Augustine 
the  first  of  the  Church  Fathers  to  regard  military 
service  as  permissible,  j  To  come  to  a  later  time, 
this  change  of  attitude  has  been  ascribed  partly  to 
the  rise  of  Mahometan  power  and  the  wave  of 
fanaticism  which  broke  over  Europe.  To  destroy 
these  unbelievers  with  fire  and  sword  was  regarded 
as  a  deed  of  piety  pleasing  to  God.  Hence  the 
wars  of  the  Crusades  against  the  infidel  were  holy 
wars,  and  appear  as  a  new  element  in  the  history 
of  civilisation.  The  nations  of  ancient  times  had 
known  only  civil  and  foreign  war.  *  They  had 
rebelled  at  home,  and  they  had  fought  mainly  for 
material  interests  abroad.  In  the  Middle  Ages  there 
were,  besides,  religious  wars  and,  with  the  rise  of 

*  There  were  so-called  "Sacred  Wars"  in  Greece,  but  these 
were  due  mainly  to  disputes  caused  by  the  Amphictyonic  League. 
They  were  not  religious,  in  the  sense  in  which  we  apply  the 
epithet  to  the  Thirty  Years1  war. 

Translator's  Introduction  17 

Feudalism,  private  war:  *  among  all  the  powers  of 
the  Dark  Ages  and  for  centuries  later,  none  was 
more  aggressive  than  the  Catholic  Church,  nor 
a  more  active  and  untiring  defender  of  its  rights 
and  claims,  spiritual  or  temporal.  It  was  in  some 
respects  a  more  warlike  institution  than  the  states 
of  Greece  and  Rome.  It  struggled  through  centuries 
with  the  Emperor  :  f  it  pronounced  its  ban  against 
disobedient  states  and  disloyal  cities:  it  pursued 
with  its  vengeance  each  heretical  or  rebellious 
prince:  unmindful  of  its  early  traditions  about 
peace,  it  showed  in  every  crisis  a  fiercely  military 
spirit.  § 

For   more    than    a  thousand   years  the    Church 

*  "The  administration  of  justice  among  rude  illiterate  people, 
was  not  so  accurate,  or  decisive,  or  uniform,  as  to  induce  men  to 
submit  implicitly  to  its  determinations.  Every  offended  baron 
buckled  on  his  armour,  and  sought  redress  at  the  head  of  his 
vassals.  His  adversary  met  him  in  like  hostile  array.  Neither  of 
them  appealed  to  impotent  laws  which  could  afford  them  no 
protection.  Neither  of  them  would  submit  points,  in  which  their 
honour  and  their  passions  were  warmly  interested,  to  the  slow 
determination  of  a  judicial  inquiry.  Both  trusted  to  their  swords 
for  the  decision  of  the  contest."  Robertson's  History  of  Charhs  V.t 
(Works,  vol.  V.)  Sect.  I.,  p.  38. 

t  Erasmus  in  the  "'IxdvoQocyiac  "  (Colloquies,  Bailey's  ed.,  Vol. 
II.,  pp.  55,  56)  puts  forward  the  suggestion  that  a  gentral  peace 
might  be  obtained  in  the  Christian  world,  if  the  Emperor  would 
remit  something  of  his  right  and  the  Pope  some  part  of  his. 

§  Cf.  Robertson,  op.  cit.,  Sect.  III.,  p.  106,  sey. 

1 8  Perpetual  Peace 

counted  fighting  clergy  *  among  its  most  active 
supporters.  This  strange  anomaly  was,  it  must  be 
said,  at  first  rather  suffered  in  deference  to  public 
opinion  than  encouraged  by  ecclesiastical  canons 
and  councils,  but  it  gave  rise  to  great  discontent 
at  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  f  The  whole 
question  of  the  lawfulness  of  military  service  for 
Christians  was  then  raised  again.  "If  there  be 
anything  in  the  affairs  of  mortals,"  wrote  Erasmus 
at  this  time  (Opera,  lI.,._Pr0v.,  951  C)  "which  it 

*  Robertson  (op.  cit.,  Note  XXI.,  p.  483)  quotes  the  following 
statement:  "flamma,  ferro,  caede,  possessiones  ecclesiarum  praelati 
defendebant."  (Guido  Abbas  ap.  Du  Cange,  p.  179.)  -  , 

f  J.  A.  Farrar,  in  a  pamphlet,  (reprinted  from  the  Gentleman's 
Magazine,  vol.  257,  1884)  on  War  and  Christianity,  quotes  the 
following  passage  from  Wycliffe  in  which  he  protests  against  this 
blot  upon  the  Church  and  Christian  professions.—  "Frian  now  say 
that  bishops  can  fight  best  of  all  men,  and  that  it  falleth  most 
properly  to  them,  since  they  are  lords  of  all  this  world.  They  say 
Christ  bade  His  disciples  sell  their  coats,  and  buy  them  swords;  but 
whereto,  if  not  to  fight?  Thus  friars  make  a  great  array,  and  stir 
up  many  men  to  fight.  But  Christ  taught  not  His  apostles  to  fight 
with  a  sword  of  iron,  but  with  the  sword  of  God's  Word,  and 
which  standeth  in  meekness  of  heart  and  in  the  prudence  of  man's 

tongue If  man-slaying  in  others  be  odious  to  God,  much 

more  in  priests,  who  should  be  vicars  of  Christ."  See  also  the 
passage  where  Erasmus  points  out  that  King  David  was  not  per- 
mitted to  build  a  temple  to  God,  because  he  was  a  man  of  blood. 
M  Nolo  clericos  ullo  sanguine  contaminari.  Gravis  impietas ! " 
(Opera,  IX.,  370  B.) 

This  question  had  already  been  considered  by  Thomas  Aquinas, 
who  decided  that  the  clergy  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  fight, 
because  the  practices  of  warfare,  although  right  amd  meritorious 
in  themselves,  were  not  in  accordance  with  a  holy  calling.  (Summa, 
II.  2:  Qu.  40.) 

Translator  s  Introduction  19 

becomes  us  deliberately  to  attack,  which  we  ought 
indeed  to  shun  by  every  possible  means,  to 
avert  and  to  abolish,  it  is  certainly  war,  than  which 
there  is  nothing  more  wicked,  more  mischievous  or 
more  widely  destructive  in  its  effects,  nothing 
harder  to  be  rid  of,  or  more  horrible  and,  in  a  word, 
more  unworthy  of  a  man,  not  to  say  of  a  Chris- 
tian." *  The  mediaeval  Church  indeed  succeeded, 
by  the  establishment  of  such  institutions  as  the 
Truce  of  God,  in  setting  some  limits  to  the  fury 
of  the  soldier:  but  its  endeavours  (and  it  made 
several  to  promote  peace)  f  were  only  to  a  trifling 
extent  successful.  Perhaps  custom  and  public 
opinion  in  feudal  Europe  were  too  strong,  perhaps 
the  Church  showed  a  certain  apathy  in  denouncing 
the  evils  of  a  military  society:  no  doubt  the 
theoretical  tenets  of  its  doctrine  did  less  to  hinder 
war  than  its  own  strongly  military  tendency,  its 

Aquinas  held  that  war — excluding  private  war — is  justifiable  in 
a  just  cause.  So  too  did  Luther,  (cf.  his  pamphlet :  Ob  Kriegsleule 
auch  in  seligem  Standc  sein  konnen  .•>)  Calvin  and  Zwingli,  the  last 
of  whom  died  sword  iu  hand. 

With  regard  to  the  question  of  a  fighting  clergy,  the  passage 
quoted  from  Origen  (pp.  14,  15,  above)  has  considerable  interest, 
Origen  looks  upon  the  active  participation  of  priests  in  warfare  as 
something  which  everyone  would  admit  to  be  impossible. 

*  See  also  the  Querela  Pads,  630  B.,  (Opera,  IV.) :~"  Whosoever 
preaches  Christ,  preaches  peace."  Erasmus  even  goes  th«  length 
of  saying  that  the  most  iniquitious  peace  is  better  than  the  most 
just  war  (op.  dt,t  636  C). 

t  Cf.  Robertson,  op.  cit.,  Note  XXI.  p.  483  and  Sect.  I.,  p.  39. 

2O  Perpetual  Peace 

lust  for  power  and  the  force  of  its  example  did  to 
encourage  it. 

Hence,  in  spite  of  Christianity  and  its  early 
vision  of  a  brotherhood  of  men,  the  history  of  the 
Middle  Ages  came  nearer  to  a  realization  of 
the  idea  of  perpetual  war  than  was  possible  in 
ancient  times.  The  tendency  of  the  growth  of 
Roman  supremacy  was  to  diminish  the  number 
of  wars,  along  with  the  number  of  possible  causes 
of  racial  friction.  It  united  many  nations  in  one 
great  whole,  and  gave  them,  to  a  certain  extent, 
a  common  culture  and  common  interests;  even, 
when  this  seemed  prudent,  a  common  right  of 
citizenship.  The  fewer  the  number  of  boundaries, 
the  less  the  likelihood  of  war.4  The  establishment 
of  great  empires  is  of  necessity  a  force,  and  a 
great  and  permanent  force  working  on  the  side 
of  peace.  With  the  fall  of  Rome  this  guarantee 
was  removed. 

The  Development  of  the  New  Science  of 
International  Law. 


Out  of  the  ruins  of  the  old  feudal  system  arose 
the  modern  state  as  a  free  independent  unity. 
Private  war  between  individuals  or  classes  of  society 
was  now  branded  as  a  breach  of  the  peace:  it 
became  the  exclusive  right  of  kings  to  appeal  to 

Translator  s  Introduction  21 

force.  War,  wrote  Gentilis  *  towards  the  end  of 
sixteenth  century,  is  the  just  or  unjust  conflict 
between  states.  Peace  was  now  regarded  as  the 
normal  condition  of  society.  As  a  result  of  these 
great  developments  in  which  the  name  "state" 
acquired  new  meaning,  jurisprudence  freed  itself 
from  the  trammelling  conditions  of  mediaeval 
Scholasticism.  Men  began  to  consider  the  problem 
of  the  rightfulness  or  wrongfulness  of  war,  to 
question  even  the  possibility  of  a  war  on  rightful 
grounds.  Out  of  these^new  ideas — partly  too  as 
one  of  the  fruits  of  the  Reformation,  f — arose 
the  first  consciously  formulated  principles  of  the 
science  of  international  law,  whose  fuller,  but 
not  yet  complete,  development  belongs  to  modern 

From  the  beginning  of  history  every  age,  every 

*  It  is  uncertain  in  what  year  the  De  Jure  Belli  of  Gentilis  was 
published — a  work  to  which  Grotius  acknowledges  considerable 
indebtedness.  Whewell,  in  the  preface  to  his  translation  of  Grotius, 
gives  the  date  1598,  but  some  writers  suppose  it  to  have  been  ten 
years  earlier.  ; 

f  This  came  about  in  two  ways.  The  Church  of  Rome  discouraged 
the  growth  of  national  sentiment.  At  the  Reformation  the  indepen- 
dence and  unity  of  the  different  nations  were  for  the  first  time 
recognised.  That  is  to  say,  the  Reformation  laid  the  foundation 
for  a  science  of  international  law.  But,  from  another  point  of 
view,  it  not  only  made  such  a  code  of  rules  possible,  it  made  it 
necessary.  The  effect  of  the  Reformation  was  not  to  diminish  the 
number  of  wars  in  which  religious  belief  could  play  a  part. 
Moreover,  it  displaced  the  Pope  from  his  former  position  as  arbiter 
in  Europe  without  setting  up  any  judicial  tribunal  in  his  itead.  • 

22  Perpetual  Peace 

people  has  something  to  show  here,  be  it  only  a 
rudimentary  sense  of  justice  in  their  dealings  with 
one  another.  We  may  instance  the  Amphictyonic 
League  in  Greece  which,  while  it  had  a  merely 
Hellenic  basis  and  was  mainly  a  religious  survival, 
shows  the  germ  of  some  attempt  at  arbitration 
between  Greek  states.  Among  the  Romans  we 
have  the  jus  feciale  *  and  the  jus  gentium^  as 
distinguished  from  the  civil  law  of  Rome,  and 
certain  military  regulations  about  the  taking  of 
booty  in  war.  Ambassadors  were  held  inviolate 

*  Cf.  Cicero :  De  OJficiis,  I.  xC'"  Belli  quidem  aequitas  sanctissime 
feciali  populi  Romani  jure  perscripta  est."  (See  th«  reference  to 
Lawrence's  comments  on  this  subject,  p.  9  above.) 

"Wars,"  says  Cicero,  "are  to  be  undertaken  for  this  end,  that 
we  may  live  in  peace  without  being  injured;  but  when  we  obtain 
the  victory,  wo  must  preserve  those  enemies  who  behaved  without 
cruelty  or  inhumanity  during  the  war:  for  example,  our  forefathers 
received,  even  as  members  of  their  state,  the  Tuscans,  the  ^iqui, 
the  Volscians,  the  Sabines  and  the  Hernici,  but  utterly  destroyed 

Carthage  and  Numantia And,  while  we  are  bound  to 

exercise  consideration  toward  those  whom  we  have  conquered  by 
force,  so  those  should  be  received  into  our  protection  who  throw 
themselves  upon  the  honour  of  our  general,  and  lay  down  their 

arms,"  (op.  cif.t  I.  xi.,  Bonn's  Translation) "In  engaging 

in  war  we  ought  to  make  it  appear  that  we  have  no  other  view 
but  peace."  (op.  cit.,  I.  xxiii.)  ^ 

In  fulfilling  a  treaty  we  muwS  not  sacrifice  the  spirit  to  the  letter 
(De  Ojficiis,  I.  x).  "There  are  also  rights  of  war,  and  the  faith 
of  an  oath  is  often  to  be  kept  with  an  enemy."  (pp.  cit.,  III.  xxix.) 

This  is  the  first  statement  by  a  classical  writer  in  which  the 
idea  of  justice  being  due  to  an  enemy  appears.  Cicero  goes 
further.  Particular  states,  he  says,  {De  Legibus,  I.  i.)  are  only 
members  of  a  whole  governed  by  reasop, 

Translator's  Introduction  23 

in  both  countries;  the  formal  declaration  of  war 
was  never  omitted.  Many  Roman  writers  held  the 
necessity  of  a  just  cause  for  war.  But  nowhere  do 
these  considerations  form  the  subject  matter  of  a 
special  science. 

In  the  Middle  Ages  the  development  of  these 
ideas  received  little  encouragement.  All  laws  are 
silent  in  the  time  of  war,  *  and  this  was  a  period 
of  war,  both  bloody  and  constant.  There  was  no 
time  to  think  of  the  right  or  wrong  of  anything, 
Moreover,  the  Church  emphasised  the  lack  of  rights 
in  unbelievers,  and  gave  her  blessing  on  their  an- 
nihilation, f  The  whple  Christian  world  was  filled 
with  the  idea  of  a '-spiritual  universal  monarchy. 
Not  such  as  that  in  the  minds  of  Greek  and  Jew 
and  Roman  who  had  been  able  to  picture  interna- 
tional peace  only  under  the  form  of  a  great  national 
and  exclusive  empire.  In  this  great  Christian  state 
there  were  to  be  no  distinctions  between  nations; 
its  sphere  was  bounded  by  the  universe.  But, 
here,  there  was  no  room  or  recognition  for  inde- 
pendent national  states  with  equal  and  personal 

rights.     This   recognition,    opposed  by  the  Roman 


*  The  saying  is  attributed  to  Pompey: — "Shall  I,  when  I  am 
preparing  for  war,  think  of  the  laws?" 

t  This  implied,  however,  the  idea  of  a  united  Christendom  as 
against  the  infidel,  with  which  we  maj  compare  the  idea  of  a 
united  Hellas  against  Persia.  In  such  things  we  have  the  germ 
not  only  of  international  law,  but  of  the  ideal  of  federation. 

24  Perpetual  Peace 

Church,  is  th«  real  basis  of  international  law. 
The  Reformation  was  the  means  by  which  the 
personality  of  the  peoples,  the  unity  and  indepen- 
dence of  the  state  were  first  openly  admitted.  On 
this  foundation,  mainly  at  first  in  Protestant  coun- 
tries, the  new  science  developed  rapidly.  Like  the 
civil  state  and  the  Christian  religion,  international 
law  may  be  called  a  peace  institution. 

GrotiuS)  Puffendorf  and  Vattel. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
Grotius  laid  the  foundations  of  a  code  of  universal 
law  (Dt  Jure  Belli  ft  Pads,  1625)  independent  of 
differences  of  religion,  in  the  hope  that  its  recog- 
nition might  simplify  the  intercourse  between  the 
newly  formed  nations.  The  primary  object  of  this 
great  work,  written  during  the  misery  and  horrors 
of  the  Thirty  Years'  war,  was  expressly  to  draw 
attention  to  these  evils  and  suggest  some  methods 
by  which  the  severity  of  warfare  might  be  miti- 
gated. Grotius  originally  meant  to  explain  only  one 
chapter  of  the  law  of  nations :  *  his  book  was  to 

*  See  Maine's  Ancient  Law,  pp.  50 — 53:  pp.  96 — 101.  Grotius 
wrongly  understood  "Jus  Gentium,"  ("a  collection  of  rules 
and  principles,  determined  by  observation  to  be  common  to  the 
institutions  which  prevailed  among  the  various  Italian  tribes")  to 
mean  "Jus  inter  gentes."  The  Roman  expression  for  International 
Law  was  not  "Jus  Gentium,"  but  "Jus  Feciale." 

"Having  adopted  from  the  Antonine  jurisconsults/'  says  Maine, 

Translator  s  Introduction 

be  called  De  Jure  Belli,  but  there  is  scarcely  any 
subject  of  international  law  which  he  leaves  un- 
touched. He  obtained,  moreover,  a  general  recog- 
nition for  the  doctrine  of  the  Law  of  Nature  which 
exerted  so  strong  an  influence  upon  succeeding 
centuries;  indeed,  between  these  two  sciences,  as 
between  international  law  and  ethics,  he  draws 
no  very  sharp  line  of  demarcation,  although,  on 
the  whole,  in  spite  of  an  unscientific,  scholastic  use 

of  quotation  from  authorities,  his  treatment  of  the 


"the  position  that  the  Jus  Gentium  and  the  Jus  Naturae  were  identical, 
Grotius,  with  his  immediate  predecessors  and  his  immediate  successors, 
attributed  to  the  Law  of  Nature  an  authority  which  would  never 
perhaps  have  been  claimed  for  it,  if  "Law  of  Nations"  had  not 
in  that  age  been  an  ambiguous  expression.  They  laid  down 
unresenredly  that  Natural  Law  is  the  code  of  states,  and  thus  put 
in  operation  a  process  which  has  continued  almost  down  to  our 
own  day,  the  process  of  engrafting  on  the  international  system 
rules  which  are  supposed  to  have  been  evolve  1  from  the  unassisted 
contemplation  of  the  conception  of  Nature.  There  is,  too,  one 
consequence  of  immense  practical  importance  to  mankind  which, 
though  not  unknown  during  the  early  modern  history  of  Europe, 
was  never  clearly  or  universally  acknowledged  till  the  doctrines 
of  the  Grotian  school  had  prevailed.  If  the  society  of  nations 
is  governed  by  Natural  Law,  the  atoms  which  compose  it  must  be 
absolutely  equal.  Men  under  the  sceptre  of  Nature  are  all  equal,  and 
accordingly  commonwealths  are  equal  if  the  international  state  be 
one  of  nature.  The  proposition  that  independent  communities, 
however  different  in  size  and  power,  are  all  equal  in  the  view  of 
the  Law  of  Nations,  has  largely  contributed  to  the  happiness  of 
mankind,  though  it  is  constantly  threatened  by  the  political  tendencie* 
of  each  successive  age.  It  is  a  doctrine  which  probably  would  never 
have  obtained  a  secure  footing  at  all  if  International  Law  had 
not  been  entirely  derived  from  the  majestic  claims  of  Nature  by  the 
Publicists  who  wrote  after  the  revival  of  letters."  (Of.  cit.,  p.  100.) 

26  Perpetual  Peace 

new  field  is  clear  and  comprehensive.  Grotius  made 
the  attempt  to  set  up  an  ethical  principle  of  right, 
in  the  stead  of  such  doctrines  of  self-interest  as 
had  been  held  by  many  of  the  ancient  writers. 
There  was  a  law,  he  held,  established  in  each  state 
purely  with  a  view  to  the  interests  of  that  state, 
but,  besides  this,  there  was  another  higher  law  in 
the  interest  of  the  whole  society  of  nations.  Its 
origin  was  divine;  the  reason  of  man  commanded 
his  obedience.  This  was  what  we  call  international 

Grotius  distinctly  holds,  like  Kant  and  Rousseau, 
and  unlike  Hobbes,  that  the  state  can  never  be 
regarded  as  a  unity  or  institution  separable  from 
the  people;  the  terms  civitas^  communitas,  coetus, 
populus,  he  uses  indiscriminately.  But  these  na- 
tions, these  independent  units  of  society  cannot  live 
together  side  by  side  just  as  they  like  ;  they  must 
recognise  one  another  as  members  of  a  European 
society  of  states,  f  Law,  he  said,  stands  above 
force  even  in  war,  "which  may  only  be  begun  to 
pursue  the  right;"  and  the  beginning  and  manner 
of  conduct  of  war  rests  on  fixed  laws  and  can  be 

justified   only   in   certain  cases.     War  is  not  to  be 


*  The  name  "  International  Law ''  was  first  given  to  the  law  of 
nations  by  Bentham.  (Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation  t  XIX,  §  xxv.; 

t  In  the  Peace  of  WestphaMa,    1648,  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe  was  recognised  on  the  basis  of  terms  such  as  these. 

Translator's  Introduction  27 

done  away  with :  Grotius  accepts  it  as  fact,  *  (as 
Hobbes  did  later)  as  the  natural  method  for  set- 
tling the  disputes  which  were  bound  constantly  to 
arise  between  so  many  independent  and  sovereign 
nations.  A  terrible  scourge  it  must  ever  remain, 
but  as  the  only  available  form  of  legal  procedure, 
it  is  sanctioned  by  the  practice  of  states  and  not 
less  by  the  law  of  nature  and  of  nations.  Grotius 
did  not  advance  beyond  this  position.  Every  vio- 
lation of  the  law  of  nations  can  be  settled  but  in 
one  way — by  war,  the  force  of  the  stronger. 

The  necessary  distinction  between  law  and  ethics 
was  drawn  by  Puffendorf,  f  a  successor  of  Grotius 
who  gave  an  outwardly  systematic  form  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  great  jurist,  without  adding  to  it 

*  Grotius,  however,  is  a  painstaking  student  of  Scripture,  and  is 
willing  to  say  something  in  favour  of  peace — not  a  permanent  peace, 
that  is  to  say,  the  idea  of  which  would  scarcely  be  likely  to  occur 
to  anyone  in  the  early  years  of  the  seventeenth  century — but  a 
plea  for  fewer,  shorter  wars.  "If  therefore,"  he  says,  "a  peace 
sufficiently  safe  can  be  had,  it  is  not  ill  secured  by  the  condonation 
of  offenses,  and  damages,  and  expenses:  especially  among  Christians, 
to  whom  the  Lord  has  given  his  peace  as  his  legacy.  And  so 
St.  Paul,  his  best  interpreter,  exhorts  us  to  live  at  peace  with  all 
men.  .  .  .  May  God  write  these  lessons — He  who  alone  can — on 
the  hearts  of  all  those  who  have  the  affairs  of  Christendom  in 
their  bands."  (De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads,  III.  Ch.  XXV.,  Whewell's 

See  also  op.  ft/.,  II.,  Ch.  XXIII.,  Sect.  VIII,  where  Grotius 
recommends  t'hat  Congresses  of  Christian  Powers  should  be  held 
with  a  view  to  the  peaceful  settlement  of  international  differences. 

t  Puffendorfs  best  known  work,  De  Jure  Natura  et  Gentium^ 
was  published  in  1672. 

2$  Perpetual  Peace 

either  ttrength  or  completeness.  Hii  views,  when 
they  were  not  based  upon  the  system  of  Grotius, 
were  strongly  influenced  by  the  speculation  of 
Hobbes,  his  chronological  predecessor,  to  whom  we 
shall  have  later  occasion  to  refer.  In  the  works 
of  Vattel,  *  who  was,  next  to  Rousseau,  the  most 
celebrated  of  Swiss  publicists,  we  find  the  theory 
of  the  customs  and  practice  in  war  widely  devel- 
oped, and  the  necessity  for  humanising  its  methods 
and  limiting  its  destructive  effects  upon  neutral 
countries  strongly  emphasised.  Grotius  and  Puffen- 
dorf,  while  they  recommend  'acts  of  mercy,  hold 
that  there  is  legally  no  right  which  requires  that 
a  conquered  enemy  shall  be  spared.  This  is  a 
matter  of  humanity  alone.  It  is  to  the  praise  of 
Vattel  that  he  did  much  to  popularise  among  the 
highest  and  most  powerful  classes  of  society,  ideas 
of  humanity  in  warfare,  and  of  the  rights  and  obliga- 
tions of  nations.  He  is,  moreover,  the  first  to  make 
a  clear  separation  between  this  science  and  the 
Law  of  Nature.  What,  he  asks,  is  international  law 
as  distinguished  from  the  Law  of  Nature?  What 
are  the  powers  of  a  state^and  the  duties  of  nations 
to  one  another?  What  are  the  causes  of  quarrel 
among  nations,  and  what  the  means  by  which  they 
can  be  settled  without  any  sacrifice  of  dignity? 

*  Le  Droit  des  Gens  was  published  in  1758  and  translated  into 
English  by  Joseph  Chitty  in  1797,  (2nd  ed 

Translator's  Introduction  29 

They  are,  in  the  first  place,  a  friendly  conciliatory 
attitude;  and  secondly,  such  means  of  settlement 
as  mediation,  arbitration  and  Peace  Congresses. 
These  are  the  refuges  of  a  peace-loving  nation,  in 
cases  where  vital  interests  are  not  at  stake.  "Nature 
gives  us  no  right  to  use  force,  except  where  mild 
and  conciliatory  measures  are  useless."  (Law  of 
Nations,  II.  Ch.  xviii.  §331.)  "  Every  power  owes 
it  in  this  matter  to  the  happiness  of  human  society 
to  show  itself  ready  for  every  means  of  recon- 
ciliation, in  cases  where  the  interests  at  stake  are 
neither  vital  nor  important."  (ibid.  §  332.)  At 
the  same  time,  it  is  never  advisable  that  a  Ration 
should  forgive  an  insult  which  it  hai  not  the  power 
to  resent. 

The  Dream  of  a  Perpetual  Peace. 

But  side  by  side  with  this  development  and 
gradual  popularisation  of  the  new  science  of  Inter- 
national Law,  ideas  of  a  less  practical,  but  not  less 
fruitful  kind  had  been  steadily  making  their  way 
and  obtaining  a  strong  hold  upon  the  popular 
mind.  The  Decree  of  Eternal  Pacification  of  1495 
had  abolished  private  war,  one  of  the  heavy  curses 
of  the  Middle  Ages.  ^Why  should  it  not  be  ex- 
tended to  banish  warfare  between  states  as  well? 
Gradually  one  proposal  after  another  was  made 

30  Perpetual  Peace 

to  attain  this  end,  or,  at  least,  to  smooth  the  way 
for  its  future  realisation.  The  first  of  these  in 
point  of  time  is  to  be  found  in  a  somewhat  bare, 
vague  form  in  Sully's  Memoirs,  *  said  to  have  been 
published  in  1634.  Haifa  century  later  the  Quaker 
William  Penn  suggested  an  international  tribunal 
of  arbitration  in  the  interests  of  peace,  f  But  it 
was  by  the  French  Abbe"  St.  Pierre  that  the  problem 
of  perpetual  peace  was  fairly  introduced  into 
political  literature:  and  this,  in  an  age  of  cabinet 
and  dynastic  wars,  while  the  dreary  cost  of  the 
war  of  the  Spanish  succession  was  yet  unpaid. 
St.  Pierre  was  the  first  who  really  clearly  realised 
and  endeavoured  to  prove  that  the  establishment 
of  a  permanent  state  of  peace  is  not  only  in  the 
interest  of  the  weaker,  but  is  required  by  the 
European  society  of  nations  and  by  the  reason  of 
man.  From  the  beginning  of  the  history  of  humanity, 
poets  and  prophets  had  cherished  the  "  sweet 
dream "  of  a  peaceful  civilisation :  it  is  in  the  form 
of  a  practical  project  that  this  idea  is  new. 

The   ancient  world   actually  represented  a  state 

*  Memoires  ou  (Economies  Royales  D'Estat,  Domestiques ,  Politiques 
ft  Alililaires  de  Henri  le  Grand,  par  Maximilian  de  Bethune,  Due 
de  Sully. 

f  See  International  Tribunals  (1899),  p.  20  seq.  Penn's  Essay 
towards  the  Present  and  Future  Peace  of  Ettrope  was  written  about 
1693,  but  is  not  included  in  all  editions  of  bis  works. 

Translators  Introduction  31 

of  what  was  almost  perpetual  war.  This  was  the 
reality  which  confronted  man,  his  inevitable  doom, 
it  seemed,  as  it  had  been  pronounced  to  the  fallen 
sinners  of  Eden.  Peace  was  something  which  man 
had  enjoyed  once,  but  forfeited.  The  myth-  and 
poetry-loving  Greeks,  and,  later,  the  poets  of  Rome 
delighted  to  paint  a  state  of  eternal  peace,  not  as 
something  to  whose  coming  they  could  look  forward 
in  the  future,  but  as  a  golden  age  of  purity  whose 
records  lay  buried  in  the  past,  a  paradise  which 
had  been,  but  which  was  no  more.  Voices,  more 
scientific,  were  raised  even  in  Greece  in  attempts, 
such  as  Aristotle's,  to  show  that  the  evolution  of 
man  had  been  not  a  course  of  degeneration  from 
perfection,  but  of  continual  progress  upwards  from 
barbarism  to  civilisation  <•-  and  culture.  But  the 
change  in  popular  thinking  on  this  matter  was  due 
less  to  the  arguments  of  philosophy  than  to  a 
practical  experience  of  the  causes  which  operate 
in  the  interests  of  peace.  The  foundation  of  a 
universal  empire  under  Alexander  the  Great  gave 
temporary  rest  to  nations  heretofore  incessantly 
at  war.  Here  was  a  proof  that  the  Divine  Will 
had  not  decreed  that  man  was  to  work  out  his 
punishment  under  unchanging  conditions  of  perpetual 
warfare.  This  idea  of  a  universal  empire  became 
the  Greek  ideal  of  a  perpetual  peace.  Such  aa 
empire  was,  in  the  language  of  th«  Stoics,  a  world- 

32  Perpetual  Peace 

state  in  which  all  men  had  rights  of  citizenship,  in 
which  all  other  nations  were  absorbed. 

Parallel  to  this  ideal  among  the  Greeks,  we  find 
the  hope  in  Israel  of  a  Messiah  whose  coming  was 
to  bring  peace,  not  only  to  the  Jewish  race,  but 
to  all  the  nations  of  the  earth.  This  idea  stands 
out  in  the  sharpest  contrast  to  the  early  nationalism 
of  the  Hebrew  people,  who  regarded  every  stranger 
as  an  idolater  and  an  enemy.  The  prophecies  of 
Judaism,  combined  with  the  cosmopolitan  ideas  of 
Greece,  were  the  source  of  the  idea,  which  is 
expressed  in  the  teaching  of  Christ,  of  a  spiritual 
world-empire,  an  empire  held  together  solely  by 
the  tie  of  a  common  religion. 

This  hope  of  peace  did  not  actually  die  during 
the  first  thousand  years  of  our  era,  nor  even  under 
the  morally  stagnating  influences  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  When  feudalism  and  private  war  were 
abolished  in  Europe,  it  wakened  to  a  new  life. 
Not  merely  in  the  mouths  of  poets  and  religious 
enthusiasts  was  the  cry  raised  against  war,  but 
by  scholars  like  Thomas  More  and  Erasmus,  jurists 
like  Gentilis  and  Grotius,  men  high  in  the  state 
and  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  like  Henry  IV.  of 
France  and  the  Due  de  Sully  or  the  Abb6  de  St. 
Pierre  whose  Projet  de  Paix  Perpetuelle  (1713)* 

*  Projet  de  traitipmtr  rendre  la  paix  perp etuelle  entre  Its  souverain* 
chretuns.  Th«  first  two  volumes  of  this  work  were  published  in 
1713  (trans.  London,  1714);  a  third  volume  followed  in  1717. 

Translator  s  Introduction  33 

obtained  immediate  popularity  and  wide-spread 
fame.  The  first  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  was 
already  prepared  to  receive  and  mature  a  plan  of 
this  kind. 

Henry  IV.  and  St.  Pierre. 

The  Grand  Dessein  of  Henry  IV.  is  supposed 
to  have  been  formed  by  that  monarch  and  repro- 
duced in  Sully 's  Memoirs^  written  in  1634  and 
discovered  nearly  a  century  later  by  St.  Pierre. 
The  story  goes  that  the  Abbe  found  the  book 
buried  in  an  old  garden.  It  has  been  shewn, 
however,  that  there  is  little  likelihood  that  this 
project  actually  originated  with  the  king,  who 
probably  corresponded-  fairly  well  to  Voltaire's 
picture  of  him  as  war  Hero  of  the  Henriade.  The 
plan  was  more  likely  conceived  by  Sully,  and 
ascribed  to  the  popular  king  for  the  sake  of  the 
better  hearing  and  greater  influence  it  might  in 
this  way  be  likely  to  have,  and  also  because, 
thereby,  it  might  be  less  likely  to  create  offence 
in  political  circles.  St.  Pierre  himself  may  or  may 
not  have  been  acquainted  with  the  facts. 

The  so-called  Grand  Dessein  of  Henry  IV.  was, 
shortly,  as  follows.  *  It  proposed  to  divide  Europe 


*  The  main  articles  of  this  and  other  peace  projects  are  to 
be  found  in  International  Tribunals,  published  by  the  Peace 

34  Perpetual  Peace 

between  fifteen  Powers,  *  in  such  a  manner  that  the 
balance  of  power  should  be  established  and  pre- 
served. These  were  to  form  a  Christian  republic 
on  the  basis  of  the  freedom  and  equality  of  its 
members,  the  armed  forces  of  the  federation  being 
supported  by  fixed  contribution.  A  general  council, 
consisting  of  representatives  from  the  fifteen  states, 
was  to  make  all-  laws  necessary  for  cementing  the 
union  thus  formed  and  for  maintaining  the  order 
once  established.  It  would  also  be  the  business 
of  this  senate  to  "  deliberate  on  questions  that 
might  arise,  to  occupy  themselves  with  discussing 
different  interests,  to  settle  quarrels  amicably,  to 
throw  light  upon  and  arrange  all  the  civil,  political 
and  religious  affairs  of  Europe,  whether  internal  or 
foreign."  (Memoires,  vol.  VI.,  p.  129  seq.) 

This  scheme  of  the  king  or  his  minister  was 
expanded  with  great  thoroughness  and  clear-sighted- 
ness by  the  Abbe  St.  Pierre :  none  of  the  many  later 
plans  for  a  perpetual  peace  has  been  so  perfect 
in  details.  He  proposes  that  there  should  be  a 
permanent  and  perpetual  union  between,  if  possible, 
all  Christian  sovereigns — of  whom  he  suggests 
nineteen,  excluding  the  Czar — "  to  preserve  unbroken 
peace  in  Europe,"  and  that  a  permanent  Congress 

*  Professor  Lorimcr  points  out  that  Prussia,  then  the  Duchy  of 
Brandenburg,  is  not  mentioned.  (Institutes  of  tJu  Law  of  Nations^ 
H  Ch.  VTI.,  p.  219.) 

Translator  s  Introduction  35 

or  senate  should  be  formed  by  deputies  of  the 
federated  states.  The  union  should  protect  weak 
sovereigns,  minors  during  a  regency,  and  so  on, 
and  should  banish  civil  as  well  as  international 
war — it  should  "render  prompt  and  adequate  assist- 
ance to  rulers  and  chief  magistrates  against  seditious 
persons  and  rebels."  All  warfare  henceforth  is  to 
be  waged  between  the  troops  of  the  federation — 
each  nation  contributing  an  equal  number — and 
the  enemies  of  European  security,  whether  outsiders 
or  rebellious  members  of  the  union.  Otherwise, 
where  it  is  possible,  all  disputes  occurring  within 
the  union  are  to  be  settled  by  the  arbitration  of 
the  senate,  and  the  Combined  military  force  of  the 
federation  is  to  be  applied  to  drive  the  Turks  out 
of  Europe.  There  is  to  be  a  rational  rearrangement 
of  boundaries,  but  after  this  no  change  is  to  be 
permitted  in  the  map  of  Europe.  The  union  should 
bind  itself  to  tolerate  the  different  forms  of  faith. 
The  objections  to  St.  Pierre's  scheme  are,  many 
of  them,  obvious.  He  himself  produces  sixty-two 
arguments  likely  to  be  raised .  against  his  plan,  and 
he  examines  these  in  turn  with  acuteness  and 
eloquence.  But  there  are  other  criticisms  which  he 
was  less  likely  to  be  able  to  forestall.  Of  the 
nineteen  states  he  names  as  a  basis  of  the  federa- 
tion, some  have  disappeared  and  the  governments  of 
others  have  completely  changed.  Indeed  St.  Pierre's 

36  Perpetual  Peace 

scheme  did  not  look  far  beyond  the  present.  But 
it  has  besides  a  too  strongly  political  character.  * 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  Abba's  plan  amounts 
practically  to  a  European  coalition  against  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  Moreover,  we  notice  with  a  smile 
that  the  French  statesman  and  patriot  is  not  lost 
in  the  cosmopolitan  political  reformer.  "  The  king- 
dom of  Spain  shall  not  go  out  of  the  House  of 
Bourbon  1"  f  France  is  to  enjoy  more  than  the 
privileges  of  honour ;  she  is  to  reap  distinct  material 
and  political  advantages  from  the  union.  Humanity 
is  to  be  a  brotherhood,  but,  in  the  federation  of 
nations,  France  is  to  stand  first.  §  9  We  see  that 
these  "reVes  d'un  homme  de  bien,"  as  Cardinal 
Dubois  called  them,  are  not  without  their  practical 
element.  But  the  great  mistake  of  St.  Pierre  is 
this:  he  actually  thought  that  his  plan  could  be 
put  into  execution  in  the  near  future,  that  an  ideal 
of  this  kind  was  realisable  at  once.  **  "  I,  myself, 

*  The  same  objection  was  raised  by  Leibniz  (see  his  Observations 
on  St.  Pierre's  Projet)  to  the  scheme  of  Henry  IV.,  who,  says 
Liebniz,  thought  more  of  overthrowing  the  house  of  Austria  than 
of  establishing  a  society  of  sovereigns. 

t  Projectt  Art.  VI.,  Eng.  trans.  (1714),  p.  119. 

§  St.  Pierre  was  not  blind  to  this  aspect  of  the  question.  Among 
the  critical  objections  which  he  anticipates  to  his  plan  is  this, — 
that  it  promises  too  great  an  increase  of  strength  to  the  house  of 
France,  and  that  therefore  the  author  would  have  been  wiser  to 
conceal  his  nationality. 

**  St.  Pierre,  in  what  may  be  called  an  apology  for  the  wording 
of  the  title  of  his  book  (above,  p.  32,  note),  justifies  his  confidence 

Translator's  Introduction  37 


form'd  it,"  he  says  in  the  preface,  "  in  full  expect- 
ation to  see  it  one  Day  executed."  As  Hobbes, 
says,  "  there  can  be  nothing  so  absurd,  but  may 
be  found  in  the  books  of  philosophers."  *  St.  Pierre 
was  not  content  to  make  his  influence  felt  on  the 
statesmen  of  his  time  and  prepare  the  way  for  the 
abolition  of  all  arbitrary  forms  of  government.  This 
was  the  flaw  which  drew  down  upon  the  good 
Abbe"  Voltaire's  sneering  epigram  f  and  the  irony 
of  Leibniz.  §  Here,  above  all,  in  this  unpractical^ 
enthusiasm  his  scheme  differs. from  that  of  Kant. 

in  these  words: — "The  Pilot  who  himself  seems  uncertain  of  the 
Success  of  his  Voyage  is  not  likely  to  persuade  the  Passenger  to 
embark.  .  .  .  I  am  persuaded,  that  it  is  not  impossible  to  find 
out  Means  sufficient  and  practicable  to  settle  an  Everlasting  Peace 
among  Christians;  and  even  believe,  that  the  Means  which  I 
have  thought  of  are  of  that  Nature."  (Preface  to  Project,  Eng. 
trans.,  1714.) 

*  Leviathan,  I.  Ch.  V. 

t  See  too  Voltaire's  allusion  to  St.  Pierre  in  his  Dictionary,  under 
"Religion."  <  "* 

§  Leibniz  regarded  the  project  of  St.  Pierre  with  an  indifference, 
somewhat  tinged  with  contempt.  In  a  letter  to  Grimarest,  {Leibnit. 
Opera,  Dutens'  ed.,  1768,  Vol.  V.,  pp.  65,  66:  in  Epfst.,  ed. 
Kortholt.,  Vol.  III.,  p.  327)  he  writes: — "I  have  seen  something 
of  M.  de  St.  Pierre's  plan  for  maintaining  perpetual  peace  in 
Europe.  It  reminds  me  of  an  inscription  outside  of  a  churchyard 
which  ran,  'Pax  Perpetua.  For  the  dead,  it  is  true,  fight  no 
more.  But  the  living,  are  of  another  mind,  and  the  mightiest 
among  them  have  little  respect  for  tribunals.1  This  is  followed 
by  the  ironical  suggestion  that  a  court  of  arbitration  should  be 
established  at  Rome  of  which  the  Pope  should  be  made  president; 
while  at  the  same  time  the  old  spiritual  authority  should  be 
restored  to  the  Church,  and  excommunication  be  the  punishment 

38  Perpetual  Peace 

Rousseau's  Criticism  of  St.  Pierre. 

Rousseau  took  St.  Pierre's  project  *  much  more 
seriously  than  either  Leibniz  or  Voltaire.  But 
sovereigns,  he  thought,  are  deaf  to  the  voice  of 
justice;  the  absolutism  of  princely  power  would 
never  allow  a  king  to  submit  to  a  tribunal  of 
nations.  Moreover  war  was,  according  to  Rous- 
seau's experience,  a  matter  not  between  nations, 
but  between  princes  and  cabinets.  It  was  one  of 
the  ordinary  pleasures  of  royal  existence  and  one 
not  likely  to  be  voluntarily  given  up.  f  We  know 
that  history  has  not  supported  Rousseau's  conten- 
tion. Dynastic  wars  are  now  no  more.  The  Great 
Powers  have  shown  themselves  able  to  impose  their 

of  non-compliance  with  the  arbitral  decree.  "  Such  plans,"  he 
adds,  "  are  as  likely  to  succeed  as  that  of  M.  de  St.  Pierre.  But 
as  we  are  allowed  to  write  novels,  why  should  we  find  fault  with 
fiction  which  would  bring  back  the  golden  age?"  But  see  also 
Observations  sur  le  Projet  d^une  Paijc  Perpituelle  de  M.  VAbbe  dc 
St.  Pierre  (Dutens,  V.,  esp.  p.  56)  and  the  letter  to  Remond  de 
Moutmort  (ibid.  pp.  20,  21)  where  Leibniz  considers  this  project 
rather  more  seriously. 

*  "  C'est  un  livre  solide  et  sense,"  says  Rousseau  (Jugement  mr 
la  Paix  Perpituelle),  "et  il  est  tres  important  qu'il  existe."    [This 
yugement  is   appended  to    Rousseau's  Exirait  du   Prejet  de  Paix 
Pcrpctuelle  de  Monsieur  ^Abbc  de  Saint-Pierre,  1761.] 
I  Cf.  Cowper:   The   Winter  Morning  Walk: — 

"Great  princes  have  great  playthings.     Some  have  play'd 
At  hewing  mountains  into  men,  and  some 
At  building  human  wonders  mountain  high. 

Translator's  Introduction  39 

own  conditions,  where  the  welfare  and  security  of 
Europe  have  seemed  to  demand  it.  Such  a  develop- 
ment seemed  impossible  enough  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  In  the  military  organisation  of  the  nations 
of  Europe  and  in  the  necessity  of  making  their 
internal  development  subordinate  to  the  care  for 
their  external  security,  Rousseau  saw  the  cause  of 
all  the  defects  in  their  administration.  *  The  forma- 
tion of  unions  on  the  model  of  the  Swiss  Confedera- 
tion or  the  German  Bund  would,  he  thought,  be 
in  the  interest  of  all  rulers.  f  But  great  obstacles 
seemed  to  him  to  lie  in  the  way  < of  the  realisation 
of  such  a  project  as  that  of  St  Pierre.  "Without 
doubt,"  says  Rousseau  in  conclusion,  "the  proposal 

of  a  perpetual  peace  is  at  present  an  absurd  one 

It  can  only  be  put  into  effect  by  methods  which  are 
violent  in  themselves  and  dangerous  to  humanity. 
One  cannot  conceive  of  the  possibility  of  a  federative 
union  being  established,  except  by  a  revolution. 

Some  seek  diversion  in  the  tented  field, 
And  make  the  sorrows  of  mankind  their  sport. 
But  war's  a  game,  which,  were  their  subjects  wise, 
Kings  should  not  play  at.     Nations  would  do  well 
T'extort  their  truncheons  from  the  puny  hands 
Of  heroes,  whose  infirm  and  baby  minds 
Are  gratified  with  mischief,  and  who  spoil, 
Because  men  suffer  it,  their  toy  the  world." 
*  "Les  troupes  resides,  peste  et  depopulation  del'Eurepe,  ne  sont 
bonnes    qu'a   deux  fins:  ou  pour  attaquer  et  conquerir  les  voisins, 
ou    pour   enchdiner  et  avjervir   les   citoyens."     (fiouvtrntnunt  de 
,  Ch.  XII.) 

4<D  Perpetual  Peace 

And,  that  granted,  who  among  us  would  venture  to 
say  whether  this  European  federation  is  to  be  desired 
or  to  be  feared  ?  It  would  work,  perhaps,  more  harm 
in  a  moment  than  it  would  prevent  in  the  course 
of  centuries."  (Jugement  sur  la  Paix  Perpttuelle!} 

The  Position  of  Hobbes. 

The  most  profound  and  searching  analysis  of 
this  problem  comes  from  Immanuel  Kant,  whose 
indebtedness  in  the  sphere  of  politics  to  Hobbes, 
Locke,  Montesquieu  and  Rousseau  it  is  difficult  to 
overestimate.  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people  comes  to  him  from  Locke  through 
Rousseau.  His  explanation  of  the  origin  of  society 
is  practically  that  of  Hobbes.  ^yThe  direct  influence 
on  politics  of  this  philosopher,  apart  from  his  share 
in  moulding  the  Kantian  theory  of  the  state,  is  one 
we  cannot  afford  to  neglect.  His  was  a  great  in- 
fluence on  the  new  science  just  thrown  on  the 
world  by  Grotius,  and  his  the  first  clear  and 
systematic  statement  we  have  of  the  nature  of 
society  and  the  establishment  of  the  state.  The  natural 
state  of  man,  says  Hobbes,  is  a  state  of  war,  *  a 

*  Hobbes  realises  clearly  that  there  probably  never  was  such  a 
state  of  war  all  over  the  world  nor  a  state  of  nature  conforming 
to  a  common  type.  The  case  is  parallel  to  the  use  of  the  term 
"original  contract"  as  an  explanation  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
civil  state  came  to  be  formed.  (Cf.  p.  52,  note^ 

See    also    Hume   (Tnquiry   concerning  the    Principles  ff 

Translator's  Introduction  4! 

bellum  omnium  contra  omnes,  where  all  struggle 
for  honour  and  for  preferment  and  the  prizes  to 
which  every  individual  is  by  natural  right  equally 
entitled,  but  which  can  of  necessity  fall  only  to  the 
few,  the  foremost  in  the  race.  Men  hate  and  fear 
the  society  of  their  kind,  but  through  this  desire 

Sect.  III.  Part  I.).  ''This  poetical  fiction  of  the  golden  age  i*, 
in  some  respects,  of  a  piece  with  the  philosophical  fiction  of  the 
state  of  nature ;  only  that  the  former  is  represented  as  the  most 
charming  and  most  peaceable  condition,  which  can  possibly  be 
imagined;  whereas  the  latter  is  painted  out  as  a  state  of  mutual 
•war  and  violence,  attended  with  the  most  extreme  necessity." 
This  fiction  of  a  state  of  nature  as  a  state  of  war,  says  Hume, 
(in  a  note  to  this  passage)  is  not  the  invention  of  Hobbe§. 
Plato  (Republic,  H  III.  IV.)  refutes  a  hypothesis  very  like  it, 
and  Cicero  (Pro  Sext.  1.  42)  regards  it  as  a  fact  universally 

Cf.  also  Spinoza  (Tract.  Pol.  c.  ii.  §  14):  "Homines  ex  natura 
hostes."  And  (c.  T.  §  2) :  "  Homines  civiles  non  nascuntur  aed  fiunt." 
These  expressions  are  to  be  understood,  says  Bluntschli  (Theory 
of  the  State,  IV.  Ch.  vi.,  p.  284,  note  a),  "rather  as  a  logical 
statement  of  what  would  be  the  condition  of  man  apart  from  civil 
society,  than  as  distinctly  implying  a  historical  theory." 

While  starting  from  the  same  premises,  Spinoza  carries  Hobbes' 
political  theories  to  their  logical  conclusion.  If  we  admit  that 
right  lies  with  might,  then  right  is  with  the  people  in  any  revolu- 
tion successfully  carried  ,yput.  (But  see  Hobbes'  Preface  to  the 
Philosophical  Rudiments  and  Kant's  Perpetual  Peace,  p.  188, 
note.}  Spinoza,  in  a  letter,  thus  alludes  to  this  point  of  differ- 
ence:— "As  regards  political  theories,  the  difference  which  you 
inquire  about  between  Hobbes  and  myself,  consists  in  this,  that  I 
always  preserve  natural  right  intact,  and  only  allot  to  the  chief 
magistrates  in  every  state  a  right  over  their  subjects  commensurate 
v  ith  the  excess  of  their  power  over  the  power  of  the  subjects. 
This  is  what  always  takes  place  in  the  state  of  nature."  (Epistlt 
50,  Works,  Bonn's  ed.,  Vol.  II.) 

42  Perpetual  Peace 

to  excel  are  forced  to  seek  it:  only  where  there 
are  many  can  there  be  a  first.  This  state  of  things, 
this  apparent  sociability  which  is  brought  about  by 
and  coupled  with  the  least  sociable  of  instincts,  be- 
comes unendurable.  "  It  is  necessary  to  peace," 
writes  Hobbes  (On  Dominion,  Ch.  VI.  3)  "that  a 
man  be  so  far  forth  protected  against  the  violence 
of  others,  that  he  may  live  securely;  that  is,  that 
he  may  have  no  just  cause  to  fear  others,  so  long 
as  he  doth  them  no  injury.  Indeed,  to  make  men 
altogether  safe  from  mutual  harms,  so  as  they  cannot 
be  hurt  or  injuriously  killed,  is  impossible;  and, 
therefore,  comes  not  within  deliberation."  But  to 
protect  them  so  far  as  is  possible  the  state  is  formed. 
Hobbes  has  no  great  faith  in  human  contracts  or 
promises.  Man's  nature  is  malicious  and  untrust- 
worthy. A  coercive  power  is  necessary  to  guarantee 
this  long-desired  security  within  the  community. 
"We  must  therefore,"  he  adds,  " provide  for  our 
security,  not  by  compacts,  but  by  punishments; 
and  there  is  then  sufficient  provision  made,  when 
there  are  so  great  punishments  appointed  for  every 
injury,  as  apparently  it  prove  a  greater  evil  to 
have  done  it,  than  not  to  have  done  it.  For  all 
men,  by  a  necessity  of  nature,  choose  that  which 
to  them  appears  to  be  the  less  evil."  (Op.  cit.t 
Ch.  VI.  4.) 
These  precautions  secure  that  relative  peace 

Translator's  Introduction  „  43 

within  the  state  which  is  one  of  the  conditions 
nf  the  safety  of  the  people.  But  it  is,  besides,  the 
duty  of  a  sovereign  to  guarantee  an  adequate  pro- 
tection to  his  subjects  against  foreign  enemies.  A 
state  of  defence  as  complete  and  perfect  as  possible 
is  not  only  a  national  duty,  but  an  absolute  neces- 
sity. The  following  statement  of  the  relation  of  the 
state  to  other  states  shows  how  closely  Hobbes  has 
been  followed  by  Kant.  "There  are  two  things 
necessary,"  says  Hobbes,  (On  Dominion,  Ch.  XIII. 
7)  "  for  the  people's  defence ;  to  be  warned  and  to 
be  forearmed.  For  the  state  of  commonwealths 
considered  in  themselves,  is  natural,  that  is  to  say, 
hostile.*  Neither,, if  they  cease  from  fighting,  is  it 
therefore  to  be  called  peace;  but  rather  a  breathing 
time,  in  which  one  enemy  observing  the  motion 
and  countenance  of  the  other,  values  his  security 
not  according  to  pacts,  but  the  forces  and  counsels 
of  his  adversary." 

Hobbes  is  a  practical  philosopher:  no  man  was 
less  a  dreamer,  a  follower  after  ideals  than  he.  He 
is,  moreover,  a  pessimist,  and  his  doctrine  of  the 
state  is  a  political  absolutism,  f  the  form  of  govern- 

*  The  italics  are  mine.— [Tr.] 

t  Professor  Paulsen  (Inimamtel  Kant,  2nd  ed.,  1899,  p.  359 — 
Eng.  trans.,  p.  353)  points  out  that  pessimism  and  absolutism 
usually  go  together  in  the  doctrines  of  philosophers.  He  gives  as 
instances  Hobbes,  Kant  and  Schopenhauer. 

Hobbes   (On   Dominion,   Ch.   X.   3,   sey.}   regarded   an   absolute 

44  Perpetual  Peace 

ment  which  above  all  has  been,  and  is,  favourable 
to  war.  He  would  no  doubt  have  ridiculed  th<*^ 
idea  of  a  perpetual  peace  between  nations,  had 
such  a  project  as  that  of  St.  Pierre— a  practical 
project,  counting  upon  a  realisation  in  the  near 
future — been  brought  before  him.  He  might  not 
even  have  accepted  it  in  the  very  much  modified 
form  which  Kant  adopts,  that  of  an  ideal — an 
unattainable  ideal — towards  which  humanity  could 
not  do  better  than  work.  He  expected  the  worst 
possible  from  man  the  individual.  Homo  homini 
lupus.  The  strictest  absolutism,  amounting  almost 
to  despotism,  was  required  to  keep  the  vicious 
propensities  of  the  human  animal  in  check.  States 
he  looked  upon  as  units  of  the  same  kind,  members 
also  of  a  society .,. ./They  had,  and  openly  exhibited, 
the  same  faults  as  individual  men.  They  too 
might  be  driven  with  a  strong  enough  coercive 
force  behind  them,  but  not  without  it;  and  such  a 
coercive  force  as  this  did  not  exist  in  a  society  of 
nations.  Federation  and  federal  troops  are  terms 
which  represent  ideas  of  comparatively  recent  origin. 

monarchy  as  the  only  proper  form  of  government,  while  in  th« 
opinion  of  Locke,  (On  Civil  Govcntmcnt,  II.  Ch.  VII,  §§  90,  91)  it 
was  no  better  than  a  state  of  nature.  Kant  would  not  have  gone 
quite  so  far.  As  a  philosopher,  he  upheld  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people  and  rejected  a  monarchy  which  was  not  governed  in  accor- 
dance with  republican  principles;  as  a  citiren,  he  deni«d  the  right 
of  resistance  to  authority.  (Cf.  Perpetual Peate,  pp.  126,  188,  note.) 

Translator  s  Introduction  45 

Without  something  of  this  kind,  any  enduring  peace 
-.Has  not  to  be  counted  upon.  International  relations 
were  and  must  remain  at  least  potentially  warlike 
in  character.  Under  no  circumstances  could  ideal 
conditions  be  possible  either  between  the  members 
of  a  state  or  between  the  states  themselves.  Human 
nature  could  form  no  satisfactory  baiis  for  a  counsel 
of  perfection. 

Hence  Hobbes  never  thought  of  questioning  the 
necessity  of  war.  It  was  in  his  eyes  the  natural 
condition  of  European  society;  but  certain  rules 
were  necessary  both  for  its  conduct  and,  where 
this  was  compatible  with  a  nation's  dignity  and 
prosperity,  for  its  prevention.  He  held  that  interna- 
tional law  was  only  a  part  of  the  Law  of  Nature, 
and  that  this  Law  of  Nature  laid  certain  obligations 
upon  nations  and  their  kings.  Mediation  must  be 
employed  between  disputants  as  much  as  possible, 
the  person  of  the  mediators  of  peace  being  held 
inviolate ;  an  umpire  ought  to  be  chosen  to  decide 
a  controversy,  to  whose  judgment  the  parties  in 
dispute  agree  to  submit  themselves ;  such  an  arbiter 
must  be  impartial.^  These  are  all  what  Hobbes 
calls  precepts  of  the  Law  of  Nature.  And  he  appeals 
to  the  Scriptures  in  confirmation  of  his  assertion 
that  peace  is  the  way  of  righteousness  and  that  the 
laws  of  nature  of  which  these  are  a  few  are  also  laws 
of  the  heavenly  kingdom.  But  peace  is  like  the 

46  Perpetual  Peace 

straight  path  of  Christian  endeavour,  difficult  to 
find  and  difficult  to  keep.  We  must  seek  after 
where  it  may  be  found;  but,  having  done  this  and 
sought  in  vain,  we  have  no  alternative  but  to  fall 
back  upon  war.  Reason  requires  "  that  every  man 
ought  to  endeavour  peace,"  (Lev.  I.  Ch.  XIV.)  "  as 
far  as  he  has  hope  of  obtaining  it;  and  when  he 
cannot  obtain  it,  that  he  may  seek,  and  use,  all 
helps,  and  advantages  of  war."  *  This,  says  Hobbes 
elsewhere,  (On  Liberty,  Ch.  I.  15)  is  the  dictate  of 
right  reason,  the  first  and  fundamental  law  of  nature. 

Kant's  Idea  of  a  Perpetual  Peace. 

With  regard  to  the  problems  of  international 
law,  Kant  is  of  course  a  hundred  and  fifty  years 
ahead  of  Hobbes.  But  he  starts  from  the  same 
point:  his  theory  of  the  beginning  of  society  is 
practically  identical  with  that  of  the  older  philo- 
sopher. Men  are  by  nature  imperfect  creatures, 
unsociable  and  untrustworthy,  cursed  by  a  love  of 
glory,  of  possession,  and  of  power,  passions  which 
make  happiness  something  for  ever  unattainable  by 
them.  Hobbes  is  content  to  leave  them  here  with 
their  imperfections,  and  let  a  strong  government 

*  We  find  the  same  rule  laid  down  as  early  as  the  time  of 
Dante.  Cf.  De  Monarchia,  Bk.  IT  9 '. — "  When  two  nations  quarrel 
they  are  bound  to  try  in  every  possible  way  to  arrange  the  quarrel 
by  means  of  discussion :  it  is  only  when  this  is  hopeless  that  they 
may  declare  war." 

Translator's  Introduction  47 

help  them  out  as  it  may.  But  not  so  Kant.  He 
Jooks  beyond  man  the  individual,  developing  slowly 
by  stages  scarcely  measurable,  progressing  at  one 
moment,  and  the  next,  as  it  seems,  falling  behind : 
he  looks  beyond  the  individual,  struggling  and 
never  attaining,  to  the  race.  Here  Kant  is  no 
pessimist.  The  capacities  implanted  in  man  by 
nature  are  not  all  for  evil:  they  are,  he  says, 
"  destined  to  unfold  themselves  completely  in  the 
course  of  time,  and  in  accordance  with  the  end  to 
which  they  are  adapted."  (Idea  of  a  Universal  History 
from  a  Cosmopolitan  Point  of  View,  1784.  Prop,  i.) 
This  end  of  humanity  is  the  evolution  of  man  from 
the  stage  of  mere  self-satisfied  animalism  to  a  high 
state  of  civilisation.  Through  his  own  reason  man  is 
to  attain  a  perfect  culture,  intellectual  and  moral.  In 
this  long  period  of  struggle,  the  potential  faculties 
which  nature  or  Providence  has  bestowed  upon  him 
reach  their  full  development.  The  process  in  which 
this  evolution  takes  place  is  what  we  call  history. 
To  man  nature  has  given  none  of  the  perfect 
animal  equipments  for  self-preservation  and  self- 
defence  which  she  has  bestowed  on  others  of  her 
creatures.  Bui  she  has^given  to  him  reason  and 
freedom  of  will,  and  has  determined  that  through 
these  faculties  and  without  the  aid  of  instinct  he 
shall  win  for  himself  a  complete  development  of 
his  capacities  and  natural  endowments.  It  is,  says 

Perpetual  Peace 

Kant,    no   happy   life    that   nature  has  marked  out 
for   man.     He   is    filled   with  desires  which  he  can 
never    satisfy.     His    life    is    one    of  endeavour  ivnd 
not   of  attainment:    not   even  the  consciousness  of 
the    well-fought    battle   is   his,   for   the   struggle   is 
more   or  less  an  unconscious  one,  the  end  unseen. 
Only   in   the   race,   and   not  in  the  individual,  can 
the  natural    capacities  of  the  human  species  reach 
full    development.     Reason,    says    Kant,    (Prop.    2, 
op.    tit.)    "does    not    itself    work    by    instinct,    but 
requires    experiments,    exercise    and   instruction   in 
order    to    advance    gradually    from    one    stage    of 
insight    to    another.     Hence    each    individual    man 
would  necessarily  have  to  live  an  enormous  length 
of  time,  in  order  to  learn  by  himself  how  to  make 
a  complete  use  of  all  his  natural  endowments.   Or, 
if  nature  should  have  given  him  but  a  short  lease 
of  life,    as  is  actually  the  case,  reason  would  then 
require    an    almost   interminable    series   of  genera- 
tions,  the    one   handing  down  its  enlightenment  to 
the  other,  in  order  that  the  seeds  she  has  sown  in 
our   species   may  be  brought  at  last  to  a  stage  of 
development   which   is   in    perfect "  accordance  with 
her  design."  Man  the  individual  shall  travel  towards 
the    land    of  promise    and  fight  for  its  possession, 
but    not    he,    nor    his    children,   nor   his  children's 
children   shall   inherit   the   land.     "Only  the  latest 
comers    can    have   the   good   fortune  of  inhabiting 

Translator's  Introduction  49 


the  dwelling  which  the  long  series  of  their  prede- 
cessors have  toiled — though/'  adds  Kant,  "without 
any  conscious  intent — to  build  up  without  even  the 
possibility  of  participating  in  the  happiness  which 
they  were  preparing."  (Proposition  3.) 

The  means  which  nature  employs  to  bring  about 
this  development  of  all  the  capacities  implanted  in 
men  is  their  mutual  antagonism  in  society — what 
Kant  calls  the  "  unsocial  sociableness  of  men,  that 
is  to  say,  their  inclination  to  enter  into  society,  an 
inclination  which  yet  is  bound  up  at  every  point 
with  a  resistance  which  threatens  continually  to 
break  up  the  society  so  formed."  (Proposition  4.) 
Man  hates  society,  and  yet  there  alone  he  can 
develop  his  capacities ;  he  cannot  live  there  peace- 
ably, and  yet  cannot  live  without  it.  It  is  the 
resistance  which  others  offer  to  his  inclinations  and 
will — which  he,  on  his  part,  shows  likewise  to  the 
desires  of  others—  that  awakens  all  the  latent  powers 
of  his  nature  and  the  determination  to  conquer  his 
natural  propensity  to  indolence  and  love  of  material 
comfort  and  to  struggle  for  the  first  place  among 
his  fellow-creatures,  to  satisfy,  in  outstripping  them, 
his  love  of  glory  and  possession  and  power.  "With- 
out those,  in  themselves  by  no  means  lovely,  qual- 
ities which  set  man  in  social  opposition  to  man,  so 
that  each  finds  his  selfish  claims  resisted  by  the 
selfishness  of  all  the  others,  men  would  have  lived 


jo  Perpetual  Peace 

on  in  an  Arcadian  shepherd  life,  in  perfect  harmony, 
contentment,  and  mutual  love ;  but  all  their  talents 
would  forever  have  remained  hidden  and  undevel- 
oped. Thus,  kindly  as  the  sheep  they  tended,  they 
would  scarcely  have  given  to  their  existence  a 
greater  value  than  that  of  their  cattle.  And  the 
place  among  the  ends  of  creation  which  was 
left  for  the  development  of  rational  beings  would 
not  have  been  filled.  Thanks  be  to  nature  for  the 
unsociableness,  for  the  spiteful  competition  of  vanity, 
for  the  insatiate  desires  of  gain  and  power  1  Without 
these,  all  the  excellent  natural  capacities  of  human- 
ity would  have  slumbered  undeveloped.  Man's 
will  is  for  harmony ;  but  nature  knows  better  what 
is  good  for  his  species:  her  will  is  for  dissension. 
He  would  like  a  life  of  comfort  and  satisfaction, 
but  nature  wills  that  he  should  be  dragged  out  of 
idleness  and  inactive  content  and  plunged  into 
labour  and  trouble,  in  order  that  he  may  be  made 
to  seek  in  his  own  prudence  for  the  means  of 
again  delivering  himself  from  them.  The  natural 
impulses  which  prompt  this  effort,— the  causes  of 
unsociableness  and  mutual  conflict,  out  of  which 
so  many  evils  spring, — are  also  in  turn  the  spurs 
which  drive  him  to  the  development  of  his  powers. 
Thus,  they  really  betray  the  providence  of  a  wise 
Creator,  and  not  the  interference  of  some  evil  spirit 
which  has  meddled  with  the  world  which  God  has 

Translator's  Introduction 

nobly  planned,  and  enviously  overturned  its  order." 
(Proposition  4:  Caird's  translation  in  The  Critical 
Philosophy  of  Kant,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  550,  551.) 

The  problem  now  arises,  How  shall  men  live 
together,  each  free  to  work  out  his  own  develop- 
ment, without  at  the  same  time  interfering  with  a 
like  liberty  on  the  part  of  his  neighbour?  The 
solution  of  this  problem  is  the  state.  Here  the 
liberty  of  each  member  is  guaranteed  and  its  limits 
strictly  defined.  A  perfectly  just  civil  constitution, 
administered  according  to  the  principles  of  right, 
would  be  that  under  which  the  greatest  possible 
amount  of  liberty  was  left  to  each  citizen  within 
these  limits.  >^  This  is  the  ideal  of  Kant,  and  here 
lies  the  greatest  practical  problem  which  has  pre- 
sented itself  to  humanity.  An  ideal  of  this  kind  is 
difficult  of  realisation.  But  nature  imposes  no  such 
duty  upon  us.  ''Out  of  such  crooked  material  as 
man  is  made,"  says  Kant,  "  nothing  can  be  hammered 
quite  straight."  (Proposition  6.)  We  must  make 
our  constitution  as  good  as  we  can  and,  with  that, 
rest  content. 

The  direct  cause  of  this  transition  from  a  state 
of  nature  and  conditions  of  unlimited  freedom  to 
civil  society  with  its  coercive  and  restraining  forces 
is  found  in  the  evils  of  that  state  of  nature  as  they 
are  painted  by  Hobbes.  A  wild  lawless  freedom 
becomes  impossible  for  man:  he  is  compelled  to 

52  Perpetual  Peace 

seek  the  protection  of  a  civil  society.  He  lives  in 
uncertainty  and  insecurity:  his  liberty  is  so  far 
worthless  that  he  cannot  peacefully  enjoy  it.  For 
this  peace  he  voluntarily  yields  up  some  part  of 
his  independence.  The  establishment  of  the  state 
is  in  the  interest  of  his  development  to  a  higher 
civilisation.  It  is  more— the  guarantee  of  his  exis- 
tence and  self-preservation.  This  is  the  sense, 
gays  Professor  Paulsen,  in  which  Kant  like  Hobbes 
regards  the  state  as  "resting  on  a  contract/1*  that 

.  •  Rousseau  (Confrat  Social:  I.  vi.)  regards  the  social  contract  as 
tacitly  implied  in  every  actual  society:  its  articles  "art  the  same 
everywhere,  and  are  everywhere  tacitly  admitted  and  recognised, 
even  though  they  may  never  have  found  formal  expression"  In 
any  constitution.  In  the  same  way  he  speaks  of  a  state  of  nature 
"  which  no  longer  exists,  which  perhaps  never  has  existed."  (Preface 
to  the  Discourse  on  the  Causes '-yf  Inequality)  But  Rousseau's 
interpretation  of  these  terms  is,  on  the  whole,  literal  in  spite  of 
these  single  passages.  He  speaks  throughout  the  Confrat  Sofia/, 
as  if  history  could  actually  record  the  signing  and  drawing  up  of 
such  documents.  Hobbes,  Hooker,  (Ecclesiastical  Polity,  I.  sect. 
10— see  also  Ritchie:  Darwin  and  Hegel,  p.  no  seq?)  Hume  and 
Kant  use  more  careful  language.  "It  cannot  be  denied,"  writes 
Hume,  (Of  the  Original  Contract}  "that  all  government  is,  at  first, 
founded  on  a  contract  and  that  the  most  ancient  rude  combinations 
of  mankind  were  formed  chiefly  by  that  principle.  In  vain  are 
we  asked  in  what  records  this  charter  of  our  liberties  is  registered. 
It  was  not  written  on  parchment,  nor  yet  on  leaves  or  barks  of 
trees.  It  preceded  the  use  of  writing  and  all  the  other  civilised 
arts  of  life.  But  we  trace  it  plainly  in  the  nature  of  man,  and 
in  the  equality,  or  something  approaching  equality,  which  we  find 
in  all  the  individuals  of  that  species."  %?> 

This  fine  passage  expresses  admirably  the  views  of  Kant  on  this 
point    Of.    Wtrkt,   (Rosenkranx)  IX.   1 60.     The  original  contract 

Translator  s  Introduction  53 

is  to  §ay,  on  the  free  will  of  all.  *  Volenti  nonfit 
injuria.  Only,  adds  Paulsen,  we  must  remember  that 
thii  contract  is  not  a  historical  fact,  as  it  seemed 
to  iome  writers  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but  an 
"idea  of  reason"  :  we  are  speaking  here  not  of  the 
history  of  the  establishment  of  the  state,  but  of  the 
reason  of  its  existence.  (Paulsen's  Kant,  p.  354.)  t 

is  merely  an  idea  of  reason,  one  of  those  ideas  which  we  thick 
into  things  iu  order  to  explain  them. 

Hobbes  docs  not  professedly  make  the  contract  historical,  but 
in  Locke's  Civil  Government  (II.  Ch.  VIII.  §  102)  there  is  some 
attempt  made  to  give  it  a  historical  basis. — By  consent  all  were 
equal,  "till  by  the  same  consent  they  set  rulers  over  themselves. 
So  that  their  politic  societies  all  began  from  a  voluntary  union, 
and  the  mutual  agreement  of  men  freely  acting  in  the  choice  of 
their  governors,  and  forms  of  government." 

Bluntschli  points  out  (7'heory  of  the  State  t  IV.  ix.,  p.  294  and 
note)  that  tht  same  theory  of  contract  on  which  Hobbe*'  doctrine 
of  an  absolute  government  was  based  was  made  the  justification  of 
violent  resistance  to  the  government  at  the  time  of  the  French 
Revolution.  The  theory  was  differently  applied  by  Hobbes,  Locke 
and  Rousseau.  According  to  the  first,  men  leave  the  "state  of 
nature"  when  they  surrender  their  rights  to  a  sovereign,  and  return 
to  that  state  during  revolution.  But,  for  Rousseau,  this  sovereign 
authority  is  the  people:  a  revolution  would  be  only  a  change  of 
ministry.  (See  Cont.  Soc.,  III.  Ch.  xviii.)  Again  Locke  holds 
revolution  to  be  justifiable  in  all  cases  where  the  government  have 
not  fulfilled  the  trust  reposed  by  the  people  iu  them.  (Cf.  Kant's 
Perpetual  Peace,  p.  188,  note}. 

*  "If  you  unite  many  men,"  Writes  Rousseau,  (Cont.  Soc.t IV.  I.) 
"and  consider  them  as  one  body,  they  will  have  but  one  will; 
and  that  will  must  be  to  promote  the  common  safety  and  general 
well-being  of  all."  This  volonti  genirale,  the  common  element 
of  all  particular  wills,  cannot  be  in  conflict  with  an/  of  them. 
(Op.  eit.,  IL  iii.) 

f  In  Eng.  trans.,  see  p.  348. 

54  Perpetual  Peace 

In  this  civil  union,  self-sought,  yet  sought  reluc- 
tantly, man  is  able  to  turn  his  most  unlovable 
qualities  to  a  profitable  use.  They  bind  this  society 
together.  They  are  the  instrument  by  which  he 
wins  for  himself  self-culture.  It  is  here  with  men, 
says  Kant,  as  it  is  with  the  trees  in  a  forest:  "just 
because  each  one  strives  to  deprive  the  other  of 
air  and  sun,  they  compel  each  other  to  seek  both 
above,  and  thus  they  grow  beautiful  and  straight. 
Whereas  those  that,  in  freedom  and  isolation  from 
one  another,  shoot  out  their  branches  at  will,  grow 
stunted  and  crooked  and  awry."  (Proposition  5, 
op.  cit.)  Culture,  art,  and  all  that  is  best  in  the 
social  order  are  the  fruits  of  that  self-loving  un- 
sociableness  in  man.  , 

The  problem  of  the  establishment  of  a  perfect 
civil  constitution  cannot  be  solved,  says  this  treatise 
(Idea  for  a  Universal  History),  until  the  external 
relations  of  states  are  regulated  in  accordance  with 
principles  of  right.  For,  even  if  the  ideal  internal 
constitution  were  attained,  what  end  would  it  serve 
in  the  evolution  of  humanity,  if  commonwealths 
themselves  were  to  re  nain  like  individuals  in  a 
state  of  nature,  each  existing  in  uncontrolled  free- 
dom, a  law  unto  himself  r  -  This  condition  of  things 
again  cannot  be  permanent.  Nature  uses  the  same 
means  as  before  to  bring  about  a  state  of  law  and 
order.  War,  present  or  near  at  hand,  the  strain 

Translator's  Introduction  55 

of  constant  preparation  for  a  possible  future  cam- 
paign or  the  heavy  burden  of  debt  and  devastation 
left  by  the  last, — these  are  the  evils  which  must 
drive  states  to  leave  a  lawless,  savage  state  of 
nature,  hostile  to  man's  inward  development,  and 
seek  in  union  the  end  of  nature,  peace.  All  wars 
are  the  attempts  nature  makes  to  bring  about  new 
political  relations  between  nations,  relations  which, 
in  their  very  nature,  cannot  be,  and  are  not  desired 
to  be,  permanent. ,.,  These  combinations  will  go  on 
succeeding  each  other,  until  at  last  a  federation  of 
all  powers  is  formed  for  the  establishment  of  per- 
petual peace.  This  is  the  end  of  humanity,  demanded 
by  reason.  Justice  will  reign,  not  only  in  the  state, 
but  in  the  whole  human  race  when  perpetual  peace 
exists  between  the  nations  of  the  world. 

This  is  the  point  of  view  of  the  Idea  for  a  Uni- 
versal History.  But  equally,  we  may  say,  law  and 
justice  will  reign  between  nations,  when  a  legally 
and  morally  perfect  constitution  adorns  the  state. 
External  perpetual  peace  pre-supposes  internal  peace 
—peace  civil,  social,  economic,  religious.  Now, 
when  men  are  perfect — and  what  would  this  be 
but  perfection — how  can  there  be  war?  Cardinal 
Fleury's  only  objection — no  light  one — to  St.  Pierre's 
project  was  that,  as  even  the  most  peace-loving 
could  not  avoid  war,  all  men  must  first  be  men  of 
noble  character.  This  seems  to  be  what  is  required 

$6  Per  Ritual  Peace 

in  the  treatise  on  Perpetual  Peace.  Kant  demands, 
to  a  certain  extent,  the  moral  regeneration  of  man. 
There  must  be  perfect  honesty  in  international 
dealings,  good  faith  in  the  interpretation  and  ful- 
filment of  treaties  and  so  on  (Art.  i)  * :  and  again, 
every  state  must  have  a  republican  constitution — a 
term  by  which  Kant  understands  a  constitution  as 
nearly  as  possible  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of 
right.  (Art.  i.)f  This  is  to  say  that  we  have  to 
start  with  our  reformation  at  home,  look  first  to 
the  culture  and  education  and  morals  of  our  citizens, 
then  to  our  foreign  relations.  This  is  a  question 
of  self-interest  as  well  as  of  ethics.  On  the  civil  and 
religious  liberty  of  a  state  depends  its  commercial 
success.  Kant  saw  the  day  coming,  when  industrial 
superiority  was  to  be  identified  with  political  pre- 
eminence. The  state  which  does  not  look  to  the 
enlightenment  and  liberty  of  its  subjects  must  fail 
in  the  race.  But  the  advantages  of  a  high  state 
of  civilisation  are  not  all  negative.  The  more  highly 
developed  the  individuals  who  form  a  state,  the 
more  highly  developed  is  its  consciousness  of  its 
obligations  to  other  nations.  In  the  ignorance  and 
barbarism  of  races  lies  the  great  obstacle  to  a  reign 
of  law  among  states.  Uncivilised  states  cannot  be 
conceived  as  members  of  a  federation  of  Europe. 

*  See  p.  107.  ^ 

t  See  p.  lao. 

Translators  Introduction  $7 

First,  the  perfect  civil  constitution  according  to 
right:  then  the  federation  of  these  law-abiding 
Powers.  This  ia  the  path  which  reason  marks 
out.  The  treatise  on  Perpetual  Peact  seems  to  be 
in  this  respect  more  practical  than  the  Idea  for 
a  Universal  History.  But  it  matters  little  which 
way  we  take  it.  The  point  of  view  is  the  same 
in  both  cases :  the  end  remains  the  development  of 
man  towards  good,  the  order  of  his  steps  in  this 

direction  is  indifferent. 

>       * 

The  Political  and  Social  Conditions  of  Kanfs  Time. 

The  history  of  the  human  race,  viewed  as  a 
whole,  Kant  regards  as  the  realisation  of  a  hidden 
plan  of  nature  to  bring  about  a  political  constitu- 
tion internally  and  externally  perfect — the  only 
condition  under  which  the  faculties  of  man  can  be 
fully  developed.  Does  experience  support  this 
theory?  Kant  thought  that,  to  a  certain  degree,  it 
did.  This  conviction  was  not,  however,  a  fruit  of 
his  experience  of  citizenship  in  Prussia,  an  absolute 
dynastic  state,  a  military  monarchy  waging  perpe- 
tual dynastic  wars  of  the  kind  he  most  hotly  con- 
demned. Kant  had  no  feeling  of  love  to  Prussia,  * 
and  little  of  a  citizen's  patriotic  pride,  or  even  in- 

*  Unlike  Hegel  whose  ideal  was  the  Prussian  state,  as  it  was 
under  Frederick  the  Great.  An  enthusiastic  supporter  of  the  power 
of  monarchy,  he  showed  himself  comparatively  indifferent  to  the 
progress  of  constitutional  liberty. 

58  Perpetual  Peace 

terest,  in  its  political  achievements.  This  was  partly 
because  of  his  sympathy  with  republican  doctrines : 
partly  due  to  his  love  of  justice  and  peculiar  hatred 
of  war,  *  a  hatred  based,  no  doubt,  not  less  on 
principle  than  on  a  close  personal  experience  of 
the  wretchedness  it  brings  with  it.  It  was  not  the 
political  and  social  conditions  in  which  he  lived 
which  fostered  Kant's  love  of  liberty  and  gave  him 
inspiration,  unless  in  the  sense  in  which  the  mind 
reacts  upon  surrounding  influences.  Looking  beyond 

*  Isolated  passages  are  sometimes  quoted  from  Kant  in  support 
of  a  theory  that  the  present  treatise  is  at  least  half  ironical  l  and 
that  his  views  on  the  question  of  perpetual  peace  did  not  essenti- 
ally differ  from  those  of  Leibniz.  "Even  war,"  he  says,  (Kritik  d. 
Urteilskraft*  I.  Book  ii.  §  28.)  "when  conducted  in  an  orderly 
way  and  with  reverence  for  the  rights  of  citizens  has  something  of 
the  sublime  about  it,  and  the  more  dangers  a  nation  which  wages 
war  in  this  manner  is  exposed  to  and  can  courageously  overcome, 
the  nobler  does  its  character  grow.  \Yhile,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
prolonged  peace  usually  has  the  effect  of  giving  free  play  to  a 
purely  commercial  spirit,  and  side  by  side  with  this,  to  an  ignoble 
self-seeking,  to  cowardice  and  effeminacy;  and  the  result  of  this 
is  generally  a  degradation  of  national  character." 

This  is  certainly  an  admission  that  war  which  does  not  violate 
the  Law  of  Nations  lias  a  good  side  as  \\ell  as  a  bad.  We  could 
look  for  no  less  in  so  clear-sighted  and  unprejudiced  a  thinker. 
Kant  would  have  been  the  first  to  admit  that  under  certain  condi- 
tions a  nation  can  have  no  higher  duty  than  to  wage  war.  War 
is  necessary,  but  it  is  in  contradiction  to  reason  and  the  spirit  of 
right.  The  "scourge  of  mankind,*'  "making  more  bad  men  than 
it  takes  away,"  the  "destroyer  of  every  good,"  Kant  calls  it 
elsewhere.  (J^heory  of  Ethics,  Abbott's  trans.,  4th  ed.,  p.  341,  note.) 

1  Cf.  K.  v.  Stengel:  Der  Ewig*  Friede,  Munich,  1899;  also 
Vaihinger:  Kantstudien,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  58, 

Translator's  Introduction  59 

Prussia  to  America,  in  whose  struggle  for  indepen- 
dence he  tpok  a  keen  interest,  and  looking  to 
France  where  the  old  dynastic  monarchy  had  been 
succeeded  by  a  republican  state,  Kant  seemed  to 
see  the  signs  of  a  coming  democratisation  of  the 
old  monarchical  society  of  Europe.  In  this  growing 
influence  on  the  slate  of  the  mass  of  the  people 
who  had  everything  to  lose  in  war  and  little  to 
gain  by  victory,  he  saw  the  guarantee  of  a  future 
perpetual  peace.  Other  forces  too  were  at  work 
to  bring  about  this  consummation.  There  was  a 
growing  consciousness  that  war,  this  costly  means 
of  settling  a  dispute,  is  not  even  a  satisfactory 
method  of  settlement.,  \  Hazardous  and  destructive 
in  its  effect,  it  is  also  uncertain  in  its  results.  Victory 
is  not  always  gain ;  it  no  longer  signifies  a  land 
to  be  plundered,  a  people  to  be  sold  to  slavery.  It 
brings  fresh  responsibilities  to  a  nation,  at  a  time 
when  it  is  not  always  strong  enough  to  bear  them. 
But,  above  all,  Kant  saw,  even  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  the  nations  of  Europe  so  closely 
bound  together  by  commercial  interests  that  a  war 
— and  especially  a  maritim6*war  where  the  scene  of 
conflict  cannot  be  to  the  same  extent  localised  as 
on  land — between  any  two  of  them  could  not  but 
seriously  affect  the  prosperity  of  the  others.  *  He 

*  Cf.   Idea  for  a    Universal  History,  Prop.  8 ;  Perpetual  Peace, 
pp.  142,  157. 

60  Ptrpttual  Peace 

clearly  realised  that  the  spirit  of  commerce  was  the 
strongest  force  in  the  service  of  the  maintenance  of 
peace,  and  that  in  it  lay  a  guarantee  of  future  union. 
This  scheme  of  a  federation  of  the  nations  of 
the  world,  in  accordance  with  principles  which 
would  put  an  end  to  war  between  them,  was  one 
whose  interest  for  Kant  seemed  to  increase  during 
the  last  twenty  years  of  his  life.  *  It  was  accord- 
ing to  him  an  idea  of  reason,  and,  in  his  first  essay 
on  the  subject — that  of  1784 — we  see  the  place  this 
ideal  of  a  perpetual  peace  held  in  the  Kantian 
system  of  philosophy.-  Its  realisation  is  the  realisa- 
tion of  the  highest  good — the  ethical  and  political 
summum  bonum,  for  here  the  aims  of  morals  and 
politics  coincide :  only  in  a  perfect  development  of 
his  faculties  in  culture  and  in  morals  can  man  at 
last  find  true  happiness.  History  is  working  towards 
the  consummation  of  this  end.  A  moral  obligation 
lies  on  man  to  strive  to  establish  conditions  which 
bring  its  realisation  nearer.  It  is  the  duty  of  statesmen 
to  form  a  federative  union  as  it  was  formerly  the 
duty  of  individuals  to  enter  the  state.  The  moral 
law  points  the  way  here  as  clearly  as  in  the  sphere  of 
pure  ethics : — "  Thou  can'st,  therefore  thou  ought'st." 

•  The  immediate  stimulus  to  Kant's  active  interest  in  this 
subject  as  a  practical  question  was  the  Peace  of  Basle  (1795)  which 
ended  the  first  stag*  in  the  series  of  wars  which  followed  the 
French  R«yoluiion, 

Translator's  Introduction  6 1 

Let  us  be  under  no  misapprehension  as  to  Kant's 
attitude  to  the  problem  of  perpetual  peace.  It  is 
an  ideal.  He  states  plainly  that  he  so  regards  it  * 
and  that  as  such  it  is  unattainable.  But  this  is  the 
essence  of  all  ideals :  they  have  not  the  less  value 
in  shaping  the  life  and  character  of  men  and  nations 
on  that  account.  They  are  not  ends  to  be  realised 
but  ideas  according  to  which  we  must  live,  regulative 
principles.  We  cannot,  says  Kant,  shape  our  life 
better  than  in  acting  as  if  such  ideas  of  reason 
have  objective  validity  and  there  be  an  immortal 
life  in  which  man  shall  live  according  to  the  laws 
of  reason,  in  peace  with  his  neighbour  and  in  free- 
dom from  the  trammels  of  sense. 

Hence  we  are  concerned  here,  not  with  an  end, 
but  with  the  means  by  which  we  might  best  set 
about  attaining  it,  if  it  were  attainable.  This  is 
the  subject  matter  of  the  Treatise  on  Perpetual 
Peace  (1/95),  a  less  eloquent  and  less  purely 
philosophical  essay  than  that  of  1784,  but  through- 
out more  systematic  and  practical.  We  have  to 
do,  not  with  the  favourite  dream  of  philanthropists 
like  St.  Pierre  and  Rousseau,  but  with  a  statement 
of  the  conditions  on  the  fulfilment  of  which 
the  transition  to  a  reign  of  peace  and  law 

*  It  is  tine  unausfuhrbabe  /ato.  See  tk«  passage  quoted  from 
the  Rtfhtsltkre,  p.  129,  note. 

62  Perpetual  Peace 

The  Conditions  of  the  Realisation  of  the 
Kantian  Ideal. 

These  means  are  of  two  kinds.  In  the  first  place, 
what  evils  must  we  set  about  removing?  What 
are  the  negative  conditions?  And,  secondly,  what 
are  the  general  positive  conditions  which  will  make 
the  realisation  of  this  idea  possible  and  guarantee 
the  permanence  of  an  international  peace  once 
attained?  These  negative  and  positive  conditions 
Kant  calls  Preliminary  and  Definitive  Articles 
respectively,  the  whole  essay  being  carefully  thrown 
into  the  form  of  a  treaty.  QThe  Preliminary  Articles 
of  a  treaty  for  perpetual  peace  are  based  on  the 
principle  that  anything  that  hinders  or  threatens 
the  peaceful  co  existence  of  nations  must  be 
abolished.  These  conditions  have  been  classified 
by  Kuno  Fischer.  Kant,  he  points  out,  *  examines 
the  principles  of  right  governing  the  different  sets 
of  circumstances  in  which  nations  find  themselves—- 
namely, (a)  while  they  are  actually  at  war ;  (b)  when 
the  time  comes  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  peace ;  (c) 
when  they  are  living  in  a  state  of  peace.  The  six 
Preliminary  Articles  fall  naturally  into  these  groups. 
War  must  not  be  conducted  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  increase  national  hatred  and  embitter  a  future 

*  Gtschichte  der  tuueren  Philosophic,  (4th  cd.,  1899),  Vol.  V.,  I. 
Ch.  12,  p.  1 68  seq. 

Translator's  Introduction  63 

peace.  (Art.  6.)  *  The  treaty  which  brings  hc/Stili- 
ties  to  an  end  must  be  concluded  in  an  honest 
desire  for  peace.  (Art.  i.)f  Again  a  nation,  when  in 
a  state  of  peace,  must  do  nothing  to  threaten  the 
political  independence  of  another  nation  or  endanger 
its  existence,  thereby  giving  the  strongest  of  all 
motives  for  a  fresh  war.  A  nation  may  commit 
this  injury  in  two  ways:  (i)  indirectly,  by  causing 
danger  to  others  through  the  growth  of  its  stand- 
ing army  (Art.  3)  § — always  a  menace  to  the  state 
of  peace — or  by  any  unusual  war  preparations  :  and 
(2)  through  too  great  a  supremacy  of  another  kind, 
by  amassing  money,  the  most  powerful  of  all 
weapons  in  warfare.  The  National  Debt  (Art.  4)  **  is 
another  standing  danger  to  the  peaceful  co-existence 
of  nations.  But,  besides,  -we  have  the  danger  of 
actual  attack.  There  is  no  right  of  intervention 
between  nations.  (Art.  5.)  ft  Nor  can  states  be  in- 
herited or  conquered  (Art.  2),  §§  or  in  any  way 
treated  in  a  manner  subversive  of  their  indepen- 
dence and  sovereignty  as  individuals.  For  a  similar 
reason,  armed  troops  cannot  be  hired  and  sold  as 

*  See  p.  114. 

t  See  p.  107. 

§  See  p.  no. 

**  See  p.  in. 

ft  S««  p.  ii 2. 

§§  See  p.  i«8. 

64  Perpetual  Peace 

These  then  are  the  negative  conditions  of  peace.  * 
There  are,  besides,  three  positive  conditions : 

*  A  large  part  of  Kant's  requirements  as  they  art  expressed  iu 
these  Preliminary  Articles  has  already  been  fulfilled.  The  first 
(Art.  l)  is  recognised  in  theory  at  least  by  modern  international 
law.  More  cannot  be  said.  A  tre.ity  of  this  kind  is  of  necessity 
more  or  less  forced  by  the  stronger  on  the  weaker.  The  formal 
ratification  of  peace  in  1871  did  not  prevent  France  from  longing 
for  the  day  when  she  might  win  back  Alsace-Lorraine  and  be 
revenged  on  Prussin.  Not  the  treaty  nor  a  consciousness  of  defeat 
has  kept  the  peace  west  of  the  Rhine,  but  a  reluctant  respect  for 
the  fortress  of  Metz  and  the  mighty  army  of  united  Germany. 

Articles  a  and  6  are  already  commonplaces  of  international  law. 
Article  2  refers  to  practices  which  have  not  survived  the  gradual 
disappearance  of  dynastic  war.  Art  6  is  the  basis  of  our  modem 
law  of  war.  Art.  3  has  been  fulfilled  in  the  literal  sense  that 
the  standing  armies  composed  of  mercenary  troops  to  which  Kant 
alludes  exist  no  longer.  But  it  is  to  be  feared  that  Kant  would 
not  think  that  we  have  made  tilings  much  better,  nor  regard 
our  present  system  of  progressive  armaments  as  a  step  in  the 
direction  of  perpetual  peace.  Art.  4  is  not  likely  to  be  fulfilled 
in  the  near  future.  It  is  long  since  Cobden  denounced  th« 
institution  of  National  Debts — an  institution  which,  as  Kant  point* 
out,  owes  its  origin  to  the  English,  th«  "commercial  people" 
referred  to  in  the  text.  Art.  5  no  doubt  came  to  Kant  through. 
Vattel.  ''No  nation,"  says  the  Swiss  publicist,  (Law  of  Nationst 
IL  Ch.  iv.  §  54)  "has  the  least  right  to  interfere  with  the  government 
of  another,"  unless,  he  adds,  (Ch.  v.  \  70)  in  a  case  of  anarchy  or 
where  the  well-being  of  the  human  race  demands  It.  This  is  a 
recognised  principle  of  modern  international  law.  Intervention  is 
held  to  be  justifiable  only  where  the  obligation  to  respect  another's 
freedom  of  action  comes  into  conflict  with  the  duty  of  self-preservation. 

Puffendorf  leaves  much  more  room  for  the  exercise  of  bene- 
volence. The  natural  affinity  and  kinship  ^between  men  is, 
says  he,  (Lts  Devoirs  eU  Fkomme  it  du  citoien,  II.  Ch.  xvi.  \  xi.) 
"a  sufficient  reason  to  authorise  us  to  take  up  defence  of  every 
person  whom  one  sees  unjustly  oppressed,  when  he  implore* 
our  aid  and  whm  wt  can  do  it  conveniently"  (The  italics  are 

Translator's  Introduction  65 

(a)  The  intercourse  of  nations  is  to  be  confined  to 
a  right  of  hospitality.   (Art.  3.)  *    There  is  nothing 
new    to    us    in   this   assertion   of  a   right   of  way. 
The    right    to    free    means    of    international    com- 
munication  has   in   the  last  hundred  years  become 
a    commonplace    of    law.      And    the    change    has 
been    brought    about,     as    Kant    anticipated,    not 
through    an   abstract   respect  for  the  idea  of  right, 
but    through    the    pressure    of   purely    commercial 
interests.     Since  Kant's  time  the  nations  of  Europe 
have    all    been    more    or    less    transformed    from 
agricultural   to   commercial    states    whose    interests 
run   mainly  in  the  same  direction,  whose  existence 
and  development  depend  necessarily  upon  "condi- 
tions of  universal  hospitality."    Commerce  depends 
upon     this     freedom     of    international    intercourse, 
and   on    commerce   mainly    depends    our    hope    of 

(b]  The  first  Definitive  Article  f  requires  that  the 
constitution   of  every   state   should   be  republican. 
What   Kant   understands    by   this   term   is  that,  in 
the  state,  law  should  rule  above  force  and  that  its 

*  See  p.  137.  The  main  principle  involved  in  this  passage  comes 
from  Vattel  (e>p.  eit.,  H  Ch.  viii.  §§  104,  105:  Ch.  ix.  §§  123,  125). 
A  sovereign,  he  says,  cannot  object  to  a  stranger  entering  his  state 
who  at  the  same  time  respects  its  laws.  No  one  can  be  quite 
deprived  of  the  right  of  way  which  has  been  handed  down  from 
the  time  when  the  whole  earth  was  common  to  all  men. 

f  See  p.  120. 


66  Ptrpttual  Peace 

constitution  should  be  a  representative  one,  guar- 
anteeing public  justice  and  based  on  the  freedom 
and  equality  of  its  members  and  their  mutual  depen- 
dence on  a  common  legislature.  Kant's  demand  is 
independent  of  the  form  of  the  government.  A 
constitutional  monarchy  like  that  of  Prussia  in  the 
time  of  Frederick  the  Great,  who  regarded  himself 
as  the  first  servant  of  the  state  and  ruled  with  the 
wisdom  and  forethought  which  the  nation  would 
have  had  the  right  to  demand  from  such  an  one- 
such  a  monarchy  is  not  in  contradiction  to  the 
idea  of  a  true  republic.  That  the  state  should 
have  a  constitution  in  accordance  with  the  princi- 
ples of  right  is  the  essential  point.  *  To  make 

*  Kant  believed  that,  in  the  newly  formed  constitution  of  the 
United  States,  his  ideal  with  regard  to  the  external  forms  of  the 
state  as  conforming  to  the  spirit  of  justice  was  most  nearly  realised. 
Professor  Paulsen  draws  attention,  in  the  following  passage,  to  the 
fact  that  Kant  held  the  English  government  of  the  eighteenth 
century  in  very  low  esteem.  (fCanf,  p.  357,  note.  See  Eng.  trans., 
p.  352,  note.)  It  was  not  the  English  state,  he  says,  which 
furnished  Kant  with  an  illustration  of  his  theory : — "  Rather  in  it 
he  sees  a  form  of  despotism  only  slightly  veiled,  not  Parliamentary 
despotism,  as  some  people  have  thought,  but  monarchical  despotism. 
Through  bribery  of  the  Commons  and  .the  Press,  the  King  had 
actually  absolute  power,  as  was  evident,  above  all,  from  the  fact 
that  he  had  often  waged  war  without,  and  in  defiance  of,  the  will 
of  the  people.  Kant  has  a  very  unfavourable  opinion  of  the 
English  state  in  every  way.  Among  the  collected  notes  written  by 
him  in  the  last  ten  years  of  the  century  and  published  by  Reicke 
(Lose  Blatter >  I.  129)  the  following  appears : — 'The  English  nation 
(gens)  regarded  as  a  people  (populus)  and  looked  upon  side  by 
side  with  other  races  is,  as  a  collection  of  individuals,  of  all 

Translator 's  Introduction  67 

this  possible,  the  law-giving  power  must  lie  with 
the  representatives  of  the  people :  there  must  be  a 
complete  separation,  such  as  Locke  and  Rousseau 
demand,  between  the  legislature  and  executive. 
Otherwise  we  have  despotism.  Hence,  while  Kant 
admitted  absolutism  under  certain  conditions,  he 
rejected  democracy  where,  in  his  opinion,  the  mass 
of  the  people  was  despot. 

An  internal  constitution,  firmly  established  on  the 
principles  of  right,  would  not  only  serve  to  kill 
the  seeds  of  national  hatred  and  diminish  the 
likelihood  of  foreign  war.  It  would  do  more:  it 
would  destroy  sources  of  revolution  and  discontent 
within  the  state.  Kant,  like  many  writers  on  this 
subject,  does  not  directly  allude  to  civil  war  *  and 


mankind  the  most  highly  to  be  esteemed.  But  as  a  state,  compared 
with  other  states,  it  is  the  most  destructive,  high-handed  and 
tyrannical,  and  the  most  provocative  of  war  among  them  all.'" 
Kuno  Fischer  (op.  cit.,  Vol.  V.,  I.  Ch.  II,  pp.  150,  151)  to 
whom  Professor  Paulsen's  reference  may  here  perhaps  allude,  states 
that  Kant's  objection  to  the  English  constitution  is  that  it  was 
an  oligarchy,  Parliament  being  not  only  a  legislative  body,  but 
through  its  ministers  also  executive  in  the  interests  of  the  ruling 
party  or  even  of  private  individuals  in  that  party; "  It  seems  more 
likely  that  what  most  offended  a  keen  observer  of  the  course  of 
the  American  War  of  Independence  was  the  arbitrary  and  ill- 
directed  power  of  the  king.  But  see  the  passage  quoted  by  Fischer 
(pp.  152,  153)  from  the  Rechtslehre  (Part  II.  Sect.  I.)  which  is,  he 
says,  unmistakeably  directed  against  the  English  constitution  and 
certain  temporary  conditions  in  the  political  history  of  the  country. 

*  St.  Pierre  actually  thought  that  his  federation  would  prevent 
civil  war.  See  Project  (1714),  p.  16. 

Ptrpttual  Peace 

the  means  by  which  it  may  be  prevented  or 
abolished.  Actually  to  achieve  this  would  be  im- 
possible :  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  either  arbitration 
or  disarmament.  But  in  a  representative  government 
and  the  liberty  of  a  people  lie  the  greatest  safe- 
guards against  internal  discontent.  Civil  peace  and 
international  peace  must  to  a  certain  extent  go 
hand  in  hand. 

We  come  now  to  the  central  idea  of  the  treatise : 
(c)  the  law  of  nations  must  be  based  upon  a  federation 
of  free  states.  (Art.  2.)  *  This  must  be  regarded  as 
the  end  to  which  mankind  is  advancing.  The 
problem  here  is  not  out  of  many  nations  to  make 
one.  This  would  be  perhaps  the  surest  way  to 
attain  peace,  but  it  is  scarcely  practicable,  and,  in 
certain  forms,  it  is  undesirable.  Kant  is  inclined  to 
approve  of  the  separation  of  nations  by  language 
and  religion,  by  historical  and  social  tradition  and 
physical  boundaries:  nature  seems  to  condemn  the 
idea  of  a  universal  monarchy,  f  The  only  footing 

*  See  p.  128. 

f  This  was  the  ideal  of  Daute.  Cf.  De  Monq.rchiat  Bk.  I.  54 : — 
"We  shall  not  find  at  any  tune  estcept  under  the  divine  monarch 
Augustus,  when  a  perfect  monarchy  existed,  that  the  world  was 
everywhere  quiet." 

Bluntschli  (Theory  of  ike  St*tct  L  Ch.  ii.,  p.  26  J*f.)  gives  an 
admirable  account  of  the  different  attempts  made  to  realise  a 
universal  empire  in  the  past— the  Empire  of  Alexander  the  Great, 
ba»^4  upon  a  plan  of  uniting  the  races  of  east  and  west;  the 
Roman  Empire  which  sought  vainly  to  stamp  its  national  character 

Translator's  Introduction  69 

on  which  a  thorough-going,  indubitable  system  of 
international  law  is  in  practice  possible  is  that  of 
the  society  of  nations :  not  the  world-republic  * 
the  Greeks  dreamt  of,  but  a  federation  of  states. 
Such  a  union  in  the  interests  of  perpetual  peace 
between  nations  would  be  the  "highest  political 
good."  The  relation  of  the  federated  states  to  one 
another  and  to  the  whole  would  be  fixed  by  cosmo- 
politan law  :  the  link  of  self-interest  which  would 
bind  them  would  again  be  the  spirit  of  commerce. 
This  scheme  of  a  perpetual  peace  had  not  escaped 
ridicule  in  the  eighteenth  century:  the  name  of 

upon  mankind;  the  Prankish  Monarchy;  the  Holy  Roman  Empire 
which  fell  to  pieces  through  the  want  of  a  central  power  strong 
enough  to  overcome  the  tendency  to  separation  and  nationalisation ; 
and  finally  the  attempt  of  Napoleon  I.,  whose  mistake  was  the 
same  as  that  which  wrecked  the  Roman  Empire — a  neglect  of  the 
strength  of  foreign  national  sentiment. 

*  Reason  requires  a  State  of  nations.  This  is  the  ideal,  and 
Kant's  proposal  of  a  federation  of  states  is  a  practical  substitute 
from  which  we  may  work  to  higher  things.  Kant,  like  Fichte, 
(\Verke,  VII.  467)  strongly  disapproves  of  a  unirersal  monarchy 
such  as  that  of  which  Dante  dreamed — a  modern  Roman  Empire. 
The  force  of  necessity,  he  says,  will  bring  nations  at  last  to  become 
members  of  a  cosmopolitan  state,  "or  if  such  a  state  of  universal 
peace  proves  (as  has  often  been  the  case  with  too  great  states)  a 
greater  danger  to  freedom  from  another  point  of  view,  in  that  it 
introduces  despotism  of  the  most  terrible  kind,  then  this  same 
necessity  must  compel  the  nations  to  enter  a  state  which  indeed 
has  the  form  not  of  a  cosmopolitan  commonweath  under  one 
sovereign,  but  of  a  federation  regulated  by  legal  principles  determined 
by  a  common  code  of  international  law.'.1  (Das  mag  in  d.  Theorit 
richtig  stift,  Wetkt,  (Rosenkranz)  VII.,  p.  225).  Cf.  also  Thtory  cf 
F.tkics,  (Abbott),  p.  341,  note,'  Ptrpttual  Pt<ut,  pp.  155,  156. 

70  Perpetual  Peace 

Kant  protected  it  henceforth.  The  facts  of  history, 
even  more  conclusively  than  the  voices  of  philo- 
sophers, soldiers  and  princes,  show  how  great  has 
been  the  progress  of  this  idea  in  recent  years. 
But  it  has  not  gained  its  present  hold  upon  the 
popular  mind  without  great  and  lasting  opposition. 
Indeed  we  have  here  what  must  still  be  regarded 
as  a  controversial  question.  There  have  been, 
and  are  still,  men  who  regard  perpetual  peace 
as  a  state  of  things  as  undesirable  as  it  is  un- 
attainable. For  such  persons,  war  is  a  necessity 
of  our  civilisation:  it  is  impossible  that  it  should 
ever  cease  to  exist.  All  that  we  can  do,  and 
there  is  no  harm,  nor  any  contradiction  in  the 
attempt,  is  to  make  wars  shorter,  fewer  and  more 
humane :  the  whole  question,  beyond  this,  is  without 
practical  significance.  Others,  on  the  other  hand,— 
and  these  perhaps  more  thoughtful — regard  war  as 
hostile  to  culture,  an  evil  of  the  worst  kind,  although 
a  necessary  evil.  In  peace,  for  them,  lies  the  true 
ideal  of  humanity,  although  in  any  perfect  form  this 
cannot  be  realised  in  the  near  future.  The  extreme 
forms  of  these  views  are  to  be  sought  in  what  has 
been  called  in  Germany  ^."  the  philosophy  of  the 
barracks  "  which  comes  forward  with  a  glorification  of 
war  for  its  own  sake,  and  in  the  attitude  of  modern 
Peace  Societies  which  denounce  all  war  wholesale, 
without  respect  of  causes  or  conditions. 

Translators  Introduction  71 

Hegel,  Schil^r  and  Moltke. 

Hegel,  the  greatest  of  the  champions  of  war, 
would  have  nothing  to  do  with  Kant's  federation 
of  nations  formed  in  the  interests  of  peace.  The 
welfare  of  a  state,  he  held,  is  its  own  highest 
law ;  and  he  refused  to  admit  that  this  welfare 
was  to  be  sought  in  an  international  peace.  Hegel 
lived  in  an  age  when  all  power  and  order  seemed 
to  lie  with  the  sword.  Something  of  the  charm 
of  Napoleonism  seems  to  hang  over  him.  He 
does  not  go  the  length  of  writers  like  Joseph 
de  Maistre,  who  see  in  war  the  finger  of  God  or 
an  arrangement  for  the  survival  of  the  fittest — a 
theory,  as  far  as  regards  individuals,  quite  in 
contradiction  with  the  real  facts,  which  show  that 
it  is  precisely  the  physically  unfit  whom  war, 
as  a  method  of  extermination,  cannot  reach.  But, 
like  Schiller  and  Moltke,  Hegel  sees  in  war  an 
educative  instrument,  developing  virtues  in  a 
nation  which  could  not  be  fully  developed  other- 
wise, (much  as  pain  and  suffering  bring  patience 
and  resignation  and  other  such  qualities  into  play 
in  the  individual),  and  drawing  the  nation  together, 
making  each  citizen  conscious  of  his  citizenship,  as 
no  other  influence  can.  War,  he  holds,  leaves  a 
nation  always  stronger  than  it  was  before ;  it  buries 
causes  of  inner  dissension,  and  consolidates  the 

7 2  Perpetual  Peace 

internal  power  of  the  state.  *>  No  other  trial  can, 
in  the  same  way,  show  what  is  the  real  strength 
and  weakness  of  a  nation,  what  it  ts,  not 
merely  materially,  but  physically,  intellectually 
and  morally. 

With  this  last  statement  most  people  will  be 
inclined  to  agree.  There  is  only  a  part  of  the 
truth  in  Napoleon's  dictum  that  "  God  is  on  the 
side  of  the  biggest  battalions  " ;  or  in  the  old  saying 
that  war  requires  three  necessaries— in  the  first 
place,  money;  in  the  second  place,  money;  and  in 
the  third,  money.  Money  is  a  great  deal :  it  is  a 
necessity;  but  what  we  call  national  back-bone 
and  character  is  more.  So  far  we  are  with 
Hegel.  But  he  goes  further.  In  peace,  says  he, 
mankind  would  grow  effeminate  and  degenerate  in 
luxury.  This  opinion  was  expressed  in  forcible 
language  in  his  own  time  by  Schilier,t  and  in  more 

•  See   the  Philosophic   <t.  Rtckttt  (K'trke,   Vol.   VHJ.)   Part   iti. 
§  324  and  appendix. 

f  Cf.  Die  Braut  von  Mtssina.-— 

"Denn  der  Mensch  verkiimmert  im  Frieden, 
Miissige  Ruh'  1st  das  Grab  des  Muths. 
Das  Gesetz  ist  der  Freund  des  Schwachen, 
Alles  will  es  nur  eben  machen, 
Mochte  gerne  die  Welt  verflachen; 
Aber  der  Krieg  lasst  die  Kraft  erscheinen, 
Alles  erhebt  er  sum  Ungemeinen, 
Selber  dem  Feigen  erzeugt  er  den  Muth." 

Thii    passage    perhaps    scarcely    give*    a   fair  repr*»entatiom   of 
Schiller's  views  on  the  question,  which,  if  wo  j«dg«  from  Wilhtlm 

Translator's  Introduction  73 

recent  years  by  Count  Moltke.  "  Perpetual  peace," 
says  a  letter  of  the  great  general,*  "is  a  dream 
and  not  a  beautiful  dream  either :  war  is  part  of 
the  divine  order  of  the  world.  During  war  are 
developed  the  noblest  virtues  which  belong  to  man — 
courage  and  self-denial,  fidelity  to  duty  and  the 
spirit  of  self-sacrifice :  the  soldier  is  called  upon 
to  risk  his  life.  Without  war  the  world  would 
sink  in  materialism."  f  "Want  and  misery,  disease, 
suffering  and  war,"  he  says  elsewhere,  "are  all 

TV//,   must   have  been   very   moderate.     War  he  says,  in  this  oft- 
quoted  passage,  is  sometimes  a  necessity.     There  is  a  limit  to  the 
power  of  tyranny  and,  when  the  burden  becomes  unbearable,  an 
appeal  to  Heaven  and  the  sword. 
Wilhelm  Tell:  Act.  II.  Sc.  2. 

"Nein,  eine  Grenze  hat  Tyrannenmacht. 
Weun  der  Gedriickte  nirgends  Recht  kanfi.  ftnden, 
Wenn  unertraglich  wird  die  Last  greift  er 
Hinauf  getrosten  Muthes  in  den  Himmel 
Und  holt  herunter  seine  ew'gen  Rechte, 
Die  droben  hangen  unverausserlich 
Und  unzerbrechlich,  wie  die  Sterne  selbst — 
Der  alte  Urstand  der  Natur  kehrt  wieder. 
Wo  Mensch  dem  Menschen  gegenuber  iteht — • 
Zum  letzten  Mittel,  wenn  kein  andres  mehr 
Verfangen  will,  1st  ihm  das  Schwert  gegeben." 
*  Letter  to   Bluntschli,  dated  Berlin,  nth  Dec.,  1880  (published 
in  Bluntschli's  Gesammelte  Kleine  Schriften,  Vol.  II.,  p.  271). 

f  Cf.  Tennyson's  Maud:  Part  I.,  vi.  and  xiii. 
"Why   do   they  prate   of  the  blessings  of  Peace?  we  have  made 

them  a  curse, 

Pickpockets,  each  hand  lusting  for  all  that  is  not  its  own; 
And  lust  of  gain,  In  the  spirit  of  Cain,  is  it  better  or  worse 
Than    the    h»art    of   the    citiien    hissing    in    war    om    his    OWE 


74  Perpetual  Peace 

given  elements  in  the  Divine  order  of  the  uni- 
verse." Moltke's  eulogy  of  war,  however,  is  some- 
what modified  by  his  additional  statement  that 
"the  greatest  kindness  in  war  lies  in  its  being 
quickly  ended."  (Letter  to  Bluntschli,  nth  Dec., 

For  I   trust   if  an  enemy's  fleet  came  yonder  round  by  the  hill, 
And   the   rushing   battle-bolt   sang  from  the  three-decker  out  of 

the  foam, 
That  the  tmooth-faced   snub-nosed   rogue  would  leap  from  his 

counter  and  till, 
And  strike,  if  he  could,  were  it  but  with  his  cheating  yardwand, 


See  too  Part  I1T.,  ii.  and  iv. 

"And  it  was  but  a  dream,  yet  it  lighten'd  my  despair 
When  I  thought  that  a  war  would  arise  in  defence  of  the  right, 
That  an  iron  tyranny  now  should  bend  or  cease, 
The  glory  of  manhood  stand  on  his  ancient  height, 
Nor  Britain's  one  sole  God  be  the  millionaire: 
No  more  shall  commerce  be  all  in  all,  and  Peace 
Pipe  on  her  pastoral  hillock  a  languid  note, 
And  watch  her  harvest  ripen,  her  herd  increase, 
Nor  the  cannon-bullet  rest  on  a  slothful  shore, 
And  the  cobweb  woven  across  the  cannon's  throat 
Shall  shake  its  threaded  tears  in  the  wind  no  more. 

Let  it  go  or  stay,  so  I  wake  to  the  higher  aims 

Of  a  land  that  has  lost  for  a  little  her  lust  of  gold, 

And  love  of  a  peace  that  was  full  of  wrongs  and  shame*, 

Horrible,  hateful,  monstrous,  not  to  be  told;  & 

And  hail  once  more  to  the  banner  of  battle  unroll'd! 

Tho'  many  a  light  shall  darken,  and  many  shall  weep 

For  those  that  are  crush'd  in  the  clash  of  jarring  claims, 

For  God's  just  wrath  shall  be  wreak'd  on  a  giant  liar; 

And  many  a  darkness  into  the  light  shall  leap, 

And  shine  in  the  sudden  making  of  splendid  names, 

And  noble  thought  be  freer  under  the  sun, 

And  the  heart  of  a  people  beat  with  one  desire." 

Translator  s  Introduction  75 

1880.)  *  The  great  forces  which  we  recognise  as 
factors  in  the  moral  regeneration  of  mankind  are 
always  slow  of  action  as  they  are  sure.  War,  if 
too  quickly  over,  could  not  have  the  great  moral 
influence  which  has  been  attributed  to  it.  The 
explanation  may  be  that  it  is  not  all  that  it  naturally 
appears  to  a  great  and  successful  general.  Hegel, 
Moltke,  Trendelenburg,  Treitschke  f  and  the  others — • 
not  Schiller  §  who  was  able  to  sing  the  blessings  of 
peace  as  eloquently  as  of  war — were  apt  to  forget 
that  war  is  as  efficient  a  school  for  forming  vices  as 
virtues;  and  that,  moreover,  those  virtues  which 
military  life  is  said  to  cultivate — courage,  self-sacri- 
fice and  the  rest — can  be  at  least  as  perfectly 
developed  in  other  trials.  There  are  in  human  life 
dangers  every  day  bravely  met  and  overcome  which 
are  not  less  terrible  than  those  which  face  the  soldier, 
in  whom  patriotism  may  be  less  a  sentiment  than  a 
duty,  and  whose  cowardice  must  be  dearly  paid. 

War  under  Altered  Conditions. 

The  Peace  Societies  of  our  century,  untiring 
supporters  of  a  point  of  view  diametrically  opposite 

*  Moltke  strangely  enough  was,  at  an  earlier  period,  of  the 
opinion  that  war,  even  when  it  is  successful,  is  a  national  mis- 
fortune. Cf.  Kehrbach's  preface  to  Kant's  essay,  Zum  Ewtge* 
Frieden,  p.  XVII. 

t  See  his  discussion  on  constitutional  monarchy  in  Germany. 
(Hist.  u.  Pol.  Au/sM*f,  Bd.  III.,  p.  533  stq.) 

§  See  Du  Piccokmlni:  Act.  I.  Sc.  4. 

76  Perpetual  Peace 

to  that  of  Hegel,  owe  their  existence  in  the  first 
place  to  new  ideas  on  the  subject  of  the  relative 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  war,  which  again 
were  partly  due  to  changes  in  the  character  of  war 
itself,  partly  to  a  new  theory  that  the  warfare  of 
the  future  should  be  a  war  of  free  competition  for 
industrial  interests,  or,  in  Herbert  Spencer's  language, 
that  the  warlike  type  of  mankind  should  make 
room  for  an  industrial  type.  This  theory,  amounting 
in  the  minds  of  some  thinkers  to  a  fervid  conviction, 
and  itself,  in  a  sense,  the  source  of  what  has  been 
contemptuously  styled  our  British  "shopkeeper's 
policy"  in  Europe,  was  based  on  something  more 
solid  than  mere  enthusiasm.  The  years  of  peace 
which  followed  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  had  brought 
immense  increase  in  material  wealth  to  countries 
like  France  and  Britain.  Something  of  the  glamour 
had  fallen  away  from  the  sword  of  the  great  Emperor. 
The  illusive  excitement  of  a  desire  for  conquest  had 
died:  the  glory  of  war  had  faded  with  it,  but  the 
burden  still  remained :  its  cost  was  still  there,  some- 
thing to  be  calmly  reckoned  up  and  not  soon 
to  be  forgotten.  Europe  was  seen  to  be  actually 
moving  towards  ruin.  v"We  shall  have  to  get  rid 
of  war  in  all  civilised  countries,"  said  Louis  Philippe 
in  1843.  "Soon  no  nation  will  be  able  to  afford 
it."  War  was  not  only  becoming  more  costly. 
New  conditions  had  altered  it  in  other  directions. 

Translator's  Introduction 

With  the  development  of  technical  science  and  its 
application  to  the  perfecting  of  methods  and  in- 
struments of  destruction  every  new  war  was  found 
to  be  bloodier  than  the  last;  and  the  day  seemed 
to  be  in  sight,  when  this  very  development  would 
make  war  (with  instruments  of  extermination)  im- 
possible altogether.  The  romance  and  picturesque- 
ness  with  which  it  was  invested  in  the  days  of 
hand-to-hand  combat  was  gone.  But,  above  all, 
war  was  now  waged  for  questions  fewer  and  more 
important  than  in  the  time  of  Kant.  Napoleon's 
successful  appeal  to  the  masses  had  suggested  to 
Prussia  the  idea  of  ^consciously  nationalising  the 
army.  Our  modern  national  wars  exact  a  sacrifice, 
necessarily  much  more  heavy,  much  more  reluctantly 
made  than  those  of  the  past  which  were  fought 
with  mercenary  troops.  Such  wars  have  not  only 
greater  dignity:  they  are  more  earnest,  and  their 
issue,  as  in  a  sense  the  issue  of  conflict  between 
higher  and  lower  types  of  civilisation,  is  speedier 
and  more  decisive. 

In  the  hundred  years  since  Kant's  death,  much 
that  he  prophesied  has  come  to  pass,  although 
sometimes  by  different  paths  than  he  anticipated. 
The  strides  made  in  recent  years  by  commerce 
and  the  growing  power  of  the  people  in  every 
state  have  had  much  of  the  influence  which  he 
foretold.  There  is  a  greater  reluctance  to  wage 

78  Pirpttual  Peace 

war.  *  But,  unfortunately,  as  Professor  Paulsen 
points  out,  the  progress  of  democracy  and  the 
nationalisation  of  war  have  not  worked  merely  in 
the  direction  of  progress  towards  peace.  War  has 
now  become  popular  for  the  first  time.  "The 
progress  of  democracy  in  states,"  he  says,  (Kant, 
p.  364!)  "has  not  only  not  done  away  with  war, 
but  has  very  greatly  changed  the  feeling  of  people 
towards  it.  With  the  universal  military  service, 
introduced  by  the  Revolution,  war  has  become  the 
people's  affair  and  popular,  as  it  could  not  be  in 
the  case  of  dynastic  wars  carried  on  with  mercenary 
troops."  In  the  people  the  love  of  peace  is  strong, 
but  so  too  is  the  love  of  a  fight,  the  love  of  victory. 
It  is  in  the  contemplation  of  facts  and  conflicting 
tendencies  like  these  that  Peace  Societies  §  have 
been  formed.  The  peace  party  is,  we  may  say, 
an  eclectic  body :  it  embraces  many  different  sections 
of  political  opinion.  There  are  those  who  hold,  for 
instance,  that  peace  is  to  be  established  on  a  basis 
of  communism  of  property.  There  are  others  who 
insist  on  the  establishment  throughout  Europe  of  a 
republican  form  of  government,  or  again,  on  a 

*  An  admirable  short  account  of  popular  feeling  on  this  matter 
is  to  be  found  in  Lawrence's  Principles  of  International  Law,  §  240. 

f  The  first  Peace  Society  was  founded  in  London  in  1816,  and 
the  first  International  Peace  Congress  held  in  1843. 

§  In  Eng.  trans,  see  p.  358. 

Translators  Introduction  79 

redistribution  of  European  territory  in  which  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  restored  to  France— changes  of  which 
at  least  the  last  two  would  be  difficult  to  carry 
out,  unless  through  international  warfare.  But 
these  are  not  the  fundamental  general  principles  of 
peace  workers.  The  members  of  this  party  agree 
in  rejecting  the  principle  of  intervention,  in  demand- 
ing a  complete  or  partial  disarmament  of  the  nations 
of  Europe,  and  in  requiring  that  all  disputes  between 
nations —  and  they  admit  the  prospects  of  dispute — 
should  be  settled  by  means  of  arbitration.  In  how 
far  are  these  principles  useful  or  practicable? 

The   Value  of  Arbitration. 

There  is  a  strong  feeling  in  favour  of  arbitration 
on  the  part  of  all  classes  of  society.  It  is  cheaper 
under  all  circumstances  than  war.  It  is  a  judgment 
at  once  more  certain  and  more  complete,  excluding 
as  far  as  possible  the  element  of  chance,  leaving 
irritation  perhaps  behind  it,  but  none  of  the 
lasting  bitterness  which  is  the  legacy  of  every 
war.  Arbitration  has  an  important  place  in  all 
peace  projects  except  that  of  Kant,  whose  federal 
union  would  naturally  fulfil  the  function  of  a  tribu- 
nal of  arbitration.  St.  Pierre,  Jeremy  Bentham,  * 

*  See  "A  Plan  for  a  Universal  and  Perpetual  Peace"  in  the 
Principles  of  International  Law  ( Works,  Vol.  11).  One  of  the  main 
principles  advocated  by  Bentham  in  this  essay  (written  between 
1787  and  1789)  is  that  every  state  should  give  up  its  colonies. 

80  Perpetual  Peace 

Bluntschli*  the  German  publicist,  Professor  Lorimerf 
and  others  among  political  writers,  §  and  among 
rulers,  Louis  Napoleon  and  the  Emperor  Alexan- 
der I.  of  Russia,  have  all  made  proposals  more 
or  less  ineffectual  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
international  disputes.  A  number  of  cases  have 
already  been  decided  by  this  means.  But  let  us 
examine  the  questions  which  have  been  at  issue. 
Of  a  hundred  and  thirty  matters  of  dispute  settled 
by  arbitration  since  1815  (cf.  International  Tri- 
bunals, published  by  the  Peace  Society,  1899)  it 
will  be  seen  that  all,  with  the  exception  of  one  or 
two  trifling  cases  of  doubt  as  to  the  succession  to 
certain  titles  or  principalities,  can  be  classified 
roughly  under  two  heads — disputes  as  to  the  deter- 
mination of  boundaries  or  the  possession  of  certain 
territory,  and  questions  of  claims  for  compensation 
and  indemnities  due  either  to  individuals  or  states, 
arising  from  the  seizure  of  fleets  or  merchant  ves- 
sels, the  insult  or  injury  to  private  persons  and  so 
on — briefly,  questions  of  money  or  of  territory. 

*  See  his  KUine  Sckriften. 

f  Institutes  of  the  Law  of  Nations  (1884),  Vol.  H,  Ch.  XIV. 

§  John  Stuart  Mill  holds  that  the  multiplication  of  federal  unions 
would  be  a  benefit  to  the  world.  [See  his  Considerations  on 
Representative  Government  (1865),  Ch.  XVII.,  where  he  discusses 
the  conditions  necessary  to  render  such  unions  successful.]  But  the 
Peace  Society  is  scarcely  justified,  on  the  strength  of  what  is  here, 
in  including  Mill  among  writers  who  have  made  definite  proposals 
of  peace  or  federation.  (See  Inter.  Trib.) 

Translator's  Introduction  8 1 

These  may  fairly  be  said  to  be  trifling  causes,  not 
touching  national  honour  or  great  political  questions. 
That  they  should  have  been  settled  in  this  way, 
however,  shows  a  great  advance.  Smaller  causes 
than  these  have  made  some  of  the  bloodiest  wars 
in  history.  That  arbitration  should  have  been  the 
means  of  preventing  even  one  war  which  would 
otherwise  have  been  waged  is  a  strong  reason  why 
we  should  fully  examine  its  claims.  "Quand  Tin- 
stitution  d'une  haute  cour,"  writes  Laveleye,  (Des 
causes  actu files  de  guerre  en  Europe  et  de  V arbitrage] 
"  n'eviterait  qu'une  guerre  sur  vingt,  il  vaudrait 
encore  la  peine  de  1'e'tablir."  But  history  shows 
us  that  there  is  no  single  instance  of  a  supreme 
conflict  having  been  settled  otherwise  than  by  war. 
Arbitration  is  a  method  admirably  adapted  to  cer- 
tain cases :  to  those  we  have  named,  where  it  has 
been  successfully  applied,  to  the  interpretation  of 
contracts,  to  offences  against  the  Law  of  Nations- 
some  writers  say  to  trivial  questions  of  honour — 
in  all  cases  where  the  use  of  armed  force  would 
be  impossible,  as,  for  instance,  in  any  quarrel  in 
which  neutralised  countries-*  like  Belgium  or  Luxem- 
bourg should  take  a  principal  part,  or  in  a  dif- 
ference between  two  nations,  such  as  (to  take  an 
extreme  case)  the  United  States  and  Switzerland, 

*  Set  what  Lawrence  says  (op   ctt.,  §  241)  of  neutralisation  mid 
the  limits  of  its  u«tful»*«ft  as  a  remedy  for  war. 


82  Perpetual  Peace 

which  could  not  easily  engage  in  actual  combat. 
These  cases,  which  we  cannot  too  carefully  examine, 
show  that  what  is  here  essential  is  that  it  should 
be  possible  to  formulate  a  juridical  statement  of 
the  conflicting  claims.  In  Germany  the  Bundestag 
had  only  power  to  decide  questions  of  law.  Other 
disputes  were  left  to  be  fought  out.  Questions  on 
which  the  existence  and  vital  honour  of  a  state 
depend — any  question  which  nearly  concerns  the 
disputants — cannot  be  reduced  to  any  cut  and  dry 
legal  formula  of  right  and  wrong.  We  may  pass 
over  the  consideration  that  in  some  cases  (as  in 
the  Franco-Prussian  War)  the  delay  caused  by  seeking 
mediation  of  any  kind  would  deprive  a  nation  of 
the  advantage  its  state  of  military  preparation 
deserved.  And  we  may  neglect  the  problem  of 
finding  an  impartial  judge  on  some  questions  of 
dispute,  although  its  solution  might  be  a  matter  of 
extreme  difficulty,  so  closely  are  the  interests  of 
modern  nations  bound  up  in  one  another.  How 
could  the  Eastern  Question,  for  example,  be  settled 
by  arbitration  ?  It  is  impossible  that  such  a  means 
should  be  sufficient  for  every  case.  Arbitration  in 
other  words  may  prevent  war,  but  can  never  be  a 
substitute  for  war.  We  cannot  wonder  that  this  is 
so.  So  numerous  and  conflicting  are  the  interests 
of  states,  so  various  are  the  grades  of  civilisation 
to  which  they  have  attained  and  the  directions 

Translator's  Introduction  83 

along  which  they  are  developing,  that  differences 
of  the  most  vital  kind  are  bound  to  occur  and 
these  can  never  be  settled  by  any  peaceful  means 
at  present  known  to  Europe.  This  is  above  all 
true  where  the  self-preservation  *  or  independence 
of  a  people  are  concerned.  Here  the  "good-will" 
of  the  nations  who  disagree  would  necessarily  be 
wanting:  there  could  be  no  question  of  the  arbi- 
tration of  an  outsider. 

But,  indeed,  looking  away  from  questions  so  vital 
and  on  which  there  can  be  little  difference  of 
opinion,  we  are  apt  to  forget,  when  we  allow 
ourselves  to  talk  extravagantly  of  the  future  of 
arbitration,  that  every  nation  thinks,  or  at  least 
pretends  to  think,  that  it  is  in  the  right  in  every 
dispute  in  which  it  appears  (cf.  Kant:  Perpetual 
Peace,  p.  120.):  and,  as  a  matter  of  history,  there 

*  Montesquieu:  Esprit  des  Lois,  X.  Ch.  2.  " The  life  of  govern- 
ments is  like  that  of  man.  The  latter  has  a  right  to  kill  in  case 
of  natural  defence :  the  former  have  a  right  to  wage  war  for  their 
own  preservation." 

See  also  Vattel  (Law  of  Nations,  II.  Ch.  XVTIL  §  332):— 'But 
if  anyone  would  rob  a  nation  of  one  of  her  essential  rights,  or  a 
right  without  which  she  could  not  hope  to  support  her  national 
existence, — if  an  ambitious  neighbour  threatens  the  liberty  of  a 
republic,  if  he  attempts  to  subjugate  and  enslave  her, — she  will 
take  counsel  only  from  her  own  courage.  She  will  not  even 
attempt  the  method  of  conferences,  in  the  case  of  a  contention  so 
odious  as  this.  She  will,  in  such  a  quarrel,  exert  her  utmost  efforts, 
exhaust  every  resource  and  lavish  her  blood  to  the  last  drop  if 
necessary.  To  listen  to  the  slightest  proposal  in  a  matter  of  this 
kind  13  to  risk  «v«rything." 

84  Perpetual 

has  never  been  a  conflict  between  civilised  states 
in  which  an  appeal  to  this  " right"  on  the  part  of 
each  has  not  been  made.  We  talk  glibly  of  the 
right  and  wrong  of  this  question  or  of  that,  of  the 
justice  of  this  war,  the  iniquity  of  that.  But  what 
do  these  terms  really  mean  ?  Do  we  know,  in  spite 
of  the  labour  which  has  been  spent  on  this  question 
by  the  older  publicists,  which  are  the  causes  that 
justify  a  war?  Is  it  not  true  that  the  same  war 
might  be  just  in  one  set  of  circumstances  and  unjust 
in  another  ?  Practically  all  writers  on  this  subject, 
exclusive  of  those  who  apply  the  biblical  doctrine 
of  non-resistance,  agree  in  admitting  that  a  natioa 
is  justified  in  defending  its  own  existence  or  in- 
dependence, that  this  is  even  a  moral  duty  as  it  is  a 
fundamental  right  of  a  state.  Many,  especially  the 
older  writers,  make  the  confident  assertion  that  all 
wars  of  defence  are  just.  But  will  this  serve  as  a 
standard?  Gibbon  tells  us  somewhere,  that  Livy 
asserts  that  the  Romans  conquered  the  world  in 
self-defence.  The  distinction  between  wars  of  ag- 
gression and  defence  is  one  very  difficult  to  draw. 
The  cause  of  a  nation  which  waits  to  be  actually 
attacked  is  often  lost:  the  critical  moment  in  iti 
defence  may  be  past.  The  essence  of  a  state's 
defensive  power  may  lie  in  a  readiness  to  strike  the 
first  blow,  or  its  whole  interests  may  be  bound  up 
in  the  necessity  of  fighting  the  matUr  out  in  it* 

Translator's  Introduction  8$ 

tnemy'a  country,  rather  than  at  home.  It  is  not 
in  the  strictly  military  interpretation  of  the  term 
"defensive",  but  in  its  wider  ethical  and  political 
•ense  that  we  can  speak  of  wars  of  defence  as  just. 
But,  indeed,  we  cannot  judge  these  questions 
abstractly.  Where  a  war  is  necessary,  it  matters 
very  little  whether  it  is  just  or  not.  Only  the 
judgment  of  history  can  finally  decide;  and  gener- 
ally it  seems  at  the  time  that  both  parties  have 
something  of  right  on  their  side,  something  perhaps 
too  of  wrong.  * 

*  The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  hard  and  fast  judgments  on  a 
complicated  problem  of  this  kind  are  convincingly  demonstrated 
in  ft  recent  tssay  by  Professor  D.  G.  Ritchie  (Studies  in  Political 
and  Social  EtMct.  Sonnenschein,  1902).  Professor  Ritchie  considers 
in  detail  a  number  of  concrete  cases  which  occurred  in  the  century 
between  1770  and  1870.  "Let  any  one  take  the  judgments  he 
would  pass  on  these  or  any  similarly  varied  cases,  and  I  think  he 
will  find  that  we  do  not  restrict  our  approval  to  wars  of  self- 
defence,  that  we  do  not  approve  self-defence  under  all  circum- 
stances, that  there  are  some  cases  in  which  we  approve  of  absorption 
of  smaller  states  by  larger,  that  there  are  cases  in  which  we  excuse 
intervention  of  third  parties  in  quarrels  with  which  at  first  they 
had  nothing  to  do,  and  that  we  sometimes  approve  war  even  when 
begun  without  the  authority  of  any  already  existing  sovereign. 
Can  any  principles  be  found  underlying  such  judgments?  In  the 
first  place  we  ought  not  to  disguise  from  ourselves  the  fact  that 
our  judgments  after  the  result  are  based  largely  on  success.  . -• .  .  . 
I  think  it  will  be  found  that  our  judgments  on  the  wars  of  the 
century  from  1770  to  1870  turn  very  largely  on  the  question,  Which 
of  the  conflicting  forces  was  making  for  constitutional  government  and 
for  social  progress  ?  or,  to  put  it  in  wider  terms,  Which  represented 
the  higher  civilisation?  And  thus  it  is  that  we  may  sometimes 
approve  the  rise  of  a  new  state  and  sometimes  the  absorption  of 
»n  old."  (Of.  cit.,  pp.  152,  155.) 

86  Perpetual  Peace 

A  consideration  of  difficulties  like  these  brings 
us  to  a  realisation  of  the  fact  that  the  chances  are 
small  that  a  nation,  in  the  heat  of  a  dispute,  will 
admit  the  likelihood  of  its  being  in  the  wrong. 
To  refuse  to  admit  this  is  generally  tantamount  to 
a  refusal  to  submit  the  difficulty  to  arbitration. 
And  neither  international  law,  nor  the  moral  force 
of  public  opinion  can  induce  a  state  to  act  contrary 
to  what  it  believes  to  be  its  own  interest.  More- 
over, as  international  law  now  stands,  it  is  not  a 
duty  to  have  recourse  to  arbitration.  This  was 
made  quite  clear  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Peace 
Conference  at  the  Hague  in  1899.  *  It  was  strongly 
recommended  that  -  arbitration  should  be  sought 
wherever  it  was  possible,  but,  at  the  same  time 
definitely  stated,  that  this  course  could  in  no  case 
be  compulsory.  In  this  respect  things  have  not 
advanced  beyond  the  position  of  the  Paris  Congress 
of  1856.1  The  wars  waged  in  Europe  subsequent 
to  that  date,  have  all  been  begun  without  previous 
attempt  at  mediation. 

But  the   work  of  the  peace  party  regarding  the 

*  See  Fred.  W.  Holls:  The  Peace  Conference  at  the  Hague, 
Macmillan,  1900. 

f  The  feeling  of  the  Congress  expressed  itself  thus  cautiously : — 
"  Messieurs  les  pl£nipotentiaires  n'hesitent  pas  a  exprimer,  au  nom 
de  leur  gouvernements,  le  voeu,  que  les  Etats  entre  lesquels 
s'el£verait  un  dissentiment  serieux,  avail t  d'en  appeler  aux  armes, 
eussent  recours,  en  tant  que  les  circonstances  I'admeUraient,  aux 
bons  offices  d'une  puissance  amie." 

Translator's  Introduction  87 

humaner  methods  of  settlement  is  not  to  be 
neglected.  The  popular  feeling  which  they  have 
been  partly  the  means  of  stimulating  has  no  doubt 
done  something  to  influence  the  action  of  statesmen 
towards  extreme  caution  in  the  treatment  of  ques- 
tions likely  to  arouse  national  passions  and  preju- 
dices. Arbitration  has  undoubtedly  made  headway 
in  recent  years.  Britain  and  America,  the  two 
nations  whose  names  naturally  suggest  themselves 
to  us  as  future  centres  of  federative  union,  both 
countries  whose  industrial  interests  are  numerous 
and  complicated,  have  most  readily,  as  they  have 
most  frequently,  settled  disputes  in  this  practical 
manner.  It  has  shown  itself  to  be  a  policy  as 
economical  as  it  is  business-like,  -its  value,  in  its 
proper  place,  cannot  be  overrated  by  any  Peace 
Congress  or  by  any  peace  pamphlet;  but  we  have 
endeavoured  to  make  it  clear  that  this  sphere  is 
but  a  limited  one.  The  "good-will"  may  not  be 
there  when  it  ought  perhaps  to  appear:  it  will 
certainly  not  be  there  when  any  vital  interest  is  at 
stake.  But,  even  if  this  were  not'so  and  arbitration 
were  the  natural  sequence  of  every  dispute,  no 
coercive  force  exists  to  enforce  the  decree  of  the 
court.  The  moral  restraint  of  public  opinion  is 
here  a  poor  substitute.  Treaties,  it  is  often  said, 
are  in  the  same  position;  but  treaties  have  been 
broken,  and  will  no  doubt  be  broken  again.  We 

38  Ptrpttutl  Ptace 

are  moved  to  the  conclusion  that  a  thoroughly 
logical  peace  programme  cannot  stop  short  of  the 
principle  of  federation.  Federal  troops  are  neces- 
sary to  carry  out  the  decrees  of  a  tribunal  of 
arbitration,  if  that  court  is  not  to  run  a  risk  of 
being  held  feeble  and  ineffectual.  Except  on  some 
such  basis,  arbitration,  as  a  substitute  for  war,  stands 
on  but  a  weak  footing. 


The  efforts  of  the  Peace  Society  are  directed  with 
even  less  hope  of  complete  success  against  another 
evil  of  our  time,  the  crushing  burden  of  modern 
armaments.  We  have  peace  at  this  moment,  but 
at  a  daily  increasing  cost.  The  Peace  Society  is 
rightly  concerned  in  pressing  this  point.  It  is  not 
enough  to  keep  off  actual  war:  there  is  a  limit  to 
the  price  we  can  afford  to  pay  even  for  peace. 
Probably  no  principle  has  cost  Europe  so  much 
in  the  last  century  as  that  handed  down  from 
Rome: — "Si  vis  pacem,  pare  bellum."  It  is  now  a 
hundred  and  fifty  years  since  Montesquieu  *  protested 

*  Esprit  des  Lois,  XJ3I.  Chap.  17.  "A  new  distemper  ha* 
spread  itself  over  Europe :  it  has  infected  our  princes,  and  induces 
them  to  keep  up  an  exorbitant  number  of  troops.  It  has  its 
redoublings,  and  of  necessity  becomes  contagious.  For  as  soon 
as  one  prince  augments  v,hat  he  calls  his  troops,  the  rest  of  course 
do  the  same:  so  that  nothing  is  gained  thereby  but  the  public 

Translator's  Introduction  89 

against  this  "  new  distemper "  which  was  spreading 
itself  over  Europe ;  but  never,  in  time  of  peace,  has 
complaint  been  so  loud  or  so  general  as  now :  and 
this,  not  only  against  the  universal  burden  of 
taxation  which  weighs  upon  all  nations  alike,  but, 
in  continental  countries,  against  the  waste  of  pro- 
ductive force  due  to  compulsory  military  service, 
a  discontent  which  seems  to  strike  at  the  very 
foundations  of  society.  Vattel  relates  that  in  early 
times  a  treaty  of  peace  generally  stipulated  that 
both  parties  should  afterwards  disarm.  And  there 
is  no  doubt  that  Kant  was  right  in  regarding 
standing  armies  as  a  danger  to  peace,  not  only  as 
openly  expressing  the  rivalry  and  distrust  between 
nation  and  nation  which  Hobbes  regards  as  the 
basis  of  international  relations,  but  also  as  putting 
a  power  into  the  hand  of  a  nation  which  it  may 
some  day  have  the  temptation  to  abuse.  A  war- 
loving,  overbearing  spirit  in  a  people  thrives  none 
the  worse  for  a  consciousness  that  its  army  or 
navy  can  hold  its  own  with  any  other  in  Europe. 
Were  it  not  the  case  that  the  essence  of  armed 
peace  is  that  a  high  state  of  efficiency  should  be 

ruin.  Each  monarch  keeps  as  many  armies  on  foot  as  if  his 
people  wer«  in  danger  of  being  exterminated:  and  they  give  th« 
name  of  Peace  to  this  general  effort  of  all  against  all." 

Montesquieu  is  of  course  writing  in  the  days  of  mercenary  troopb; 
but  the  cost  to  the  nation  of  our  modern  armies,  both  ia  time  «f 
peace  and  of  war,  is  incomparably  greater. 

Perpetual  Peace 

general,  the  danger  to  peace  would  be  very  great 
indeed.  No  doubt  it  is  due  to  this  fact  that  France 
has  kept  quietly  to  her  side  of  the  Rhine  during 
the  last  thirty  years.  The  annexation  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  an  immediate  stimulus  to  the  increase 
of  armaments;  but  otherwise,  just  because  of  this 
greater  efficiency  and  the  slightly  stronger  military 
position  of  Germany,  it  has  been  an  influence  on 
the  side  of  peace. 

The  Czar's  Rescript  of  1898  gave  a  new  stimulus 
to  an  interest  in  this  question  which  the  subsequent 
conference  at  the  Hague  was  unable  fully  to  satisfy. 
We  are  compelled  to  consider  carefully  how  a 
process  of  simultaneous  disarmament  can  actually 
be  carried  out,  and  what  results  might  be  antici- 
pated from  this  step,  with  a  view  not  only  to  the 
present  but  the  future,  Can  this  be  done  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  justice  ?  Organi- 
sations like  a  great  navy  or  a  highly  disciplined 
army  have  been  built  up,  in  the  course  of  centuries, 
at  great  cost  and  at  much  sacrifice  to  the  nation. 
They  are  the  fruit  of  years  of  wise  government 
and  a  high  record  of  national  industry.  Are  such 
visible  tokens  of  the  culture  and  character  and 
worth  of  a  people  to  be  swept  away  and  Britain, 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain,  Turkey  to  stand  on 
the  same  level?  And,  even  if  no  such  ethical 
considerations  should  arise,  on  what  method  are 

Translator  s  Introduction  91 

we  to  proceed?  The  standard  as  well  as  the 
nature  of  armament  depends  in  every  state  on 
its  geographical  conditions  and  its  historical 
position.  An  ocean-bound  empire  like  Britain 
is  comparatively  immune  from  the  danger  of 
invasion :  her  army  can  be  safely  despatched  to 
the  colonies,  her  fleet  protects  her  at  home,  her 
position  is  one  of  natural  defence.  But  Germany 
and  Austria  find  themselves  in  exactly  opposite 
circumstances,  with  the  hard  necessity  imposed 
upon  them  of  guarding  their  frontiers  on  every 
side.  The  safety  of  a  nation  like  Germany  is 
in  the  hands  of  its  army:  its  military  strength 
lies  in  an  almost  perfect  mastery  of  the  science 
of  attack. 

The  Peace  Society  has  hitherto  made  no 
attempt  to  face  the  difficulties  inseparable  from 
any  attempt  to  apply  a  uniform  method  of 
treatment  to  peculiarities  and  conditions  so  con- 
flicting and  various  as  these.  Those  who  have 
been  more  conscientious  have  not  been  very 
successful  in  solving  them.  Indeed,  so  con- 
stantly is  military  technique  changing  that  it 
is  difficult  to  prophesy  wherein  will  lie,  a  few 
years  hence,  the  essence  of  a  state's  defensive 
power  or  what  part  the  modern  navy  will  play 
in  this  defence.  No  careful  thinker  would  sug- 
gest, in  the  face  of  dangers  threatening  from  the 

Ptrprtual  Ptace 

East,  *  a  complete  disarmament.  The  simplest  of 
many  suggestions  made — but  this  on  the  basis  of 
universal  conscription  -  seems  to  be  that  the  number 
of  years  or  months  of  compulsory  military  service 
should  be  reduced  to  some  fixed  period.  But  this 
does  not  touch  the  difficulty  of  colonial  empires  f 
like  Britain  which  might  to  a  certain  extent  disarm, 
like  their  neighbours,  in  Europe,  but  would  be 
compelled  to  keep  an  army  for  the  defence  of  their 
colonies  elsewhere.  It  is,  in  the  meantime,  inevit- 
able that  Europe  should  keep  up  a  high  standard 
of  armament — this  is,  (and  even  if  we  had  European 
federation,  would  remain)  an  absolute  necessity  as 
a  protection  against  the  yellow  races,  and  in  Europe 
itself  there  are  at  present  elements  hostile  to  the 
cause  of  peace.  -  Alsace-Lorraine,  Polish  Prussia, 
Russian  Poland  and  Finland  are  still,  to  a  considerable 
degree,  sources  of  discontent  and  dissatisfaction.  But 
in  Russia  itself  lies  the  great  obstacle  to  a  future 
European  peace  or  European  federation :  we  can 
scarcely  picture  Russia  as  a  reliable  member  of 
such  a  union.  That  Russia  should  disarm  is  scarcely 

*  Even  St.  Pierre  was  alive  to  this  danger  (Projet,  Art.  VIII:  in 
the  English  translation  of  1714,  p.  160): — "The  European  Union 
thall  endeavour  to  obtain  in  Asia,  a  permanent  society  like  that  of 
Europe,  that  Peace  may  be  maintaiu'd  There  also;  and  especially 
that  it  may  have  no  cause  to  fear  any  Asiatic  Sovereign,  either 
as  to  its  tranquillity,  or  its  Commerce  in  Asia" 

f  Beutham's  suggestion,  would  b«  useful  here !  See  bore,  p.  79, 

Translators  Introduction  93 

feasible,  in  view  of  its  own  interest :  it  has  always 
to  face  the  danger  of  rebellion  in  Poland  and 
anarchy  at  home.  But  that  Europe  should  disarm, 
before  Russia  has  attained  a  higher  civilisation,  a 
consciousness  of  its  great  future  as  a  north  eastern, 
inter-oceanic  empire,  and  a  government  more  favour- 
able to  the  diffusion  of  liberty,  is  still  less  practic- 
able. *  We  have  here  to  fall  back  upon  federation 
again.  It  is  not  impossible  that,  in  the  course  of 
time,  this  problem  may  be  solved  and  that  the 
contribution  to  the  federal  troops  of  a  European 
union  may  be  regulated  upon  some  equitable  basis 
the  form  of  which  we  cannot  now  well  prophesy. 
European  federation  would  likewise  meet  all 
difficulties  where  a  risk  might  be  likely  to  occur 
of  one  nation  intervening  to  protect  another.  As 
we  have  said  (above,  p.  64,  note]  nations  are 
now-a-days  slow  to  intervene  in  the  interests  of 
humanity:  they  are  in  general  constrained  to  do 
so  only  by  strong  motives  of  self-interest,  and  when 
these  are  not  at  hand  they  are  said  to  refrain  from 
respect  for  another's  right  of  independent  action. 
Actually  a  state  which  is  actuated  by  less  selfish 
impulses  is  apt  to  lose  considerably  more  than  it 

*  The  best  thing  for  Europe  might  be  that  Russia  (p«rhaps 
including  China)  should  be  regarded  as  a  serious  danger  by  all 
the  civilised  power*  of  the  West.  That  would  bring  us  nearer  to 
tht  United  States  of  Europe  and  America  (for  th«  United  State«, 
America,  is  Russia's  neighbour  on  the  East)  than  anythiag  else. 

94  Perpetual  Peace 

gains,  and  the  feeling  of  the  people  expresses 
itself  strongly  against  any  quixotic  or  sentimental 
policy.  It  is  not  impossible  that  the  Powers  may 
have  yet  to  intervene  to  protect  Turkey  against 
Russia.  Such  a  step  might  well  be  dictated  purely 
by  a  proper  care  for  the  security  of  Europe;  but 
wars  of  this  kind  seem  not  likely  to  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  near  future. 

We  have  said  that  the  causes  of  difference  which 
may  be  expected  to  disturb  the  peace  of  Europe 
are  now  fewer.  A  modern  sovereign  no  longer  spends 
his  leisure  time  in  the  excitement  of  slaying  or 
seeing  slain.  He  could  not,  if  he  would.  His  honour 
and  his  vanity  are  protected  by  other  means :  they 
play  no  longer  an  important  part  in  the  affairs  of 
nations.  The  causes  of  war  can  no  more  be  either 
trifling  or  personal.  Some  crises  there  are,  which 
are  ever  likely  to  be  fatal  to  peace.  There  present 
themselves,  in  the  lives  of  nations,  ideal  ends  for 
which  everything  must  be  sacrificed :  there  are  rights 
which  must  at  all  cost  be  defended.  The  question 
of  civil  war  we  may  neglect:  liberty  and  wise 
government  are  the  only  -  medicine  for  social  dis- 
content, and  much  may  be  hoped  from  that  in  the 
future.  But  now,  looking  beyond  the  state  to  the 
great  family  of  civilised  nations,  we  may  say  that 
the  one  certain  cause  of  war  between  them  or  of 
rebellion  within  a  future  federated  union  will  be  a 

Translator  s  Introduction  95 

menace  to  the  sovereign  rights,  the  independence 
and  existence  of  any  member  of  that  federation. 
Other  causes  of  quarrel  offer  a  more  hopeful  pro- 
spect. Some  questions  have  been  seen  to  be  speci- 
ally fitted  for  the  legal  procedure  of  a  tribunal  of 
arbitration,  others  to  be  such  as  a  federal  court 
would  quickly  settle.  The  preservation  of  the 
balance  of  power  which  Frederick  the  Great 
regarded  as  the  talisman  of  peace  in  Europe — a 
judgment  surely  not  borne  out  by  experience — is 
happily  one  of  the  causes  of  war  which  are  of  the 
past.  Wars  of  colonisation,  such  as  would  be  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  Russia  to  conquer  India, 
seem  scarcely  likely  to  recur  except  between  higher 
and  lower  races.  The  cost  is  now-a-days  too  great. 
Political  wars,  wars  for  national  union  and  unity, 
of  which  there  were  so  many  during  the  past 
century,  seem  at  present  not  to  be  near  at  hand; 
and  the  integration  of  European  nations — what  may 
be  called  the  great  mission  of  war — is,  for  the 
moment,  practically  complete;  for  it  is  highly 
improbable  that  either  Alsace-Lorraine  or  Poland — 
still  less  Finland — will  be  the  cause  of  a  war  of 
this  kind. 

Our  hope  lies  in  a  federated  Europe.  Its  troops 
would  serve  to  preserve  law  and  order  in  the 
country  from  which  they  were  drawn  and  to  protect 
its  eoloniei  abroad ;  but  their  higher  function  would 

96  Perpetual  Peace 

be  to  keep  peace  in  Europe,  to  protect  the  weaker 
members  of  the  Federation  and  to  enforce  the  decision 
of  the  majority,  either,  if  necessary,  by  actual  war, 
or  by  the  mere  threatening  demonstrations  of  fleets, 
such  as  have  before  proved  effectual. 

We  have  carefully  considered  what  has  been 
attempted  by  peace  workers,  and  we  have  now  to 
take  note  that  all  the  results  of  the  last  fifty  years 
are  not  to  be  attributed  to  their  conscientious  but 
often  ill-directed  labour.  The  diminution  of  the 
causes  of  war  is  to  be  traced  less  to  the  efforts  of 
the  Peace  Society,  (except  indirectly,  in  so  far  as 
they  have  influenced  the  minds  of  the  masses)  than 
to  the  increasing  power  of  the  people  themselves. 
The  various  classes  of  society  are  opposed  to  vio- 
lent methods  of  settlement,  not  in  the  main  from 
a  conviction  as  to  the  wrongfulness  of  war  or  from 
any  fanatical  enthusiasm  for  a  brotherhood  of 
nations,  but  from  self-interest.  War  is  death  to 
the  industrial  interests  of  a  nation.  It  is  vain  to 
talk,  in  the  language  of  past  centuries,  of  trade 
between  civilised  countries  being  advanced  and 
markets  opened  up  or  enlarged  by  this  mean*.  * 

*  Trad«  in  barbarous  or  savage  countries  is  still  increased  by 
war,  especially  on  the  French  and  German  plan  which  leaves  no 
open  door  to  other  nations.  Here  the  trade  follows  the  flag.  And  war, 
of  course,  among  civilised  races  causes  small  nationi  to  disappear 
and  thtir  tariffs  with  them.  This  is  beneficial  to  tradt,  but  to  a 
degree  so  trifling  that  it  may  bere  bt  neglected. 

Translator's  Introduction  97 

Kings  give  up  the  dream  of  military  glory  and 
accept  instead  the  certainty  of  peaceful  labour 
and  industrial  progress,  and  all  this  (for  we  may 
believe  that  to  some  monarchs  it  is  much)  from 
no  enthusiastic  appreciation  of  the  efforts  of  Peace 
Societies,  from  no  careful  examination  of  the 
New  Testament  nor  inspired  interpretation  of  its 
teaching.  It  is  self-interest,  the  prosperity  of  the 
country — patriotism,  if  you  will — that  seems  better 
than  war. 

What  may  be  expected  from  Federation. 

Federation  and  federation  alone  can  help  out 
the  programme  of  the  Peace  Society.  It  cannot 
be  pretended  that  it  will  do  everything.  To  state 
the  worst  at  once,  it  will  not  prevent  war.  Even 
the  federations  of  the  states  of  Germany  and 
America,  bound  together  by  ties  of  blood  and 
language  and,  in  the  latter  case,  of  sentiment, 
were  not  strong  enough  within  to  keep  out  dissen- 
sion and  disunion.  *  Wars  would  not  cease,  but 
they  would  become  much  less  frequent.  "Why  is 
there  no  longer  war  between  England  and  Scot- 
land? Why  did  Prussian  and  Hanoverian  fight 
side  by  side  in  1870,  though  they  had  fought 

*  Cf.  also  the  civil  war  of  1847  in  Switzerland. 

98  Perpetual  Peace 

against  each  other  only  four  years  before  ?  .  . .  If 
we  wish  to  know  how  war  is  to  cease,  we  should 
ask  ourselves  how  it  has  ceased "  (Professor  D.  G. 
Ritchie,  op.  cit.t  p.  169).  Wars  between  different 
grades  of  civilisation  are  bound  to  exist  as  long 
as  civilisation  itself  exists.  The  history  of  culture 
and  of  progress  has  been  more  or  less  a  history 
of  war.  A  calm  acceptance  of  this  position  may 
mean  to  certain  short-sighted,  enthusiastic  theorists 
an  impossible  sacrifice  of  the  ideal ;  but,  the  sacri- 
fice once  made,  we  stand  on  a  better  footing  with 
regard  to  at  least  one  class  of  arguments  against 
a  federation  of  the  world.  Such  a  union  will  lead, 
it  is  said,  to  an  equality  in  culture,  a  sameness 
of  interests  fatal  to  progress ;  all  struggle  and  con- 
flict will  be  cast  out  of  the  state  itself;  national 
characteristics  and  individuality  will  be  obliterated  ; 
the  lamb  and  the  wolf  will  lie  down  together: 
stagnation  will  result,  intellectual  progress  will  be 
at  an  end,  politics  will  be  no  more,  history  will 
stand  still.  This  is  a  sweeping  assertion,  an  alarm- 
ing prophecy.  But  a  little  thought  will  assure 
us  that  there  is  small  cause  for  apprehension. 
There  can  be  no  such  standstill,  no  millennium  in 
human  affairs.  A  gradual  smoothing  down  of 
sharply  accentuated  national  characteristics  there 
might  be:  this  is  a  result  which  a  freer,  more 
friendly  intercourse  between  nations  would  be  very 

Translator's  Introduction  99 

likely  to  produce.  But  conflicting  interests,  keen 
rivalry  in  their  pursuit,  difference  of  culture  and 
natural  aptitude,  and  all  or  much  of  the  individu- 
ality which  language  and  literature,  historical  and 
religious  traditions,  even  climatic  and  physical  con- 
ditions produce  are  bound  to  survive  until  the 
coming  of  some  more  overwhelming  and  far-spread- 
ing revolution  than  this.  It  would  not  be  well  if 
it  were  otherwise,  if  those  "  unconscious  and  invi- 
sible peculiarities"  in  which  Fichte  sees  the  hand 
of  God  and  the  guarantee  of  a  nation's  future 
dignity,  virtue  and  merit  should  be  swept  away. 
(Reden  an  die  deutsche  Nation,  *  1 807.)  Nor  is 
stagnation  to  be  feared.  "  Strife,"  said  the  old 
philosopher,  "is  the  father  of  all  things."  There 
can  be  no  lasting  peace  in  the  processes  of  nature 
and  existence.  It  has  been  in  the  constant  rivalry 
between  classes  within  themselves,  and  in  the 
struggle  for  existence  with  other  races  that  great 
nations  have  reached  the  highwater  mark  of  their 
development.  A  perpetual  peace  in  international 
relations  we  may — nay,  surely  will — one  day  have, 
but  eternity  will  not  see  the  end  to  the  feverish 
unrest  within  the  state  and  the  jealous  competition 
and  distrust  between  individuals,  groups  and  classes 
of  society.  Here  there  must  ever  be  perpetual  war. 
It  was  only  of  this  political  peace  between  civil- 

*  See   IVerke,  VTL,  p.  467. 

ioo  Perpetual  Peace 

ised  nations  that  Kant  thought.  *  In  this  form  it 
is  bound  to  come.  The  federation  of  Europe  will 
follow  the  federation  of  Germany  and  of  Italy,  not 
only  because  it  offers  a  solution  of  many  problems 
which  have  long  taxed  Europe,  but  because  great 
men  and  careful  thinkers  believe  in  it.  f  It  may 
not  come  quickly,  but  such  men  can  afford  to 
wait.  "  If  I  were  legislator,"  cried  Jean  Jacques 
Rousseau,  "I  should  not  say  what  ought  to  be 
done,  but  I  would  do  it."  This  is  the  attitude  of 
the  unthinking,  unpractical  enthusiast.  The  wish 
is  not  enough :  the  will  is  not  enough.  The  mills 
of  God  must  take  their  own  time :  no  hope  or 
faith  of  ours,  no  struggle  or  labour  even  can 
hurry  them. 

It  is  a  misfortune  that  the  Peace  Society  has 
identified  itself  with  so  narrow  and  uncritical  an 
attitude  towards  war,  and  that  the  copious  clo- 

*  The  other  he  knew  was  impossible.  Peace  within  the  state 
meant  decay  and  death.  In  the  antagonism  of  nations,  he  saw 
nature's  means  of  educating  the  race:  it  was  a  law  of  existence, 
a  law  of  progress,  and,  as  such,  eternal. 

t  For  a  vivid  picture  of  the  material  advantages  offered  by 
such  a  union  and  of  the  dismal  future  that  may  lie  before  an 
unfederated  Europe,  we  cannot  do  better  than  read  Mr.  Andrew 
Carnegie's  recent  Rectorial  Address  to  the  students  of  St.  Andrews 
University  (Oct  1902).  Unfortunately,  Mr.  Carnegie's  enthusiasm 
stops  here:  he  does  not  tell  us  by  what  means  the  difficulties  at 
present  in  the  way  of  *  federation,  industrial  or  political,  are  to 
be  overcome. 

Translator's  Introduction  IO1 

quence  of  its  members  is  not  based  upon  a  con- 
sideration of  the  practical  difficulties  of  the  case. 
This  well-meaning,  hard  working  and  enthusiastic 
body  would  like  to  do  what  is  impossible  by  an 
impossible  method.  The  end  which  it  sets  for  itself 
is  an  unattainable  one.  But  this  need  not  be  so. 
To  make  unjustifiable  aggression  difficult,  to  banish 
unworthy  pretexts  for  making  war  might  be  a 
high  enough  ideal  for  any  enthusiasm  and  offer 
scope  wide  enough  for  the  labours  of  any  society. 
But  the  Peace  Society  has  not  contented  itself 
with  this  great  work.  Through  its  over-estimation 
of  the  value  of  peace,  *-.its  cause  has  been  injured 
and  much  of  its  influence  has  been  weakened  or 
lost.  Our  age  is  one  which  sets  a  high  value  upon 
human  life;  and  to  this  change  of  thinking  may 
be  traced  our  modern  reform  in  the  methods  of 
war  and  all  that  has  been  done  for  the  alleviation 
of  suffering  by  the  great  Conventions  of  recent 
years.  For  the  eyes  of  most  people  war  is  merely 
a  hideous  spectacle  of  bloodshed  and  deliberate 
destruction  of  life :  this  is  its  obvious  side.  But  it 
is  possible  to  exaggerate  this  confessedly  great 
evil.  Peace  has  its  sacrifices  as  well  as  war :  the 

*  Professor  D.  (».  Ritchie  remarks  that  it  is  less  an  over- 
estimation  of  the  value  of  peace  than  a  too  easy-going  acceptance 
of  abstract  and  unanalysed  phrases  about  the  rights  of  nation* 
that  injurei  the  work  of  the  Peace  Society.  Cf.  his  note  on  the 
principles  of  the  Peace  Congresses  (op.  cif,,  p.  172). 

102  Perpetual  Peace 

progress  of  humanity  requires  that  the  individual 
should  often  be  put  aside  for  the  sake  of  lasting 
advantage  to  the  whole.  An  opposite  view  can 
only  be  reckoned  individualistic,  perhaps  material- 
istic. "The  reverence  for  human  life,"  says  Mar- 
tineau,  (Studies  of  Christianity,  pp.  352,  354)  "is 
carried  to  an  immoral  idolatry,  when  it  is  held  more 
sacred  than  justice  and  right,  and  when  the  spec- 
tacle of  blood  becomes  more  horrible  than  the 
sight  of  desolating  tyrannies  and  triumphant  hypo- 
crisies. .  .  .  We  have,  therefore,  no  more  doubt 
that  a  war  may  be  right,  than  that  a  policeman 
may  be  a  security  for  justice,  and  we  object  to  a 
fortress  as  little  as  to  a  handcuff." 

The  Peace  Society  are  not  of  this  opinion :  they 
greatly  doubt  that  a  war  may  be  right,  and  they 
rarely  fail  to  take  their  doubts  to  the  tribunal  of 
Scripture.  Their  efforts  are  well  meant,  this  piety 
may  be  genuine  enough ;  but  a  text  is  rarely  a 
proof  of  anything,  and  in  any  case  serves  one  man 
in  as  good  stead  as  another.  We  remember  that 
"the  devil  can  cite  Scripture  for  his  purpose." 
This  unscientific  method  of  proof  or  persuasion  has 
ever  been  widely  popular.  It  is  a  serious  examin- 
ation of  the  question  that  we  want,  a  more  careful 
study  of  its  actual  history  and  of  the  possibilities 
of  human  nature ;  less  vague,  exaggerated  language 
about  what  ought  to  be  done,  and  a  realisation  of 

Translator's  Introduction  103 

what  has  been  actually  achieved ;  above  all,  a  clear 
perception  of  what  may  fairly  be  asked  from  the  future. 
It  used  to  be  said — is  perhaps  asserted  still  by 
the  war-lovers — that  there  was  no  path  to  civilisation 
which  had  not  been  beaten  by  the  force  of  arms, 
no  height  to  which  the  sword  had  not  led  the  way. 
The  inspiration  of  war  was  upon  the  great  arts  of 
civilisation:  its  hand  was  upon  the  greatest  of  the 
sciences.  These  obligations  extended  even  to  com- 
merce. War  not  only  created  new  branches  of 
industry,  it  opened  new  markets  and  enlarged  the 
old.  These  are  great  claims,  according  to  which 
war  might  be  called  the  moving  principle  of  history. 
If  we  keep  our  eyes  fixed  upon  the  history  of  the 
past,  they  seem  not  only  plausible:  they  are  in  a 
great  sense  true.  Progress  did  tread  at  the  heels 
of  the  great  Alexander's  army :  the  advance  of 
European  culture  stands  in  the  closest  connection 
with  the  Crusades.  But  was  this  happy  compensation 
for  a  miserable  state  of  affairs  not  due  to  the 
peculiarly  unsocial  conditions  of  early  times  and 
the  absence  of  every  facility  for  the  interchange  of 
ideas  or  material  advantages?  It  is  inconceivable 
that  now-a-days  *  any  aid  to  the  development  of 
thought  in  Europe  should  come  from  war.  The 

*  The  day  is  past,  when  a  nation  could  enjoy  the  exclusive 
advantages  of  its  own  inventions.  Vattel  naively  recommends  that 
we  should  keep  the  knowledge  of  certain  kinds  of  trade,  the 

IO4  Perpetual  Peace 

old  adage,  in  more  than  a  literal  sense,  has  but 
too  often  been  proved  true: — "Inter  arma,  Musae 
silent."  Peace  is  for  us  the  real  promoter  of 

We  have  to  endeavour  to  take  an  intermediate 
course  between  uncritical  praise  and  wholesale 
condemnation,  between  extravagant  expectation 
and  unjustifiable  pessimism.  War  used  to  be  the 
rule:  it  is  now  an  overwhelming  and  terrible  ex- 
ception— an  interruption  to  the  peaceful  prosperous 
course  of  things,  inflicting  unlimited  suffering  and 
temporary  or  lasting  loss.  Its  evils  are  on  the 
surface,  apparent  to  the  most  unthinking  observer. 
The  day  may  yet  dawn,  when  Europeans  will  have 
learned  to  regard  the  force  of  arms  as  an  instrument 
for  the  civilisation  of  savage  or  half-savage  races, 
and  war  within  their,  continent  as  civil  war,  neces- 
sary and  justifiable  sometimes  perhaps,  but  still  a 
blot  upon  their  civilisation  and  brotherhood  as  men. 
Such  a  suggestion  rings  strangely.  But  the  great 
changes,  which  the  roll  of  centuries  has  marked, 
once  came  upon  the  world  not  less  unexpectedly. 
How  far  off  must  the  idea  of  a  civil  peace  have 
seemed  to  small  towns  and  states  of  Europe  in  the 
fifteenth  century!  How  strange,  only  a  century 

building  of  war-ships  and  the  like,  to  ourselves.  Prudence,  he 
says,  prevents  us  from  making  an  enemy  stronger  and  the  care  of 
our  own  safety  forbids  it.  (Law  of  Nations,  n.  Ch.  I.  §  16.) 

Translator  s  Introduction  105 

ago,  would  the  idea  of  applying  steam  power  or 
electrical  force  have  seemed  to  ourselves  I  Let  us 
not  despair.  War  has  played  a  great  part  in  the 
history  of  the  world:  it  has  been  ever  the  great 
architect  of  nations,  the  true  mother  of  cities.  It 
has  justified  itself  to-day  in  the  union  of  kindred 
peoples,  the  making  of  great  empires.  It  may  be 
that  one  decisive  war  may  yet  be  required  to  unite 
Europe.  May  Europe  survive  that  struggle  and 
go  forward  fearlessly  to  her  great  future !  A  peaceful 
future  that  may  not  be.  It  must  never  be  forgotten 
that  war  is  sometimes  a  moral  duty,  that  it  is  ever 
the  natural  sequence  of  human  passion  and  human 
prejudice.  An  unbroken  peace  we  cannot  and  do 
not  expect ;  but  it  is  this  that  we  must  work  for.  As 
Kant  says,  we  must  keep  it  before  us  as  an  ideal, 



WE  need  not  try  to  decide  whether  this  satirical  in- 
scription, (once  found  on  a  Dutch  innkeeper's  sign- 
board above  the  picture  of  a  churchyard)  is  aimed 
at  mankind  in  general,  or  at  the  rulers  of  states  in 
particular,  unwearying  in  their  love  of  war,  or  per- 
haps only  at  the  philosophers  who  cherish  the 
sweet  dream  of  perpetual  peace.  The  author  of  the 
present  sketch  would  make  one  stipulation,  however. 
The  practical  politician  stands  upon  a  definite  foot- 
ing with  the  theorist:  with  great  self-complacency 
he  looks  down  upon  him  as  a  mere  pedant  whose 
empty  ideas  can  threaten  no  danger  to  the  state 
(starting  as  it  does  from  principles  derived  from 
experience),  and  who  may  always  be  permitted  to 

*  The  text  used  in  this  translation  is  that  edited  by  Kehr- 
bach.  [Tr.] 

f  I  have  seen  something  of  M.  de  St.  Pierre's  plan  for  maintain- 
ing perpetual  peace  in  Europe.  It  reminds  me  of  an  inscription 
outside  of  a  churchyard,  which  ran  ''Pax  Ferfetua.  For  the  dead, 
it  is  true,  fight  no  more.  But  the  living  are  of  another  mind,  and 
the  mightiest  among  them  have  little  respect  for  tribunals."  (Leib- 
nitz: Letter  to  Grirnaresf,  quoted  above,  p.  37,  note  §.)  [Tr.] 

translation  lo? 

knock  down  his  eleven  skittles  at  once  without  a 
worldly-wise  statesman  needing  to  disturb  himself. 
Hence,  in  the  event  of  a  quarrel  arising  between 
the  two,  the  practical  statesman  must  always  act 
consistently,  and  not  scent  danger  to  the  state 
behind  opinions  ventured  by  the  theoretical  politi- 
cian at  random  and  publicly  expressed.  With  which 
saving  clause  (clausula  salvatoria]  the  author  will 
herewith  consider  himself  duly  and  expressly  pro- 
tected against  all  malicious  misinterpretation. 



I.  —  "No  treaty  of  peace  shall  be  regarded  as 
valid,  if  made  with  the  secret  reservation  of  mate- 
rial for  a  future  war." 

For  then  it  would  be  a  mere  truce,  a  mere 
suspension  of  hostilities,  not  peace.  A  peace  signi- 
fies the  end  of  all  hostilities  and  to  attach  to  it 
the  epithet  "  eternal  "  is  not  only  a  verbal  pleonasm, 
but  matter  of  suspicion.  The  causes  of  a  future 
war  existing,  although  perhaps  not  yet  known  to 
the  high  contracting  parties  themselves,  are  entirely 

io8  Perpetual  Peace 

annihilated  by  the  conclusion  of  peace,  howev< 
acutely  they  may  be  ferreted  out  of  documents 
the  public  archives.  There  may  be  a  mental  rese 
vation  of  old  claims  to  be  thought  out  at  a  futui 
time,  which  are,  none  of  them,  mentioned  at  th 
stage,  because  both  parties  are  too  much  exhauste 
to  continue  the  war,  while  the  evil  intention  remain 
of  using  the  first  favourable  opportunity  for  furthe 
hostilities.  Diplomacy  of  this  kind  only  Jesuitic? 
casuistry  can  justify:  it  is  beneath  the  dignity  of 
ruler,  just  as  acquiescence  in  such  processes  c 
reasoning  is  beneath  the  dignity  of  his  minister,  i ! 
one  judges  the  facts  as  they  really  are.  * 

If,  however,  according  to  present  enlightened  idea.1 
of  political  wisdom,  the  true  glory  of  a  state  lie* 
in  the  uninterrupted  development  of  its  power  by 
every  possible  means,  this  judgment  must  certainly 
strike  one  as  scholastic  and  pedantic. 

2. — "No  state  having  an  independent  existence— 
whether  it  be  great  or  small-  shall  be  acquired  by 
another  through  inheritance,  exchange,  purchase  or 
donation."  f 

*  On  the  honourable  interpretation  of  treaties,  see  Vattel  (op.  fit., 
II.  Ch.  XVII,  esp.  §§  263—296,  291).  See  also  what  he  says  of 
the  validity  of  treaties  and  the  necessity  for  holding  them  sacred 
(II.  Ch.  XII.  §§  157,  158:  II.  Ch.  XV).  [Tr.j 

f  "Even  the  smoothest  way,"  says  Hume,  (Of  the  Original 
Contract)  "by  which  a  nation  may  receive  a  foreign  master,  bj 


For  a  state  is  not  a  property  (patrimonium\  as 
may  be  the  ground  on  which  its  people  are  settled,  j 
It  is  a  society  of  human  beings  over  whom  no  one  | 
but  itself  has  the  right  to  rule  and  to  dispose.  | 
Like  the  trunk  of  a  tree,  it  has  its  own  roots,  and 
to  graft  it  on  to  another  state  is  to  do  away  with 
its  existence  as  a  moral  person,  and  to  make  of  it 
a  thing.  Hence  it  is  in  contradiction  to  the  idea 
of  the  original  contract  without  which  no  right 
over  a  people  is  thinkable.  *  Everyone  knows  to 
what  danger  the  bias  in  favour  of  these  modes  of 
acquisition  has  brought  Europe  (in  other  parts  of  the 
world  it  has  never  been  known).  The  custom  of 
marriage  between  states,  as  if  they  were  individuals, 
has  survived  even  up  to  the  most  recent  times,f  and  is 
regarded  partly  as  a  new  kind  of  industry  by  which 
ascendency  may  be  acquired  through  family  alli- 
ances, without  any  expenditure  of  strength ;  partly 

marriage  or  a  will,  is  not  extremely  honourable  for  the  people; 
but  supposes  them  to  be  disposed  of,  like  a  dowry  or  a  legacy, 
according  to  the  pleasure  or  interest  of  their  rulers."  [Tr.] 

*  An  hereditary  kingdom  is  not  a  state  which  can  be  inherited 
by  another  state,  but  one  whose  sovereign  power  can  be  inherited 
by  another  physical  person.  The  state  then  acquires  a  ruler,  not  the 
ruler  as  *uch  (that  is,  as  one  already  possessing  another  realm)  the  state. 

t  This  has  been  one  of  the  causes  of  the  extraordinary  admixture 
of  races  in  the  modern  Austrian  empire.  Cf.  the  lines  of  Matthias 
Corvinus  of  Hungary  (quoted  in  Sir  W.  Stirling  Maxwell's  Cloister 
Life  sf  Ckarlts  the  Fifth,  Ch.  I ,  notcy— 

"Bella  gerant  alii,  ru,  felix  Austria,  nube! 
Nam  quae  Mars  aliis,  dat  tibi  regna  Venus."      [Tr.] 

no  Perpetual  Peace 

as  a  device  for  territorial  expansion.  Moreover,  the 
hiring  out  of  the  troops  of  one  state  to  another 
to  fight  against  an  enemy  not  at  war  with  their 
native  country  is  to  be  reckoned  in  this  connection ; 
for  the  subjects  are  in  this  way  used  and  abused 
at  will  as  personal  property. 

3. -"Standing  armies  (miles  perpetuus]  shall  be 
abolished  in  course  of  time." 

For  they  are  always  threatening  other  states 
with  war  by  appearing  to  be  in  constant  readiness 
to  fight.  They  incite  the  various  states  to  outrival 
one  another  in  the  number  of  their  soldiers,  and 
to  this  number  no  limit  can  be  set.  Now,  since 
owing  to  the  sums  devoted  to  this  purpose,  peace 
at  last  becomes  even  more  oppressive  than  a  short 
war,  these  standing  armies  are  themselves  the  cause 
of  wars  of  aggression,  undertaken  in  order  to  get 
rid  of  this  burden.  To  which  we  must  add  that 
the  practice  of  hiring  men  to  kill  or  to  be  killed 
seems  to  imply  a  use  of  them  as  mere  machines 
and  instruments  in  the  hand  of  another  (namely, 
the  state)  which  cannot  easily  be  reconciled  with 
the  right  of  humanity  in  our  own  person.  *  The 

*  A  Bulgarian  Prince  thus  answered  the  Greek  Emperor  who 
magnanimously  offered  to  settle  a  quarrel  with  him,  not  by  shed- 
ding the  blood  of  his  subjects,  but  by  a  duel: — "A  smith  who  has 

Translation  1 1 1 

matter  stands  quite  differently  in  the  case  of  volun- 
tary periodical  military  exercise  on  the  part  of 
citizens  of  the  state,  who  thereby  seek  to  secure  them- 
selves and  their  country  against  attack  from  without. 
The  accumulation  of  treasure  in  a  state  would 
in  the  same  way  be  regarded  by  other  states  as  a 
menace  of  war,  and  might  compel  them  to  anticipate 
this  by  striking  the  first  blow.  For  of  the  three 
forces,  the  power  of  arms,  the  power  of  alliance 
and  the  power  of  money,  the  last  might  well 
become  the  most  reliable  instrument  of  war,  did 
not  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  the  amount  stand 
in  the  way. 

4. — "  No  national  debts  shall  oe  contracted  in 
connection  with  the  external  affairs  of  the  state." 

This  source  of  help  is  above  suspicion,  where 
assistance  is  sought  outside  or  within  the  state,  on 
behalf  of  the  economic  administration  of  the  country 
(for  instance,  the  improvement  of  the  roads,  the 
settlement  and  support  of  new  colonies,  the  establish- 
ment of  granaries  to  provide  against  seasons  of 
scarcity,  and  so  on).  But,  as  a  common  weapon 
used  by  the  Powers  against  one  another,  a  credit 
system  under  which  debts  go  on  indefinitely  in- 

tongs  will  not  take  the  red-hot  iron  from  the  fire  with  his  hands  " 
(This   note  is  a-wanting  in  the  second  Edition  of  1796.     It  is 
repeated  in  Art.  II.,  see  p.  130.)     [Tr.j 

1 1 2  Perpetual  Peace 

creasing  and  are  yet  always  assured  against  im- 
mediate claims  (because  all  the  creditors  do  not 
put  in  their  claim  at  once)  is  a  dangerous  money 
power.  This  ingenious  invention  of  a  commercial 
people  in  the  present  century  is,  in  other  words, 
a  treasure  for  the  carrying  on  of  war  which 
may  exceed  the  treasures  of  all  the  other  states 
taken  together,  and  can  only  be  exhausted  by 
a  threatening  deficiency  in  the  taxes — an  event, 
however,  which  will  long  be  kept  off  by  the 
very  briskness  of  commerce  resulting  from  the 
reaction  of  this  system  on  industry  and  trade.  The 
ease,  then,  with  which  war  may  be  waged,  coupled 
with  the  inclination  of  rulers  towards  it — an 
inclination  which  seems  to  be  implanted  in  human 
nature — is  a  great  obstacle  in  the  way  of  perpetual 
peace.  The  prohibition  of  this  system  must  be 
laid  down  as  a  preliminary  article  of  perpetual 
peace,  all  the  more  necessarily  because  the  final 
inevitable  bankruptcy  of  the  state  in  question  must 
involve  in  the  loss  many  who  are  innocent;  and 
this  would  be  a  public  injury  to  these  states. 
Therefore  other  nations  are  at  least  justified  in 
uniting  themselves  against  such  an  one  and  its 

5. — "No  state   shall   violently  interfere  with  the 
constitution  and  administration  of  another." 

Translation  113 

For  what  can  justify  it  in  so  doing?  The  scandal 
which  is  here  presented  to  the  subjects  of  another 
state?  The  erring  state  can  much  more  serve  as 
a  warning  by  exemplifying  the  great  evils  which  a 
nation  draws  down  on  itself  through  its  own  law- 
lessness. Moreover,  the  bad  example  which  one  free 
person  gives  another,  (as  scandalum  acceptum]  does 
no  injury  to  the  latter.  In  this  connection,  it  is 
true,  we  cannot  count  the  case  of  a  state  which 
has  become  split  up  through  internal  corruption 
into  two  parts,  each  of  them  representing  by  itself 
an  individual  state  which  lays  claim  to  the  whole. 
Here  the  yielding  of  assistance  to  one  faction  could 
not  be  reckoned  as  interference  on  the  part  of  a 
foreign  state  with  the  constitution  of  another,  for 
here  anarchy  prevails.  So  long,  however,  as  the 
inner  strife  has  not  yet  reached  this  stage  the 
interference  of  other  powers  would  be  a  violation 
of  the  rights  of  an  independent  nation  which  is 
only  struggling  with  internal  disease.  *  It  would 

*  See  Vattel:  Law  of  Nations,  II.  Ch.  IV.  §  55.  No  foreign 
power,  he  says,  has  a  right  to  judge  the  conduct  and  administration 
of  any  sovereign  or  oblige  him  to  alter  it.  "  If  he  loads  his  subjects 
with  taxes,  or  if  he  treats  them  with  severity,  the  nation  alone  is 
concerned;  and  no  other  is  called  upon  to  offer  redress  for  his 
behaviour,  or  oblige  him  to  follow  more  wise  and  eqnitable 

maxims But    (loc.    cii.    §    56)  when  the  bands  of  the 

political  society  are  broken,  or  at  least  suspended,  between  the 
sovereign  and  his  people,  the  contending  parties  may  then  be 
considered  M  two  distinct  powers;  and,  since  they  are  both  equally 


114  Perpetual  Peace 

therefore    itself  cause    a    scandal,    and    make    the 
autonomy  of  all  states  insecure. 

6. — "No  state  at  war  with  another  shall  coun- 
tenance such  modes  of  hostility  as  would  make 
mutual  confidence  impossible  in  a  subsequent  state 
of  peace:  such  are  the  employment  of  assassins 
(percussores)  or  of  poisoners  (venefici],  breaches  of 
capitulation,  the  instigating  and  making  use  of 
treachery  (perduellio]  in  the  hostile  state." 

These  are  dishonourable  stratagems.  For  some 
kind  of  confidence  in  the  disposition  of  the  enemy 
must  exist  even  in  the  midst  of  war,  as  otherwise 
peace  could  not  be  concluded,  and  the  hostilities 
would  pass  into  a  war  of  extermination  (bellum 
internecinum).  War,  however,  is  only  our  wretched 
expedient  of  asserting  a  right  by  force,  an  expe- 
dient adopted  in  the  state  of  nature,  where  no 
court  of  justice  exists  which  could  settle  the  matter 
in  dispute.  In  circumstances  like  these,  neither  of 
the  two  parties  can  be  called  an  unjust  enemy, 
because  this  form  of  speech  presupposes  a  legal 
decision :  the  issue  of  the  conflict — just  as  in  the 

independent  of  all  foreign  authority,  nobody  has  a  right  to  judge 
them.  Either  may  be  in  the  right;  and  each  of  those  who  grant 
their  assistance  may  imagine  that  he  is  giving  his  support  to  the 
better  cause."  [Tr.] 

Translation  1 1 5 

case  of  the  so-called  judgments  of  God — decides 
on  which  side  right  is.  Between  states,  however, 
no  punitive  war  (bellum  punitivum]  is  thinkable, 
because  between  them  a  relation  of  superior  and 
inferior  does  not  exist.  Whence  it  follows  that  a 
war  of  extermination,  where  the  process  of  annihil- 
ation would  strike  both  parties  at  once  and  all 
right  as  well,  would  bring  about  perpetual  peace 
only  in  the  great  graveyard  of  the  human  race. 
Such  a  war  then,  and  therefore  also  the  use  of  all 
means  which  lead  to  it,  must  be  absolutely  for- 
bidden. That  the  methods  just  mentioned  do  in- 
evitably lead  to  this  result  is  obvious  from  the  fact 
that  these  infernal  arts,  already  vile  in  themselves, 
on  coming  into  use,  are  not  long  confined  to  the 
sphere  of  war.  Take,  for  example,  the  use  of 
spies  (uti  exploratoribus}.  Here  only  the  dishonesty 
of  others  is  made  use  of;  but  vices  such  as  these, 
when  once  encouraged,  cannot  in  the  nature  of 
things  be  stamped  out  and  would  be  carried  over 
into  the  state  of  peace,  where  their  presence  would 
be  utterly  destructive  to  the  purpose  of  that  state. 
Although  the  laws  stated  are,  objectively  regarded, 
(i.e.  in  so  far  as  they  affect  the  action  of  rulers) 
purely  prohibitive  laws  (leges  prohibitivce],  some  of 
them  (leges  strictce]  are  strictly  valid  without  regard 
to  circumstances  and  urgently  require  to  be  enforced. 
Such  are  Nos.  I,  5,  6.  Others,  again,  (like  Nos.  2, 

Ii6  Perpetual  Peace 

3,  4)  although  not  indeed  exceptions  to  the  maxims 
.of  law,  yet  in  respect  of  the  practical  application 
of  these  maxims  allow  subjectively  of  a  certain 
latitude  to  suit  particular  circumstances.  The  en- 
forcement of  these  leges  latce  may  be  legitimately 
put  off,  so  long  as  we  do  not  lose  sight  of  the 
ends  at  which  they  aim.  This  purpose  of  reform 
does  not  permit  of  the  deferment  of  an  act  of 
restitution  (as,  for  example,  the  restoration  to 
certain  states  of  freedom  of  which  they  have  been 
deprived  in  the  manner  described  in  article  2)  to 
an  infinitely  distant  date — as  Augustus  used  to  say, 
to  the  "Greek  Kalends",  a  day  that  will  never 
come.  This  would  be  to  sanction  non-restitution. 
Delay  is  permitted  only  with  the  intention  that 
restitution  should  not  be  made  too  precipitately 
and  so  defeat  the  purpose  we  have  in  view.  For 
the  prohibition  refers  here  only  to  the  mode  of 
acquisition  which  is  to  be  no  longer  valid,  and 
not  to  the  fact  of  possession  which,  although 
indeed  it  has  not  the  necessary  title  of  right,  yet 
at  the  time  of  so-called  acquisition  was  held  legal 
by  all  states,  in  accordance  with  the  public  opinion 
of  the  time.  * 

*  It  has  been  hitherto  doubted,  not  without  reason,  whether  there 
can  be  laws  rf  permission  (leges  permit  sivai)  of  pure  reason  as 
well  as  commands  (leges  praceptivci)  and  prohibitions  (leges  pro- 
hibittva).  For  law  in  general  hai  a  basis  of  objective  practical 
necessity:  permission,  on  the  other  hand,  is  bated  upon  the  eou- 

Translation  1 1 7 



A  state  of  peace  among  men  who  live  side  by 
side  is  not  the  natural  state  (status  naturalis\  which 

tingency  of  certain  actions  in  practice.  It  follows  that  a  law  of 
permission  would  enforce  what  cannot  be  enforced ;  and  this  would 
involve  a  contradiction,  if  the  object  of  the  law  should  be  the  same 
in  both  cases.  Here,  however,  in  the  present  case  of  a  law  of 
permission,  the  presupposed  prohibition  is  aimed  merely  at  the 
future  manner  of  acquisition  of  a  right — for  example,  acquisition 
through  inheritance:  the  exemption  from  this  prohibition  (/'.*.  the 
permission)  refers  to  the  present  state  of  possession.  In  the  tran- 
sition from  a  state  of  nature  to  the  civil  state,  this  holding  of 
property  can  continue  as  a  bona  fide,  if  usurpatory,  ownership, 
under  the  new  social  conditions,  in  accordance  with  a  permission 
of  the  Law  of  Nature.  Ownership  of  this  kind,  as  soon  as  its 
true  nature  becomes  known,  is  seen  to  be  mere  nominal  possession 
(fossessio  putativd)  sanctioned  by  opinion  and  customs  in  a  natural 
state  of  society.  After  the  transition  stage  is  passed,  such  modes 
of  acquisition  are  likewise  forbidden  in  the  subsequently  evolved 
civil  state :  and  this  power  to  remain  in  possession  would  not  be 
admitted  if  the  supposed  acquisition  had  taken  place  in  the  civilized 
community.  It  would  be  bound  to  come  to  an  end  as  an  injury 
to  the  right  of  others,  the  moment  its  illegality  became  patent. 

I  have  wished  here  only  by  the  way  to  draw  the  attention  of 
teachers  of  the  Law  of  Nature  to  the  idea  of  a  lex  permissiva 
which  presents  itself  spontaneously  in  any  system  of  rational  classi- 
fication. I  do  so  chiefly  because  use  is  often  made  of  this  con- 
cept in  civil  law  with  reference  to  statutes ;  with  this  difference, 
that  the  law  of  prohibition  stands  alone  by  itself,  while  permis- 
sion is  not,  as  it  ought  to  be,  introduced  into  that  law  as  a  limiting 
clause,  but  is  thrown  among  the  exceptions.  Thus  "  this  or  that  is 
forbidden", — say,  Nos.  I,  2,  3,  and  so  on  in  an  infinite  progression, — 
while  permissions  are  only  added  to  the  law  incidentally :  they 
are  not  reached  by  the  application  of  some  principle,  but  only  by 

ii8  Perpetual  Peace 

is  rather  to  be  described  as  a  state  of  war :  *  that 
is  to  say,  although  there  is  not  perhaps  always 
actual  open  hostility,  yet  there  is  a  constant  threat- 
ening that  an  outbreak  may  occur.  Thus  the 
state  of  peace  must  be  established,  f  For  the  mere 

groping  about  among  cases  which  have  actually  occurred.  Were 
this  not  so,  qualifications  would  have  had  to  be  brought  into  the 
formula  of  laws  of  prohibition  which  would  have  immediately 
transformed  them  into  laws  of  permission.  Count  von  Windisch- 
gratz.  a  man  whose  wisdom  was  equal  to  his  discrimination,  urged 
this  very  point  in  the  form  of  a  question  propounded  by  him  for 
a  prize  essay.  One  must  therefore  regret  that  this  ingenious 
problem  has  been  so  soon  neglected  and  left  unsolved.  For  the 
possibility  of  a  formula  similar  to  those  of  mathematics  is  the  sole 
real  test  of  a  legislation  that  would  be  consistent.  Without  this, 
the  so-called  jus  cerium  will  remain  forever  a  mere  pious  wish: 
we  can  have  only  general  laws  valid  on  the  whole;  no  general  laws 
possessing  the  universal  validity  which  the  concept  law  seems  to 

*  "Fron?  this  diffidence  of  one  another,  there  is  no  way  for  any 
man  to  secure  himself,  so  reasonable,  as  anticipation;  that  is, 
by  force,  or  wiles,  to  master  the  persons  of  all  men  he  can,  so 
long,  till  he  see  no  other  power  great  enough  to  endanger  him: 
and  this  is  no  more  than  his  own  conservation  requireth,  and  is 
generally  allowed."  (Hobbes:  Lev.  I.  Ch.  XIII.)  [Tr.] 

f  Hobbes  thus  describes  the  establishment  of  the  state,  "^com- 
monwealth is  said  to  be  instituted,  when  a  multitude  of  men  do  agree, 
and  covenant,  every  one,  with  every  one,  that  to  whatsoever  man, 
or  assembly  of  men,  shall  be  given  by  the  major  part,  the  fight  to 
present  the  person  of  them  all,  that  is  to  say,  to  be  their  represen- 
tative;  everyone,  as  well  he  that  voted  for  it,  as  he  that  voted 
against  it,  shall  authorize  all  the  actions  and  judgments,  of  that 
man,  or  assembly  of  men,  in  the  same  manner,  as  if  they  were 
his  own,  to  the  end,  to  live  peaceably  amongst  themselves,  and  be 
protected  against  other  men."  (Lev.  II.  Ch.  XVIII.) 

There  is  a  covenant  between  them,  "as  if  every  man  should 
•ay  to  every  man,  /  authorize  and  give  up  my  right  of  governing 

Translation  \  1 9 

cessation  of  hostilities  is  no  guarantee  of  continued 
peaceful  relations,  and  unless  this  guarantee  is  given    ' 
by   every    individual  to    his  neighbour — which  can  j 
only   be    done   in   a   state    of  society  regulated  by  I 
law — one    man   is   at   liberty   to    challenge  anothei 
and  treat  him  as  an  enemy.  * 

myself t  to  this  man,  or  to  this  assembly  of  nteri>  on  this  condition^ 
that  thou  give  up  thy  right  to  him,  and  authorize  nil  his  actions 
in  like  wanner."  (Lev.  II.  Ch.  XVII.)  [Tr.] 

*  It  is  usually  accepted  that  a  man  may  not  take  hostile  steps 
against  any  one,  unless  the  latter  has  already  injured  him  by  act. 
This  is  quite  accurate,  if  both  are  citizens  of  a  law-governed  state. 
For,  in  becoming  a  member  of  this  community,  each  gives  the 
other  the  security  he  demands  against  injury,  by  means  of  the 
supreme  authority  exercising  control  over  them  both.  The  indivi- 
dual, however,  (or  nation)  who  remains  in  a  mere  state  of  nature 
deprives  me  of  this  security  and  does  me  injury,  by  mere  proximity. 
There  is  perhaps  no  active  (facto)  molestation,  but  there  is  a  state 
of  lawlessness,  (status  injustus)  which,  by  its  very  existence,  offers  a 
continual  menace  to  me.v^I  can  therefore  compel  him,  either  to 
enter  into  relations  with  me  under  which  we  are  both  subject  to 
law,  or  to  withdraw  from  my  neighbourhood.  So  that  the  postulate 
upon  which  the  following  articles  are  based  is: — "All  men  who 
have  the  power  to  exert  a  mutual  influence  upon  one  another  must 
be  under  a  civil  government  of  some  kind." 

A  legal  constitution  is,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  indivi- 
duals who  compose  the  state  :— 

(1)  A  constitution  formed  in  accordance  with  the  right  of  citizen- 
ship of  the  individuals  who  constitute  a  nation  (jus  civitatis}. 

(2)  A   constitution    whose  principle   is  international  law  which 
determines  the  relations  of  states  (jus  gentium). 

(3)  A    constitution    formed    in    accordance    with    cosmopolitan 
law,    in    as   far  as  individuals  and  states,  standing  in  an  external 
relation    of   mutual    reaction,    may  be  regarded  as  citizens  of  one 
world-state  (jus  cosmopoliticum). 

This  classification  is  not  an  arbitrary  one,  but  is  necessary 
>\  ith  reference  to  the  idea  of  perpetual  peace,  For,  if  even  one  of 

12O  Ptrpttual  Peace 


I. — "The   civil   constitution   of  each  state  shall  be 

The  only  constitution  which  has  its  origin  in  the 
idea  of  the  original  contract,  upon  which  the  lawful 
legislation  of  every  nation  must  be  based,  is  the 
republican.  *  It  is  a  constitution,  in  the  first  place, 

these  units  of  society  were  in  a  position  physically  to  influence 
another,  while  yet  remaining  a  member  of  a  primitive  order  of 
society,  then  a  state  of  war  would  be  joined  with  these  primitive 
conditions;  and  from  this  it  is  our  present  purpose  to  free  ourselves. 

*  Lawful,  that  is  to  say,  external  freedom  cannot  be  defined,  as 
it  so  ofteu  is,  as  the  right  \J3ef ugniss]  "to  do  whatever  one  likes, 
so  long  as  this  does  not  wrong  anyone  else."  l  For  what  is  this 
right?  It  is  the  possibility  of  actions  which  do  not  lead  to  the 
injury  of  others.  So  the  explanation  of  a  "right"  would  be 
something  like  this: — "Freedom  is  the  possibility  of  actions  which 
do  not  injure  anyone.  A  man  does  not  wrong  another — whatever 
his  action — if  he  docs  not  wrong  another":  which  is  empty 
tautology.  My  external  (lawful)  freedom  is  rather  to  be  explained  in 
this  way:  it  is  the  right  through  which  I  require  not  to  obey  any 
external  laws  except  those  to  which  I  could  have  given  my  consent. 
In  exactly  the  same  way,  external  (legal)  equality  in  a  state  is  that 
relation  of  the  subjects  in  consequence  of  which  no  individual 
can  legally  bind  or  oblige  another  to  anything,  without  at  the 
same  time  submitting  himself  to  the  law  which  ensures  that  he 
can,  in  his  turn,  be  bound  and  obliged  in  like  manner  by  this 

The   principle    of  lawful  independence  requires  no  explanation, 

1  Hobbes'  definition  of  freedom  is  interesting.  See  Lev.  II.  Ch. 
XXI.: — "A  FREEMAN,  is  het  that  in  those  things,  -which  by  hit 
strength  and  wit  he  is  able  to  do,  is  not  hindered  to  dt  what  he 
has  a  will  to?'  [Tr.j 

Translation  121 

founded  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  the 
freedom  of  the  members  of  society  as  human 
beings:  secondly,  in  accordance  with  the  principle 
of  the  dependence  of  all,  as  subjects,  on  a  common 
legislation:  and,  thirdly,  in  accordance  with  the 
law  of  the  equality  of  the  members  as  citizens. 
It  is  then,  looking  at  the  question  of  right,  the 
only  constitution  whose  fundamental  principles  lie 
at  the  basis  of  every  form  of  civil  constitution. 
And  the  only  question  for  us  now  is,  whether  it  is 
also  the  one  constitution  which  can  lead  to  per- 
petual peace. 

Now   the   republican  constitution  apart  from  the 
soundness    of   its    origin,    since   it   arose    from   the 

as  it  is  involved  in  the  general  concept  of  a  constitution.  The 
validity  of  this  hereditary  and  inalienable  right,  which  belongs  of 
necessity  to  mankind,  is  affirmed  and  ennobled  by  the  principle 
of  a  lawful  relation  between  man  himself  and  higher  beings, 
if  indeed  he  believes  in  such  beings.  This  is  so,  because  he 
thinks  of  himself,  in  accordance  with  these  very  principles,  as 
a  citizen  of  a  transcendental  world  as  well  as  of  the  world  of 
stnae.  For,  as  far  as  my  freedom  goes,  I  am  bound  by  no 
obligation  even  with  regard  to  Divine  Laws — which  are  appre- 
hended by  me  only  through  my  reason — except  in  so  far  as  I 
could  have  given  my  assent  to  them;  for  it  is  through  the  law 
of  freedom  of  my  own  reason  that  I  first  form  for  myself  a  , 
concept  of  a  Divine  Will...  As  for  the  principle  of  equality,  in  ; 
so  far  as  it  applies  to  the  most  sublime  being  in  the  universe  ;' 
next  to  God — a  being  I  might  perhaps  figure  to  myself  as  a 
mighty  emanation  of  the  Divine  spirit, — there  is  no  reason  why, 
if  I  perform  my  duty  in  the  sphere  in  which  I  am  placed,  as  that 
aeon  doet  in  his,  the  duty  of  obedience  alone  should  fall  to  my 
share,  the  right  to  command  to  him.  That  this  principle  of 

122  Perpetual  Peace 

pure  source  of  the  concept  of  right,  has  also  the 
prospect  of  attaining  the  desired  result,  namely, 
perpetual  peace.  And  the  reason  is  this.  If,  as 
must  be  so  under  this  constitution,  the  consent  of 
the  subjects  is  required  to  determine  whether  there 
shall  be  war  or  not,  nothing  is  more  natural  than 
that  they  should  weigh  the  matter  well,  before 
undertaking  such  a  bad  business.  For  in  decreeing 
war,  they  would  of  necessity  be  resolving  to  bring 
down  the  miseries  of  war  upon  their  country.  This 
implies:  they  must  fight  themselves;  they  must 
hand  over  the  costs  of  the  war  out  of  their  own 

equality,  (unlike  the  principle  of  freedom),  does  not  apply  to 
our  relation  to  God  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  to  this  Being  alone, 
the  idea  of  duty  does  not  belong. 

As  for  the  right  to  equality  which  belongs  to  all  citizens  as 
subjects,  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  admissibility  of  an 
hereditary  nobility  hinges  on  the  following  question: — "Does 
social  rank — acknowledged  by  the  state  to  be  higher  in  the  case 
of  one  subject  than  another — stand  above  desert,  or  does  merit 
take  precedence  of  social  standing?"  Now  it  is  obvious  that,  if 
high  position  is  combined  with  good  family,  it  is  quite  uncertain 
whether  merit,  that  is  to  say,  skill  and  fidelity  in  office,  will  follow 
as  well.  This  amounts  to  granting  the  favoured  individual  a  com- 
manding position  without  any  question  of  desert;  r.nd  to  that, 
the  universal  will  of  the  people— expressed  in  an  original  contract 
which  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  all  right — would  never 
consent.»JFor  it  does  not  follow  that  a  nobleman  is  a  man  of 
noble  character.  In  the  case  of  the  official  nobility,  as  one  might 
term  the  rank  of  higher  magistracy — which  one  must  acquire  by 
merit — the  social  position  is  not  attached  like  property  to  the 
person  but  to  his  office,  and  equality  is  not  thereby  disturbed; 
for,  if  a  man  gives  up  office,  he  lays  down  with  it  his  official 
rank  and  falls  back  into  the  rank  of  his  fellows. 

Translation  123 

property;  they  must  do  their  poor  best  to  make 
good  the  devastation  which  it  leaves  behind;  and 
finally,  as  a  crowning  ill,  they  have  to  accept  a 
burden  of  debt  which  will  embitter  even  peace 
itself,  and  which  they  can  never  pay  off  on  account 
of  the  new  wars  which  are  always  impending. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  a  government  where  the 
subject  is  not  a  citizen  holding  a  vote,  (*.  e.  in  a 
constitution  which  is  not  republican),  the  plunging 
into  war  is  the  least  serious  thing  in  the  world. 
For  the  ruler  is  not  a  citizen,  but  the  owner  of 
the  state,  and  does  not  lose  a  whit  by  the  war, 
while  he  goes  on  enjoying  the  delights  of  his  table 
or  sport,  or  of  his  pleasure  palaces  and  gala  days. 
He  can  therefore  decide  on  war  for  the  most 
trifling  reasons,  as  if  it  were  a  kind  of  pleasure 
party.  *  Any  justification  of  it  that  is  necessary  for 
the  sake  of  decency  he  can  leave  without  concern 
to  the  diplomatic  corps  who  are  always  only  too 
ready  with  their  services. 

*  Cf.  Cowper:  Tht   Winter  Morning  Walk:— 
"But  is  it  fit,  or  can  it  bear  the  shock 
Of  rational  discussion,  that  a  man, 
Compounded  and  made  up  like  other  men 
Of  elements  tumultuous,    , 

Should  when  he  pleases,  and  on  whom  he 
"Wage  war,  with  any  or  with  no  pretence 
Of  provocation  giv'n  or  wrong  sustaiu'd^ 

114  Ptrpttual  Peace 

The  following  remarks  must  be  made  in  order 
that  we  may  not  fall  into  the  common  error  of 
confusing  the  republican  with  the  democratic  con- 
stitution. The  forms  of  the  state  (civitas]  *  may 
be  classified  according  to  either  of  two  principles 
of  division : — the  difference  of  the  persons  who  hold 
the  supreme  authority  in  the  state,  and  the  manner 
in  which  the  people  are  governed  by  their  ruler 
whoever  he  may  be.  The  first  is  properly  called 
the  form  of  sovereignty  (forma  imperii],  and  there 
can  be  only  three  constitutions  differing  in  this 
respect:  where,  namely,  the  supreme  authority 
belongs  to  only  one,  to  several  individuals  work- 
ing together,  or  to  the  whole  people  constituting 
the  civil  society.  Thus  we  have  autocracy  or  the 
sovereignty  of  a  monarch,  aristocracy  or  the 
sovereignty  of  the  nobility,  and  democracy  or  the 

And  force  the  beggarly  last  doit,  by  means 
That  his  own  humour  dictates,  from  tha  clutch 
Of  poverty,  that  thus  he  may  procure 
His  thousands,  weary  of  penurious  life, 
A  splendid  opportunity  to  die?" 

''He  deems  a  thousand  or  ten  thousand  lives 
Spent  in  the  purchase  of  renown  for  him, 
An  easy  reckoning."     [Tr.] 

*  Cf.  Hobbes:  On  Dominion,  Ch.  VII.  §  I.  "As  for  the 
difference  of  cities,  it  is  taken  from  the  difference  of  the  persons  to 
whom  the  supreme  power  is  committed.  This  power  is  committed 
either  to  one  man,  or  council,  or  some  one  court  consisting  of 
many  men."  [Tr.] 

Translation  125 

sovereignty  of  the  people.  The  second  principle  of 
division  is  the  form  of  government  (forma  regi- 
mims),  and  refers  to  the  way  in  which  the  state 
makes  use  of  its  supreme  power :  for  the  manner 
of  government  is  based  on  the  constitution,  itself 
the  act  of  that  universal  will  which  transforms  a 

multitude   into  a  nation.     In  this  respect  the  form 


of  government  is  either  republican  or  despotic. 
Republicanism  is  the  political  principle  of  severing 
the  executive  power  of  the  government  from  the 
legislature.  Despotism  is  that  principle  in  pur- 
suance of  which  the  state  arbitrarily  puts  into 
effect  laws  which  it  has  itself  made :  consequently 
it  is  the  administration  of  the  public  will,  but 
this  is  identical  with  the  private  will  of  the  ruler. 
Of  these  three  forms  of  a  state,  democracy,  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  is  of  necessity  des- 
potism, because  it  establishes  an  executive  power, 
since  all  decree  regarding — and,  if  need  be, 
against — any  individual  who  dissents  from  them. 
Therefore  the  ''whole  people",  so-called,  who  carry 
their  measure  are  really  not  all,  but  only  a  majo- 
rity: so  that  here  the  universal  will  is  in  contra- 
diction with  itself  and  with  the  principle  of  freedom. 
Every  form  of  government  in  fact  which  is  not 
representative  is  really  no  true  constitution  at  all, 
because  a  law-giver  may  no  more  be,  in  one  and 
the  same  perion,  the  administrator  of  his  own 

126  Perpetual  Peace 

will,  than  the  universal  major  premise  of  a 
syllogism  may  be,  at  the  same  time,  the  sub- 
sumption  under  itself  of  the  particulars  contained  in 
the  minor  premise.  And,  although  the  other  two 
constitutions,  autocracy  and  aristocracy,  are  always 
defective  in  so  far  as  they  leave  the  way  open  for 
such  a  form  of  government,  yet  there  is  at  least 
always  a  possibility  in  these  cases,  that  they  may 
take  the  form  of  a  government  in  accordance  with 
the  spirit  of  a  representative  system.  Thus  Frederick 
the  Great  used  at  least  to  say  that  he  was  "  merely 
the  highest  servant  of  the  state.  *  The  democratic 
constitution,  on  the  other  hand,  makes  this  impos- 
sible, because  under  such  a  government  every  one 
wishes  to  be  master.  We  may  therefore  say  that 
the  smaller  the  staff  of  the  executive — that  is  to 
say,  the  number  of  rulers— and  the  more  real,  on  the 
other  hand,  their  representation  of  the  people,  so 
much  the  more  is  the  government  of  the  state  in 

*  The  lofty  appellations  which  are  often  given  to  a  ruler — such 
as  the  Lord's  Anointed,  the  Administrator  of  the  Divine  Will 
upon  earth  and  Vicar  of  God — have  been  many  times  censured  as 
flattery  gross  enough  to  make  one  giddy.  But  it  seems  to  me 
without  cause.  Far  from  making  a  prince  arrogant,  names  like 
these  must  rather  make  him  humble  at  heart,  if  he  has  any  intel- 
ligence— which  we  take  for  granted  he  has — and  reflects  that  he 
has  undertaken  an  office  which  is  too  great  for  any  human  being. 
For,  indeed,  it  is  the  holiest  which  God  has  on  earth — namely,  the 
right  of  ruling  mankind:  and  he  must  ever  live  in  fear  of  injuring 
this  treasure  of  God  in  some  respect  or  other. 

Translation  1 27 

accordance  with  a  possible  republicanism ;  and  it 
may  hope  by  gradual  reforms  to  raise  itself  to 
that  standard.  For  this  reason,  it  is  more  difficult 
under  an  aristocracy  than  under  a  monarchy — 
while  under  a  democracy  it  is  impossible  except 
by  a  violent  revolution — to  attain  to  this,  the 
one  perfectly  lawful  constitution.  The  kind  of 
government,  *  however,  is  of  infinitely  more  im- 
portance to  the  people  than  the  kind  of  consti- 
tution, although  the  greater  or  less  aptitude  of  a 
people  for  this  ideal  greatly  depends  upon  such 
external  form.  The  form  of  government,  however, 
if  it  is  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  idea  of  right, 
must  embody  the  representative  system  in  which 
alone  a  republican  form  of  administration  is  pos- 

*  Mallet  du  Pan  boasts  in  his  seemingly  brilliant  but  shallow 
and  superficial  language  that,  after  many  years  experience,  he  has 
come  at  last  to  be  convinced  of  the  truth  of  the  well  known 
saying  of  Pope  [Essay  on  Man,  III.  303] : — 

"For  Forms  of  Government  let  fools  contest; 

Whate'er  is  best  administered  is  best",  "> 

If  this  means  that  the  best  administered  government  is  best 
administered,  then,  in  Swift's  phrase,  he  has  cracked  a  nut  to  find  a 
worm  in  it.  If  it  means,  however,  that  the  best  conducted  govern- 
ment is  also  the  best  kind  of  government, — that  is,  the  best  form 
of  political  constitution, — then  it  is  utterly  false :  for  examples  of 
wise  administration  are  no  proof  of  the  kiud  of  government.  Who 
ever  ruled  better  than  Titus  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  and  yet  the  one 
left  Domitian,  the  other  Commodus,  as  his  successor?  This  could 
not  have  happened  where  the  constitution  was  a  good  one,  for 
their  absolute  unfitness  for  the  position  was  early  enough  known, 
and  the  power  of  the  emperer  was  sufficiently  great  to  exclude  them. 

128  Perpetual  Peace 

sible  and  without  which  it  is  despotic  and  violent, 
be  the  constitution  what  it  may.  None  of  the 
ancient  so-called  republics  were  aware  of  this,  and 
they  necessarily  slipped  into  absolute  despotism 
which,  of  all  despotisms,  is  most  endurable  under 
the  sovereignty  of  one  individual. 


II. — "The   law   of   nations   shall  be  founded  oa  a 
federation  of  free  states." 

Nations,  as  states,  may  be  judged  like  individuals 
who,  living  in  the  natural  state  of  society — that  is 
to  say,  uncontrolled  by  external  law — injure  one 
another  through  their  very  proximity.  *.~  Every  state, 
for  the  sake  of  its  own  security,  may — and  ought 
to — demand  that  its  neighbour  should  submit  itself 
to  conditions,  similar  to  those  of  the  civil  society 
where  the  right  of  every  individual  is  guaranteed. 

*  "For  as  amongst  masterless  men,  there  is  perpetual  war,  of 
every  man  against  his  neighbour;  no  inheritance,  to  transmit  to 
the  son,  nor  to  expect  from  the  father;  no  propriety  of  goods,  or 
lands;  no  security;  but  a  full  and  absolute  liberty  in  every  parti- 
cular man :  so  in  states,  and  commonwealths  not  dependent  on  one 
another,  every  commonwealth,  not  every  man,  has  an  absolute 
liberty,  to  do  what  it  shall  judge,  that  is  to  say,  what  that  man, 
or  assembly  that  represented  it,  shall  judge  most  conducing  to 
their  benefit.  But  withal,  they  live  in  the  condition  of  a  perpetual 
war,  and  upon  the  confines  of  battle,  witk  their  frontiers  arm«4, 
and  cannons  planted  against  their  neighbours  round  about." 
(Hobbes:  Leviathan,  II.  Ch.  XXI.)  [Tr.J 

Translation  \  29 

This  would  give  rise  to  a  federation  of  nations  which, 
however,  would  not  have  to  be  a  State  of  nations.  * 
That  would  involve  a  contradiction.  For  the  term 
"state"  implies  the  relation  of  one  who  rules  to 
those  who  obey — that  is  to  say,  of  lawgiver  to  the 
subject  people :  and  many  nations  in  one  state  would 
constitute  only  one  nation,  which  contradicts  our 
hypothesis,  since  here  we  have  to  consider  the  right 
of  one  nation  against  another,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  so  many  separate  states  and  are  not  to  be 
fused  into  one. 

*  But  see  p.  136,  where  Kant  seems  to  speak  of  a  State  of  nations 
as  the  ideal.  Kant  expresses  himself,  on  this  point,  more  clearly 
in  the  Rechtslehre,  Part.  II.  §  61 :— "  The  natural  state  of  nations," 
he  says  here,  "like  that  of  individual  men,  is  a  condition  which 
must  be  abandoned,  in  order  that  they  may  enter  a  state  regulated 
by  law.  Hence,  before  this  can  take  place,  every  right  possessed 
by  these  nations  and  every  external  "mine"  and  "thine"  \id  est, 
symbol  of  possession]  which  states  acquire  or  preserve  through  war  are 
merely  provisional^  and  can  become  ftremftorily  valid  and  constitute 
a  true  state  of  peace  only  in  a  universal  union  of  ttates,  by  a 
process  analogous  to  that  through  which  a  people  becomes  a  state. 
Since,  however,  the  too  great  extension  of  such  a  State  of  nations 
over  vast  territories  must,  in  the  long  run,  make  the  government  of 
that  union — and  therefore  the  protection  of  each  of  its  members — 
impossible,  a  multitude  of  such  corporations  will  lead  again  to  a 
state  of  war.  So  that  ferpetual peace,  the  final  goal  of  international 
law  as  a  whole,  is  really  an  impracticable  idea  \eine  unaus/uhr~ 
bare  Idee\  The  political  principles,  however,  which  are  directed 
towards  this  end,  (that  is  to  say,  towards  the  establishment  of  such 
unions  of  states  as  may  serve  as  a  continual  approximation  to  that 
ideal),  are  not  impracticable;  on  the  contrary,  as  this  approximation 
is  required  by  duty  and  is  therefore  founded  also  upon  the  rights 
of  men  and  of  states,  these  principles  are,  without  doubt,  capable 
of  practical  realisation."  [Tr.] 


Perpetual  Peace 

The  attachment  of  savages  to  their  lawless  liberty, 
the  fact  that  they  would  rather  be  at  hopeless 
variance  with  one  another  than  submit  themselves 
to  a  legal  authority  constituted  by  themselves,  that 
they  therefore  prefer  their  senseless  freedom  to  a 
reason-governed  liberty,  is  regarded  by  us  with 
profound  contempt  as  barbarism  and  uncivilisation 
and  the  brutal  degradation  of  humanity.  So  one 
would  think  that  civilised  races,  each  formed  into 
a  state  by  itself,  must  come  out  of  such  an  aban- 
doned condition  as  soon  as  they  possibly  can. 
On  the  contrary,  however,  every  state  thinks  rather 
that  its  majesty  (the  "majesty"  of  a  people  is  an 
absurd  expression)  lies  just  in  the  very  fact  that 
it  is  subject  to  no  external  legal  authority ;  and  the 
glory  of  the  ruler  consists  in  this,  that,  without  his 
requiring  to  expose  himself  to  danger,  thousands 
stand  at  his  command  ready  to  let  themselves  be 
sacrificed  for  a  matter  of  no  concern  to  them.  * 
The  difference  between  the  savages  of  Europe 
and  those  of  America  lies  chiefly  in  this,  that, 
while  many  tribes  of  the  latter  have  been  entirely 
devoured  by  their  enemies,  Europeans  know  a 
better  way  of  using  the  vanquished  than  by  eating 

*  A  Greek  Emperor  who  magnanimously  volunteered  to  settle 
by  a  duel  his  quarrel  with  a  Bulgarian  Prince,  got  the  following 
answer:— "A  smith  who  has  toQgs  will  not  pluck  the  glowing 
iron  from  the  fire  with  his  hands." 

Translation  131 

them;  and  they  prefer  to  increase  through  them 
the  number  of  their  subjects,  and  so  the  number 
of  instruments  at  their  command  for  still  more 
widely  spread  war. 

The  depravity  of  human  nature  *  shows  itself 
without  disguise  in  the  unrestrained  relations  of 
nations  to  each  other,  while  in  the  law-governed 
civil  state  much  of  this  is  hidden  by  the  check 
of  government.  This  being  so,  it  is  astonishing 
that  the  word  "right"  has  not  yet  been  entirely 
banished  from  the  politics  of  war  as  pedantic, 
and  that  no  state  has  yet  ventured  to  publicly 
advocate  this  point  of  view/  For  Hugo  Grotius, 
Puffendorf,  Vattel  and  others — Job's  comforters,  all 
of  them — are  always  quoted  in  good  faith  to  justify 
an  attack,  although  their  codes,  whether  couched 
in  philosophical  or  diplomatic  terms,  have  not— nor 
can  have — the  slightest  legal  force,  because  states, 
as  such,  are  under  no  common  external  authority; 
and  there  is  no  instance  of  a  state  having  ever 

*  "Both  sayings  are  very  true:  that  man  to  man  is  a  kind  of 
God;  and  that  man  to  man  u  an  arrant  wolf.  The  first  is  true, 
if  we  compare  citizens  amongst  themselves;  and  the  second,  if  we 
compare  cities.  In  the  one,  there  is  some  analogy  of  similitude  with 
the  Deity;  to  wit,  justice  and  charity,  the  twin  sisters  of  peace.  But 
in  the  other,  good  men  must  defend  themselves  by  taking  to  them 
for  a  sanctuary  the  two  daughters  of  war,  deceit  and  violence: 
that  is,  in  plain  terms,  a  mere  brutal  rapacity."  (Hobbes:  Epistle 
Dedicatory*"  to  the  Philosophical  Rudiments  concerning  Government 
and  Society?)  ^Tr.] 

132  Perpetual  Peace 

been  moved  by  argument  to  desist  from  its 
purpose,  even  when  this  was  backed  up  by  the 
testimony  of  such  great  men.  This  homage  which 
every  state  renders— in  words  at  least — to  the 
idea  of  right,  proves  that,  although  it  may  be 
slumbering,  there  is,  notwithstanding,  to  be  found 
in  man  a  still  higher  natural  moral  capacity  by 
the  aid  of  which  he  will  in  time  gain  the  mastery 
over  the  evil  principle  in  his  nature,  the  existence 
of  which  he  is  unable  to  deny.  And  he  hopes 
the  same  of  others;  for  otherwise  the  word 
"right"  would  never  be  uttered  by  states  who 
wish  to  wage  war,  unless  to  deride  it  like  the 
Gallic  Prince  who  declared: — " The  privilege  which 
nature  gives  the  strong  is  that  the  weak  must 
obey  them."  * 

The  method  by  which  states  prosecute  their 
rights  can  never  be  by  process  of  law — as  it  is 
where  there  is  an  external  tribunal — but  only  by  war. ' 
Through  this  means,  however,  and  its  favourable 
issue,  victory,  the  question  of  right  is  never  decided. 
A  treaty  of  peace  makes,  it  may  be,  an  end  to 
the  war  of  the  moment,  but  not  to  the  conditions 

*  "The  strongest  are  still  never  sufficiently  strong  to  ensure 
them  the  continual  mastership,  unless  they  find  means  of  trans- 
forming force  into  right,  and  obedience  into  duty. 

From  the  right  of  the  strongest,  right  takes  an  ironical  appear- 
ance, and  is  rarely  established  as  a  principle."  (Contrat  Soda/,  I, 
Ch.  III.)  [Tr.j 

i  j  $ 

of  war  which  at  any  time  may  afford  a  new  pretext 
for  opening  hostilities;  and  this  we  cannot  exactly 
condemn  as  unjust,  because  under  these  conditions 
everyone  is  his  own  judge.  Notwithstanding,  not 
quite  the  same  rule  applies  to  states  according  to 
the  law  of  nations  as  holds  good  of  individuals  in 
a  lawless  condition  according  to  the  law  of  nature, 
namely,  "that  they  ought  to  advance  out  of  this 
condition."  This  is  so,  because,  as  states,  they  have 
already  within  themselves  a  legal  constitution,  and 
have  therefore  advanced  beyond  the  stage  at  which 
others,  in  accordance  with  their  ideas  of  right,  can 
force  them  to  come  under  a  wider  legal  constitution. 
Meanwhile,  however,  reason,  from  her  throne  of 
the  supreme  law-giving  moral  power,  absolutely 
condemns  war  *  as  a  morally  lawful  proceeding, 

*  "The  natural  state,"  says  Hobbes,  (On  Dominion,  Ch.  VH  §  18) 
"hath  the  same  proportion  to  the  ciril,  (I  mean,  liberty  to  subjection), 
•which  passion  hath  to  reason,  or  a  beast  to  a  man." 

Locke  speaks  thus  of  man,  when  he  puts  himself  into  the  state 
of  war  with  another: — "haying  quitted  reason,  which  God  hath 
given  to  be  the  rule  betwixt  man  aod  man,  and  the  common  bond 
whereby  human  kind  is  united  ioto  one  fellowship  and  society; 
and  having  renounced  the  way  of  peace  which  that  teaches,  and 
made  use  of  the  force  of  war,  to  compass  his  unjust  ends  upon 
another,  where  he  has  no  right:  and  so  revolting  from  his  own 
kind  to  that  of  beasts,  by  making  force,  which  is  theirs,  to  be  hig 
rule  of  right,  he  renders  himself  liable  to  be  destroyed  by  the 
injured  person,  and  the  rest  of  mankind  that  will  join  with  him 
in  the  execution  of  justice,  as  any  other  wild  bea«t,  or  noxious 
brute,  with  whom  mankind  can  have  neither  society  nor  stcurity." 
(Civil  Grvtrnrnmt,  Ch.  XV.  §  172.)  [Tr.] 

134  Perpttual  Peace 

and  makes  a  state  of  peace,  on  the  other  hand, 
an  immediate  duty.  Without  a  compact  between 
the  nations,  however,  this  state  of  peace  cannot 
be  established  or  assured.  Hence  there  must  be 
an  alliance  of  a  particular  kind  which  we  may 
call  a  covenant  of  peace  (foedus  pacificum\  which 
would  differ  from  a  treaty  of  peace  (pactum  pads] 
in  this  respect,  that  the  latter  merely  puts  an 
end  to  one  war,  while  the  former  would  seek 
to  put  an  end  to  war  for  ever.  This  alliance  does 
not  aim  at  the  gain  of  any  power  whatsoever 
of  the  state,  but  merely  at  the  preservation  and 
security  of  the  freedom  of  the  state  for  itself  and 
of  other  allied  states  at  the  same  time.  *  The  latter 
do  not,  however,  require,  for  this  reason,  to  submit 
themselves  like  individuals  in  the  state  of  nature 
to  public  laws  and  coercion.  The  practicability  or 
objective  reality  of  this  idea  of  federation  which 
is  to  extend  gradually  over  all  states  and  so  lead 
to  perpetual  peace  can  be  shewn.  For,  if  Fortune 
ordains  that  a  powerful  and  enlightened  people 
should  form  a  republic, — which  by  its  very  nature 
is  inclined  to  perpetual  peace — this  would  serve  as 
a  centre  of  federal  union  for  other  states  wishing 
to  join,  and  thus  secure  conditions  of  freedom 

*  Cf.  Rousseau:  Gouverntment  de  Polognt,  Ch.  V.  Federate 
government  is  "the  only  one  which  unites  in  itself  all  the  advantage* 
of  great  and  small  states/'  [Tr.] 

Translation  13  J 

among  the  states  in  accordance  with  the  idea  of 
the  law  of  nations.  Gradually,  through  different 
unions  of  this  kind,  the  federation  would  extend 
further  and  further. 

It  is  quite  comprehensible  that  a  people  should 
say : — "  There  shall  be  no  war  among  us,  for  we  shall 
form  ourselves  into  a  state,  that  is  to  say,  constitute 
for  ourselves  a  supreme  legislative,  administrative 
and  judicial  power  which  will  settle  our  disputes 
peaceably."  But  if  this  state  says:— "There  shall 
be  no  war  between  me  and  other  states,  although 
I  recognise  no  supreme  law-giving  power  which 
will  secure  me.  my  rights  and  whose  rights  I  will 
guarantee;"  then  it  is  not  at  all  clear  upon  what 
grounds  I  could  base  my  confidence  in  my  right, 
unless  it  were  the  substitute  for  that  compact  on 
which  civil  society  is  based— namely,  free  federation 
which  reason  must  necessarily  connect  with  the 
idea  of  the  law  of  nations,  if  indeed  any  meaning 
is  to  be  left  in  that  concept  at  all. 

There  is  no  intelligible  meaning  in  the  idea  of  the 
law  of  nations  as  giving  a  right  to  make  war;  for 
that  must  be  a  right  to  decide  what  is  just,  not  in 
accordance  with  universal,  external  laws  limiting 
the  freedom  of  each  individual,  but  by  means  of 
one-sided  maxims  applied  by  force.  We  must 
then  understand  by  this  that  men  of  such  ways 
of  thinking  are  quite  justly  served,  when  they 

136  Perpetual  Peace 

destroy  one  another,  and  thui  find  perpetual  peace 
in  the  wide  grave  which  covers  all  the  abomina- 
tions of  acts  of  violence  as  well  as  the  authors  of 
such  deeds.  For  states,  in  their  relation  to  one 
another,  there  can  be,  according  to  reason,  no  other 
way  of  advancing  from  that  lawless  condition  which 
unceasing  war  implies,  than  by  giving  up  their 
savage  lawless  freedom,  just  as  individual  men  have 
done,  and  yielding  to  the  coercion  of  public  laws. 
Thus  they  can  form  a  State  of  nations  (civitas 
gentium],  one,  too;  which  will  be  ever  increasing 
and  would  finally  embrace  all  the  peoples  of  the 
earth.  States,  however,  in  accordance  with  their 
understanding  of  the  law  of  nations,  by  no  means 
desire  this,  and  therefore  reject  in  hypothesi  what 
ii  correct  in  thesi.  Hence,  instead  of  the  positive 
idea  of  a  world-republic,  if  all  is  not  to  be  lost, 
only  the  negative  substitute  for  it,  a  federation 
averting  war,  maintaining  its  ground  and  ever 
extending  over  the  world  may  stop  the  current  of 
this  tendency  to  war  and  shrinking  from  the  con- 
trol of  law.  But  even  then  there  will  be  a  con- 
stant danger  that  this  propensity  may  break  out.  * 

*  On  the  conclusion  of  peace  at  the  end  of  a  war,  it  might  not 
be  unseemly  for  a  nation  to  appoint  a  day  of  humiliation,  after 
the  festival  of  thanksgiving,  on  which  to  invoke  the  mercy  of 
Heaven  for  the  terrible  sin  which  the  human  race  are  guilty  of, 
in  their  continued  unwillingness  to  submit  (in  their  relation*  with 
other  states)  to  a  law-governed  constitution,  preferring  rather 

Translation  1 3  7 

"Furor  impiui  intui  — fremit  horddui  oro  crucnto." 
(Virgil.)  * 


III. — "The  rights  of  men,  as  citizens  of  the  world, 
shall  be  limited  to  the  conditions  of  universal 

We  are  speaking  here,  as  in  the  previous  articles, 
not  of  philanthropy,  but  of  right ;  and  in  this  sphere 
hospitality  signifies  the  claim  of  a  stranger  entering 
foreign  territory  to  be  treated  by  its  owner  without 
hostility.  The  latter  may  send  him  away  again,  if 
this  can  be  done  without  causing  his  death;  but, 
so  long  as  he  conducts  himself  peaceably,  he  must 
not  be  treated  as  an  enemy.  It  is  not  a  right  to 
be  treated  as  a  guest  to  which  the  stranger  can  lay 

in  the  pride  of  their  independence  to  use  the  barbarous  method 
of  war,  which  after  all  does  not  really  settle  what  is  wanted, 
namely,  the  right  of  each  state  in  a  quarrel.  The  feasts  of 
thanksgiving  during  a  war  for  a  victorious  battle,  the  hymns 
which  are  sung — to  use  the  Jewish  expression — "  to  the  Lord  of 
Hosts"  are  not  in  less  strong  contrast  to  the  ethical  idea  of  a 
father  of  mankind;  for,  apart  from  the  indifference  these  customs 
show  to  the  way  in  which  nations  seek  to  establish  their  rights — 
sad  enough  as  it  is — these  rejoicings  bring  in  an  element  of 
txultation  that  a  great  number  of  Urea,  or  at  least  the  happiness 
of  many,  has  been  destroyed. 
*  Cf.  Aeneidos,  I.  294  $tq. 

"Furor  impius  iatu*, 

Saeva  sedens  super  arma,  et  centum  vinetua  ai'nis 
Post  tergum  nodis,  fremet  horridus  ore  cnieuto."     [Tr.] 

138  Perpetual  Ptaee 

claim  — a  special  friendly  compact  on  his  behalf 
would  be  required  to  make  him  for  a  given  time 
an  actual  inmate — but  he  has  a  right  of  visitation. 
This  right  *  to  present  themselves  to  society  belongs 
to  all  mankind  in  virtue  of  our  common  right  of 
possession  on  the  surface  of  the  earth  on  which,  as 
it  is  a  globe,  we  cannot  be  infinitely  scattered,  and 
must  in  the  end  reconcile  ourselves  to  existence 
side  by  side:  at  the  same  time,  originally  no  one 
individual  had  more  right  than  another  to  live  in 
any  one  particular  spot.  Uninhabitable  portions  of 
the  surface,  ocean  and  desert,  split  up  the  human 
community,  but  in  such  a  way  that  ships  and  camels 
— "the  ship  of  the  desert" — make  it  possible  for 
men  to  come  into  touch  with  one  another  across 
these  unappropriated  regions  and  to  take  advantage 
of  our  common  claim  to  the  face  of  the  earth  with 
a  view  to  a  possible  intercommunication.  The  in- 
hospitality  of  the  inhabitants  of  certain  sea  coasts 
— as,  for  example,  the  coast  of  Barbary — in  plunder- 
ing ships  in  neighbouring  seas  or  making  slaves  of 
shipwrecked  mariners ;  or  the  behaviour  of  the 
Arab  Bedouins  in  the  deserts,  who  think  that 

*  Cf.  Vattel  (pp.  cit.,  II.  ch.  IX.  §  123):— "The  right  of  passage 
is  also  a  remnant  of  the  primitive  state  of  communion,  in  which 
the  entire  earth  was  common  to  all  mankind,  and  the  passage  was 
everywhere  free  to  each  individual  according  to  his  necessities. 
Nobody  can  be  entirely  deprived  of  this  right."  See  also  aboTe, 
P,  65,  note.  [Tr.] 

Translation  139 

proximity  to  nomadic  tribes  constitutes  a  right  to 
rob,  is  thus  contrary  to  the  law  of  nature.  This 
right  to  hospitality,  however — that  is  to  say,  the 
privilege  of  strangers  arriving  on  foreign  soil — does 
not  amount  to  more  than  what  is  implied  in  a 
permission  to  make  an  attempt  at  intercourse  with 
the  original  inhabitants.  In  this  way  far  distant 
territories  may  enter  into  peaceful  relations  with 
one  another.  These  relations  may  at  last  come 
under  the  public  control  of  law,  and  thus  the  hu- 
man race  may  be  brought  nearer  the  realisation 
of  a  cosmopolitan  constitution. 

Let  us  look  now,  for  the  sake  of  comparison,  at 
the  inhospitable  behaviour  of  the  civilised  nations, 
especially  the  commercial  states  of  our  continent. 
The  injustice  which  they  exhibit  on  visiting  foreign 
lands  and  races — this  being  equivalent  in  their 
eyes  to  conquest — is  such  as  to  fill  us  with 
horror.  America,  the  negro  countries,  the  Spice 
Islands,  the  Cape  etc.  were,  on  being  discovered, 
looked  upon  as  countries  which  belonged  to  no- 
body; for  the  native  inhabitants  were  reckoned  as 
nothing.  In  Hindustan,  under  the  pretext  of  in- 
tending to  establish  merely  commercial  depots,  the 
Europeans  introduced  foreign  troops ;  and,  as  a 
result,  the  different  states  of  Hindustan  were  stirred 
up  to  far-spreading  wars.  Oppression  of  the  natives 
followed,  famine,  insurrection,  perfidy  and  all 

140  Pfrpetual  Piace 

the    rest    of  the   litany    of  evilt    which   can    afflict 

China  *  and  Japan  (Nipon)  which  had  made  an 
attempt  at  receiving  guests  of  this  kind,  have  now 

*  ID  order  to  call  this  great  empire  by  the  uame  which  it  girts 
itself — namely,  China,  not  Sina  or  a  word  of  similar  sound — we  have 
only  to  look  at  Gcorgii:  Alphab.  Tibet.,  pp.  651 — 654,  particularly 
nott  b.,  below.  According  to  the  observation  of  Professor  Fischer 
of  St.  Petersburg,  there  is  really  no  particular  name  which  it  always 
goes  by:  tfce  most  usual  is  the  word  Kin,  is.  gold,  which  the  inha- 
bitants of  Tibet  call  Scr.  Hence  the  emperor  is  called  the  king 
of  gold,  /./.  the  king  of  the  most  splendid  country  in  the  world. 
This  word  Kin  may  probably  be  Ckin  in  the  empire  itself,  but 
b«  pronounced  Kin  by  the  Italian  missionaries  on  account  of 
ihe  gutturals.  Thus  we  see  that  the  country  of  the  Seres,  BO  often 
mentioned  by  the  Romans,  was  China:  the  silk,  however,  was 
despatched  to  Europe  across  Greater  Tibet,  probably  through 
Smaller  Tibet  and  Bucharia,  through  Persia  and  then  on.  Thi« 
lead*  to  many  reflections  as  to  the  antiquity  of  this  wonderful 
state,  M  compared  with  Hindustan,  at  the  time  of  it*  union  with 
Tibet  and  thence  with  Japan.  On  the  other  hand,  the  name 
Sina  or  Tschina  which  is  said  to  be  given  to  this  land  by  neigh- 
bouring people*  leads  to  nothing. 

Perhaps  we  can  explain  the  ancient  intercourse  of  Europe  with 
Tibet— »  fact  at  no  time  widely  kcown — by  looking  at  what 
Hesychius  has  preserred  on  the  matter.  I  refer  to  the  shout,  Kot/z- 
Of4*-a%  (Konx  Ompax),  the  cry  of  the  Hierophants  in  the  Eleusiniaa 
mysteries  (cf.  Travels  of  Anacharsit  tke  Younger,  Part  V.,  p.  447, 
setf.).  For,  according  to  Georgii  Alfk.  Tibet.,  the  word  Coneioa 
which  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  Konx  means  God.  Pak-ci« 
(fb.  p.  520)  which  might  easily  be  pronounced  by  the  Greeks  like 
fax  means  promulgator  legis,  the  divine  principle  permeating 
nature  (called  also,  on  p.  177,  Cencresi).  Om,  however,  which  La 
Croie  translates  by  benedictus,  i.e.  blessed,  can  when  applied  to 
th«  Deity  mean  nothing  but  beatified  (p.  507).  Now  P.  Franc. 
Hormtiua,  when  be  asked  th«  Lhamas  of  Tibet,  as  he  often  did, 
what  tfecy  mndaratood  by  God  (Cencria)  always  got  tfce  aaswer :— 

Translation  141 

taken  a  prudent  step.  Only  to  a  single  European 
people,  the  Dutch,  has  China  given  the  right  of 
access  to  her  shores  (but  not  of  entrance  into  the 
country),  while  Japan  has  granted  both  these  con- 
cessions; but  at  the  same  time  they  exclude  the 
Dutch  who  enter,  as  if  they  were  prisoners,  from 
social  intercourse  with  the  inhabitants.  The  worst, 
or  from  the  standpoint  of  ethical  judgment  the 
best,  of  all  this  is  that  no  satisfaction  is  derived 
from  all  this  violence,  that  all  these  trading  com- 
panies stand  on  the  verge  of  ruin,  that  the  Sugar 
Islands,  that  seat  of  the  most  horrible  and  delib- 

"it  is  the  assembly  of  all  the  saints,"  i.e.  the  assembly  of  those 
blessed  ones  who  have  been  born  again  according  to  the  faith  of 
the  Lama  and,  after  many  wanderings  in  changing  forms,  have  at 
last  returned  to  God,  to  Burchane :  that  is  to  say,  they  are  beings 
to  be  worshipped,  souls  which  have  undergone  transmigration 
(p.  223).  So  the  mysterious  expression  JKonx  Ompax  ought 
probably  to  mean  the  holy  (Konx\  blessed,  (Om)  and  wise  (Pax) 
supreme  Being  pervading  the  universe,  the  personification  of  nature. 
Its  use  in  the  Greek  mysteries  probably  signified  monotheism  for 
the  Epoptes,  in  distinction  from  the  polytheism  of  the  people, 
although  elsewhere  P.  Horalius  scented  atheism  here.  How  that 
mysterious  word  came  by  way  of  Tibet  to  the  Greeks  may 
be  explained  as  above;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  in  this  way  is 
made  probable  an  early  intercourse  of  Europe  with  China  across 
Tibet,  earlier  perhaps  than  the  communication  with  Hindustan. 
(There  is  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  words 
x^y£  '<fytwa£ — according  to  Liddell  and  Scott,  a  corruption  of  jwy|» 
iliofus  T«$fd  Kant's  inferences  here  seem  to  be  more  than  far- 
fetched. Lobeck,  in  his  Aglaophamus  (p.  775),  gives  a  quite  different 
interpretation  which  has,  he  says,  been  approved  by  scholars.  And 
Whately  {Historic  Doubts  relative  to  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  3rd.  ed., 
Postcript)  uses  Konx  Ompax  as  a  pseudonym.  [Tr.]) 

142  Perpetual  Peace 

erate  slavery,  yield  no  real  profit,  but  only  have 
their  use  indirectly  and  for  no  very  praiseworthy 
object — namely,  that  of  furnishing  men  to  be 
trained  as  sailors  for  the  men-of-war  and  thereby 
contributing  to  the  carrying  on  of  war  in  Europe. 
And  this  has  been  done  by  nations  who  make  a 
great  ado  about  their  piety,  and  who,  while  they 
are  quite  ready  to  commit  injustice,  would  like,  in 
their  orthodoxy,  to  be  considered  among  the  elect. 
The  intercourse,  more  or  less  close,  which  has 
been  everywhere  steadily  increasing  between  the 
nations  of  the  earth,  has  now  extended  so  enor- 
mously that  a  violation  of  right  in  one  part  of  the 
world  is  felt  all  over  it.  Hence  the  idea  of  a  cos- 
mopolitan right  is  no  fantastical,  high-flown  notion 
of  right,  but  a  complement  of  the  unwritten  code 
of  law  — constitutional  as  well  as  international 
law — necessary  for  the  public  rights  of  mankind 
in  general  and  thus  for  the  realisation  of  perpetual 
peace.  For  only  by  endeavouring  to  fulfil  the 
conditions  laid  down  by  this  cosmopolitan  law  can 
we  flatter  ourselves  that  we  are  gradually  approach- 
ing that  ideal. 



THIS  guarantee  is  given  by  no  less  a  power 
than  the  great  artist  nature  (natura  dcsdala  rerum) 
in  whose  mechanical  course  is  clearly  exhibited  a 
predetermined  design  to  make  harmony  spring 
from  human  discord,  even  against  the  will  of  man. 
Now  this  design,  although  called  Fate  when  looked 
upon  as  the  compelling  force  of  a  cause,  the 
laws  of  whose  operation  are  unknown  to  us,  is, 
when  considered  as  the  purpose  manifested  in  the 
course  of  nature,  called  Providence,  *  as  the  deep- 

*  In  the  mechanical  system  of  nature  to  which  man  belongs  as 
a  sentient  being,  there  appears,  as  the  underlying  ground  of  its 
existence,  a  certain  form  which  we  cannot  make  intelligible  to 
ourselves  except  by  thinking  into  the  physical  world  the  idea  of 
an  end  preconceived  by  the  Author  of  the  universe:  this  predeter- 
mination of  nature  on  the  part  of  God  we  generally  call  Divine 
Providence.  In  so  far  as  this  providence  appears  in  the  origin  of 
the  universe,  we  speak  of  Providence  as  founder  of  the  world 
(prcvidentia  conditrix  ;  semel  jussit,  semper  parent.  Augustine).  As 
it  maintains  the  course  of  nature,  however,  according  to  universal 
laws  of  adaptation  to  preconceived  ends,  [/.*.  teleological  laws] 
we  call  it  a  ruling  providence  (providentia  gubernatrix).  Further, 
we  name  it  the  guiding  providence  (providentia  directrix),  as  it 
appears  in  the  world  for  special  ends,  which  we  coXild  not  foresee, 
but  suspect  only  from  the  result.  Finally,  regarding  particular  events 

144  Perpetual  Peace 

lying  wisdom  of  a  Higher  Cause,  directing  itself 
towards  the  ultimate  practical  end  of  the  human 
race  and  predetermining  the  course  of  things  with 
a  view  to  its  realisation.  This  Providence  we  do 

as  (Hvine  purposes,  we  speak  no  longer  of  providence,  but  of  dispensa- 
tion (directio  txtraordinaria).  As  this  term,  however,  really  suggests 
the  idea  of  miracles,  although  the  events  are  not  spoken  of  by  this 
name,  the  desire  to  fathom  dispensation,  as  such,  is  a  foolish 
presumption  in  men.  Tor,  from  one  single  occurrence,  to  jump  at 
the  conclusion  that  there  u  a  particular  principle  of  efficient  causes 
and  that  this  event  is  an  end  and  not  merely  the  natural  \natur- 
meehanische\  sequence  of  a  design  quite  unknown  to  us  is  absurd 
and  presumptuous,  in  however  pious  and  humble  a  spirit  we  may 
speak  of  it.  In  the  same  way  to  distinguish  between  a  universal 
and  a  particular  providence  when  regarding  it  materialiier,  in  its 
relation  to  actual  objects  in  the  world  (to  say,  for  instance,  that 
there  may  be,  indeed,  a  providence  for  the  preservation  of  the 
different  species  of  creation,  but  that  individuals  are  left  to  chance) 
is  false  and  contradictory.  For  providence  is  called  universal  for  the 
very  reason  that  no  single  thing  may  be  thought  of  as  shut  out  from 
its  care.  Probably  the  distinction  of  two  kinds  of  providence, 
formaliter  or  subjectively  considered,  had  reference  to  the  manner 
in  which  it*  purposes  are  fulfilled.  So  that  we  have  ordinary 
providence  (eg.  the  yearly  decay  and  awakening  to  new  life  in 
nature  with  change  of  season)  and  what  we  may  call  unusual  or 
special  providence  (e.g.  the  bringing  of  timber  by  ocean  currents 
to  Arctic  shores  where  it  does  not  grow,  and  where  without  this 
aid  the  inhabitants  could  not  live).  Here,  although  we  can  quite 
well  explain  the  physico-mcchanical  cause  of  these  phenomena 
— in  this  case,  for  example,  the  banks  of  the  rivers  in  temperate 
countries  are  over-grown  with  trees,  some  of  which  fall  into 
the  water  and  are  carried  along,  probably  by  the  Gulf  Stream — 
we  must  not  overlook  the  teleological  cause  which  points  to  the  pro- 
vidential care  of  a  ruling  wisdom  above  nature.  But  the  concept, 
commonly  used  in  the  schools  of  philosophy,  of  a  co-operation  on 
the  part  of  the  Deity  or  a  concurrence  (concursus)  in  the  operations 
going  on  in  the  world  of  sense,  must  be  dropped.  For  it  is,  firstly, 


not,  it  i«  true,  perceive  in  the  cunning  contrivances 
[Kunstanstaltfn]  of  nature  ;  nor  can  we  even 
conclude  from  the  fact  of  their  existence  that 
it  is  there;  but,  as  in  every  relation  between 
the  form  of  things  and  their  final  cause,  we 
can,  and  must,  supply  the  thought  of  a  Higher 
Wisdom,  in  order  that  we  may  be  able  to  form 
an  idea  of  the  possible  existence  of  these  products 
after  the  analogy  of  human  works  of  art  [Kunsthand- 

wlf-contradictory  to  couple  the  like  and  the  unlike  together  (fty- 
phes  jungtre  equh}  and  to  let  HIM  who  is  Himself  the  entire  cause 
of  tht  changes  im  the  universt  make  good  any  shortcomings  in 
His  own  predetermining  providence  (which  to  require  this  must 
be  defective)  during  the  course  of  the  world;  for  example,  to  say 
ttat  the  physician  has  restored  the  sick  with  the  help  of  God  —  that 
is  to  say  that  Ht  has  been  present  as  a  support.  For  tausa  soli- 
taria  nen  j*t*>*t.  God  created  the  physician  as  well  as  his  means 
ef  healing;  and  we  must  ascribe  the  result  wholly  to  Him,  if  we 
will  go  back  to  the  supreme  First  Cause  which,  theoretically,  is 
beyond  our  comprehension.  Or  we  can  ascribe  the  result  entirely 
to  the  physician,  in  so  far  as  we  follow  up  this  event,  as 
explicable  in  the  chain  of  physical  causes,  according  to  the 
order  of  nature.  Secondly,  moreover,  such  a  way  of  looking  at 
this  question  destroys  all  the  fixed  principles  by  which  we  judge 
an  effect.  But,  from  the  ethico-practical  point  of  view  which  looks 
entirely  to  the  transcendental  side  of  things,  the  idea  of  a  divine 
concurrence  is  quite  proper  and  even  necessary  :  for  example,  in 
the  faith  that  God  will  make  good  the  imperfection  of  our  human 
justice,  if  only  our  feelings  and  intentions  are  sincere;  and  that  He 
will  do  this  by  means  beyond  our  comprehension,  and  therefore 
we  should  not  slacken  our  efforts  after  what  is  good.  Whence  it 
follows,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  no  one  must  attempt  to  explain 
a  goo  1  action  as  a  mere  event  in  time  by  this  (oncurmt  ;  for  that 
would  be  to  pretend  a  theoretical  knowledge  of  the  supersensible 
aad  hence  be  absurd, 



*  The  representation  to  ourselves  of  the 
relation  and  agreement  of  these  formations  of  nature 
to  the  moral  purpose  for  which  they  were  made  anc 
which  reason  directly  prescribes  to  us,  is  an  Idea 
it  is  true,  which  is  in  theory  superfluous;  but  in 
practice  it  is  dogmatic,  and  its  objective  reality  K 
well  established,  f  Thus  we  see,  for  example,  with 
regard  to  the  ideal  \Pfiichtb egriff\  of  perpetual 
peace,  that  it  is  our  duty  to  make  use  of  the 
mechanism  of  nature  for  the  realisation  of  that  end. 
Moreover,  in  a  case  like  this  where  we  are  interested 
merely  in  the  theory  and  not  in  the  religious  question, 
the  use  of  the  word  "  nature "  is  more  appropriate 
than  that  of  "providence",  in  view  of  the  limitation* 
of  human  reason,  which,  in  considering  the  relation 
of  effects  to  their  causes,  must  keep  within  the 
limits  of  possible  experience.  And  the  term 
"nature"  is  also  less  presumptuous  than  the  other. 
To  speak  of  a  Providence  knowable  by  us  would  be 
boldly  to  put  on  the  wings  of  Icarus  in  order  to 
draw  near  to  the  mystery  of  its  unfathomable 

Before  we  determine  the  surety  given  by  nature 
more  exactly,  we  must  first  look  at  what  ultimately 
makes  this  guarantee  of  peace  necessary — the 

*    14  AT/,    which   we  cannot  diuerar  troai  the  id**  of  a 
skill  capable  of  producing  th«o».     (Tr.j 
t  Sec  preface,  p.  ix.  above. 

First  Supplement 

circumstances  in  which  nature  has  carefully  placed 
the  actors  in  her  great  theatre.  In  the  next  place, 
we  shall  proceed  to  consider  the  manner  in  which 
she  gives  this  surety. 

The  provisions  she  has  made  are  as  follow  :  (i) 
she  has  taken  care  that  men  can  live  in  all  parts 
of  the  world  ;  (2)  she  has  scattered  them  by  means 
of  war  in  all  directions,  even  into  the  most  inhos- 
pitable regions,  so  that  these  too  might  be  popu- 
lated ;  (3)  by  this  very  means  she  has  forced  them 
to  enter  into  relations  more  or  less  controlled  by 
law.  It  is  surely  wonderful  that,  on  the  cold  wastes 
round  the  Arctic  Ocean,  there  is  always  to  be 
found  moss  for  the  reindeer  to  scrape  out  from 
under  the  snow,  the  reindeer  itself  either  serving 
as  food  or  to  draw  the  sledge  of  the  Ostiak  or 
Samoyedes.  And  salt  deserts  which  would  other- 
wise be  left  unutilised  have  the  camel,  which  seems 
as  if  created  for  travelling  in  such  lands.  This 
evidence  of  design  in  things,  however,  is  still  more 
clear  when  we  come  to  know  that,  besides  the 
fur-clad  animals  of  the  shores  of  the  Arctic  Ocean, 
there  are  seals,  walruses  and  whales  whose  flesh 
furnishes  food  and  whose  oil  fire  for  the  dwellers 
in  these  regions.  -  But  the  providential  care  of 
nature  excites  our  wonder  above  all,  when  we  hear 
of  the  driftwood  which  is  carried  —  whence  no  one 
knows  —  to  these  treeless  shores:  for  without  the 

148  Pfrpttual  Ptatt 

aid  of  this  material  the  natives  could  neither  con- 
struct their  craft,  nor  weapons,  nor  huts  for  shelter. 
Here  too  they  have  so  much  to  do,  making  war 
against  wild  animals,  that  they  live  at  peace  with 
one  another.  But  what  drove  them  originally  into 
these  regions  was  probably  nothing  but  war. 

Of  animals,  used  by  us  as  instruments  of  war, 
the  horse  was  the  first  which  man  learned  to  tame 
ind  domesticate  during  the  period  of  the  peopling 
of  the  earth;  the  elephant  belongs  to  the  later 
period  of  the  luxury  of  states  already  established. 
In  the  same  way,  the  art  of  cultivating  certain 
grasses  called  cereals — no  longer  known  to  us  in 
their  original  form — and  also  the  multiplication  and 
improvement,  by  transplanting  and  grafting,  of  the 
original  kinds  of  fruit — in  Europe,  probably  only 
two  species,  the  crab-apple  and  wild  pear — could 
only  originate  under  the  conditions  accompanying 
established  states  where  the  rights  of  property  are 
assured.  That  is  to  say  it  would  be  after  man, 
hitherto  existing  in  lawless  liberty,  had  advanced 
beyond  the  occupations  of  a  hunter,  *  a  fisherman 

*  Of  all  modes  of  livelihood  the  life  of  the  hunter  is  undoubtedly 
most  incompatible  with  a  civilised  condition  of  society.  Because, 
to  live  by  hunting,  families  must  isolate  themselves  from  their 
neighbours,  soon  becoming  estranged  and  spread  over  widely 
scattered  forests,  to  be  before  long  on  terms  of  hostility,  since 
each  requires  a  great  deal  of  space  to  obtain  food  and  raiment. 

God's  command  to  Noah  not  to  shed  blood  (I.  Genesis^  IX.  4—6) 

First  Supplement  149 

or  a  shepherd  to  the  life  of  a  tiller  of  the  soil, 
when  salt  and  iron  were  discovered, — to  become, 
perhaps,  the  first  articles  of  commerce  between 
different  peoples, — and  were  sought  far  and  near. 
In  this  way  the  peoples  would  be  at  first  brought 
into  peaceful  relation  with  one  another,  and  so  come 
to  an  understanding  and  the  enjoyment  of  friendly 
intercourse,  even  with  their  most  distant  neighbours. 
Now  while  nature  provided  that  men  could  live 
on  all  parts  of  the  earth,  she  also  at  the  same  time 
despotically  willed  that  they  should  live  everywhere 
on  it,  although  against  their  own  inclination  and 
even  although  this  imperative  did  not  presuppose 
an  idea  of  duty  which  would  compel  obedience  to 
nature  with  the  force  of  a  moral  law.  But,  to 
attain  this  end,  she  has  chosen  war.  So  we  see 
certain  peoples,  widely  separated,  whose  common 

[4.  "But  flesh  with   the   life  thereof,  which  U  the  blood 
thereof,  shall  ye  not  eat. 

5.  And    surely  your  blood  of  your  lives  will  I  require; 
at  the  hand  of  every  beast  will  I  require  it,  and  at  the  hand 
of  man;  at  the  hand  of  every  man's  brother  will  I  require 
the  life  of  man. 

6.  Whoso  sheddeth  man's  blood,  by  man  shall  his  blood 
be  shed  :  for  in  the  image  of  God  made  he  man."] 

is  frequently  quoted,  and  was  afterwards — in  another  connection  it 
is  true — made  by  the  baptised  Jews  a  condition  to  which  Chris- 
tians, newly  converted  from  heathendom,  had  to  conform.  Cf. 
Acts  XV.  20 ;  XXI.  25.  This  command  seems  originally  to  have 
been  nothing  else  than  a  prohibition  of  the  life  of  the  hunter; 
for  here  the  possibility  of  eating  raw  flesh  must  often  occur,  and, 
in  forbidding  the  one  custom,  we  condemn  th«  other. 

150  Perpetual  Peace 

descent  is  made  evident  by  affinity  in  their  langu- 
ages. Thus,  for  instance,  we  find  the  Samoyedes 
on  the  Arctic  Ocean,  and  again  a  people  speaking 
a  similar  language  on  the  Altai  Mts.,  200  miles 
[Mfileri\  *  off,  between  whom  has  pressed  in  a  mount- 
ed tribe,  war-like  in  character  and  of  Mongolian 
origin,  which  has  driven  one  branch  of  the  race 
far  from  the  other,  into  the  most  inhospitable 
regions  where  their  own  inclination  would  certainly 
not  have  carried  them,  f  In  the  same  way,  through 
the  intrusion  of  the  Gothic  and  Sarmatian  tribes, 
the  Finns  in  the  most  northerly  regions  of  Europe, 
whom  we  call  Laplanders,  have  been  separated  by 
as  great  a  distance  from  the  Hungarians,  with  whose 
language  their  own  is  allied.  And  what  but  war 
can  have  brought  the  Esquimos  to  the  north  of 
America,  a  race  quite  distinct  from  those  of  that 
country  and  probably  European  adventurers  of 

*  About  1000  English  miles. 

f  The  question  might  be  put:—" If  it  is  nature's  will  that  thes« 
Arctic  shores  should  not  remain  unpopulated,  what  will  become 
of  their  inhabitants,  if,  as  is  to  be  expected,  at  some  time  or 
other  no  more  driftwood  should  be  brought  to  them?  For  we 
may  believe  that,  with  the  advance  of  civilisation,  the  inhabitants 
of  temperate  zones  will  utilise  berter  the  wood  which  grows  on 
the  banks  of  their  rivers,  aiid  not  let  it  fall  into  the  stream  and 
so  be  swept  away."  I  answer:  the  inhabitants  of  the  shores  of 
the  River  Obi,  the  Yenisei,  the  Lena  will  supply  them  with  it 
through  trade,  and  take  in  exchange  the  animal  produce  in  which 
the  seat  of  Arctic  shore*  are  so  rich— that  is,  if  nature  KM  first 
of  all  brought  about  peace  among  them. 

First  Supplement  151 

prehistoric  times?  And  war  too,  nature's  method 
of  populating  the  earth,  must  have  driven  the 
Pescherais  *  in  South  America  as  far  as  Patagonia. 
War  itself,  however,  is  in  need  of  no  special  ) 
stimulating  cause,  but  seems  engrafted  in  human7 
nature,  and  is  even  regarded  as  something  noble  \ 
in  itself  to  which  man  is  inspired  by  the  love  of 
glory  apart  from  motives  of  self-interest.  Hence, 
among  the  savages  of  America  as  well  as  those  of 
Europe  in  the  age  of  chivalry,  martial  courage  is 
looked  upon  as  of  great  value  in  itself,  not  merely 
when  a  war  is  going  on,  as  is  reasonable  enough, 
but  in  order  that  there  should  be  war:  and  thus 
war  is  often  entered  upon  merely  to  exhibit  this 
quality.  So  that  an  intrinsic  dignity  is  held  to 
attach  to  war  in  itself,  and  even  philosophers 
eulogise  it  as  an  ennobling,  refining  influence  on 
humanity,  unmindful  of  the  Greek  proverb,  "  War 
is  evil,  in  so  far  as  it  makes  more  bad  people 
than  it  takes  away." 

So  much,  then,  of  what  nature  does  for  her  own 
ends  with  regard  to  the  human  race  as  members 
of  the  animal  world.  -  Now  comes  the  question 
which  touches  the  essential  points  in  this  design  of 
a  perpetual  peace: — "What  does  nature  do  in  this 
respect  with  reference  to  the  end  which  man's  own 

*  Cf.  EMC.  Brit,   (gth  «••!.),  art.  '; Indians",  in  which  there  is  an 
t»  "  Futgiww,  At  Ptsckti-mis"  tf  some  \rrihws.     [Tr.] 

151  Perpetual  Peace 

reason  sets  before  him  as  a  duty  ?  and  consequently 
what  does  she  do  to  further  the  realisation  of  hit 
moral  purpose  ?  How  does  she  guarantee  that  what 
man,  by  the  laws  of  freedom,  ought  to  do  and  yet 
fails  to  do,  he  will  do,  without  any  infringement 
of  his  freedom  by  the  compulsion  of  nature  and 
that,  moreover,  this  shall  be  done  in  accordance 
with  the  three  forms  of  public  right — constitutional 
or  political  law,  international  law  and  cosmopolitan 
law?"  When  I  say  of  nature  that  she  wills  that 
this  or  that  should  take  place,  I  do  not  mean  that 
she  imposes  upon  us  the  duty  to  do  it — for  only  the 
free,  unrestrained,  practical  reason  can  do  that — but 
that  she  does  it  herself,  whether  we  will  or  not. 
"Fata  voltntem  ducunt," nolentem  trahunt" 

i .  Even  if  a  people  were  not  compelled  through 
internal  discord  to  submit  to  the  restraint  of  public 
laws,  war  would  bring  this  about,  working  from 
without.  For,  according  to  the  contrivance  of  na- 
ture which  we  have  mentioned,  every  people  finds 
another  tribe  in  its  neighbourhood,  pressing  upon 
it  in  such  a  manner  that  it  is  compelled  to  form 
itself  internally  into  a  state  to  be  able  to  defend 
itself  as  a  power  should.  Now  the  republican 
constitution  is  the  only  one  which  is  perfectly 
adapted  to  the  rights  of  man,  but  it  is  also  the 
most  difficult  to  establish  and  still  more  to  main- 
tain. So  generally  is  this  retognised  that  people 

First  Supplement  153 

often  say  the  members  of  a  republican  state  would 
require  to  be  angels,  *  because  men,  with  their  self- 
seeking  propensities,  are  not  fit  for  a  constitution 
of  so  sublime  a  form  But  now  nature  comes  to 
the  aid  of  the  universal,  reason-derived  will  which, 
much  as  we  honour  it,  is  in  practice  powerless. 
And  this  she  does,  by  means  of  these  very  self- 
seeking  propensities,  so  that  it  only  depends — - 
and  so  much  lies  within  the  power  of  man — on  a 
good  organisation  of  the  state  for  their  forces  to 
be  so  pitted  against  one  another,  that  the  one  may 
check  the  destructive  activity  of  the  other  or  neu- 
tralise its  effect.  And  hence,  from  the  standpoint  of 
reason,  the  result  will  be  the  same  as  if  both  forces 
did  not  exist,  and  each  individual  is  compelled  to 
be,  if  not  a  morally  good  man,  yet  at  least  a  good 
citizen.  The  problem  of  the  formation  of  the  state, 
hard  as  it  may  sound,  is  not  insoluble,  even  for  a 

*  Rousseau  uses  these  terms  in  speaking  of  democracy.  (Cont. 
Sea.,  III.  Ch.  4.)  "  If  there  were  a  nation  of  Gods,  they  might  be 
governed  by  a  democracy:  but  so  perfect  a  government  will  not 
agree  with  men." 

But  he  writes  elsewhere  of  republican  governments  (op.  ft/., 
II.  Ch.  6.): — "AH  lawful  governments  are  republican."  And  in  a 
footnote  to  this  passage: — "I  do  not  by  the  word  'republic'  mean 
an  aristocracy  or  democracy  only,  but  in  general  all  governments 
directed  by  the  public  will  which  is  the  law.  If  a  government  is 
to  b«  lawful,  it  must  not  be  coufused  with  the  sovereign  power, 
but  be  considered  as  the  administrator  of  that  power:  and  then 
Monarchy  itself  is  a  republic,"  This  language  ha*  a  eiosd  affinity 
\vitfc  &*t  wed  by  Kam*.  (Cf.  above,  p.  i»$.)  [Tr.] 

154  Perpetual  Peace 

race  of  devils,  granted  that  they  have  intelligence. 
It  may  be  put  thus : — "  Given  a  multitude  of  rational 
beings  who,  in  a  body,  require  general  laws  for  their 
own  preservation,  but  each  of  whom,  as  an  individual, 
is  secretly  inclined  to  exempt  himself  from  this 
restraint :  how  are  we  to  order  their  affairs  and  how 
establish  for  them  a  constitution  such  that,  although 
their  private  dispositions  may  be  really  antagonistic, 
they  may  yet  so  act  as  a  check  upon  one  another, 
that,  in  their  public  relations,  the  effect  is  the  same 
as  if  they  had  no  such  evil  sentiments."  Such  a 
problem  must  be  capable  of  solution.  For  it  deals, 
not  with  the  moral  reformation  of  mankind,  but 
only  with  the  mechanism  of  nature ;  and  the  problem 
is  to  learn  how  this  mechanism  of  nature  can  be 
applied  to  men,  in  order  so  to  regulate  the  antago- 
nism of  conflicting  interests  in  a  people  that  they 
may  even  compel  one  another  to  submit  to  compul- 
sory laws  and  thus  necessarily  bring  about  the  state 
of  peace  in  which  laws  have  force.  We  can  see, 
in  states  actually  existing,  although  very  imperfectly 
organised,  that,  in  externals,  they  already  approx- 
imate very  nearly  to  what  the  Idea  of  right  prescribes, 
although  the  principle  of  morality  is  certainly  not 
the  cause.  A  good  political  constitution,  however, 
is  not  to  be  expected  as  a  result  of  progress  in 
morality;  but  rather,  conversely,  the  good  moral  • 
condition  of  a  nation  is  to  be  looked  for,  M  one  of 

First  Supplement  155 

the  first  fruits  of  such  a  constitution.  Hence  the 
mechanism  of  nature,  working  through  the  self- 
seeking  propensities  of  man  (which  of  course  coun- 
teract one  another  in  their  external  effects),  may  be 
used  by  reason  as  a  means  of  making  way  for  the 
realisation  of  her  own  purpose,  the  empire  of  right, 
and,  as  far  as  is  in  the  power  of  the  state,  to  pro- 
mote and  secure  in  this  way  internal  as  well  as 
external  peace.  We  may  say,  then,  that  it  is  the 
irresistible  will  of  nature  that  right  shall  at  last 
get  the  supremacy.  What  one  here  fails  to  do  will 
be  accomplished  in  the  long  run,  although  perhaps 
with  much  inconvenience  to  us.  As  Bouterwek  says, 
11  If  you  bend  the  reed  too  much  it  breaks :  he  who 
would  do  too  much  does  nothing." 

2.  The  idea  of  international  law  presupposes 
the  separate  existence  of  a  number  of  neighbouring 
and  independent  states ;  and,  although  such  a  con- 
dition of  things  is  in  itself  already  a  state  of  war, 
(if  a  federative  union  of  these  nations  does  not 
prevent  the  outbreak  of  hostilities)  yet,  according 
to  the  Idea  of  reason,  this  is  better  than  that  all 
the  states  should  be  merged  into  one  under  a 
power  which  has  gained  the  ascendency  over  its 
neighbours  and  gradually  become  a  universal  mo- 
narchy. *  For  the  wider  the  sphere  of  their  jurisdic- 

*  $««  above,   p.   69,   n»tet   ««p.   reference  to  Thetry  0f  Etkus. 

156  Perpetual  Peace 

tion,  the  more  laws  lose  in  force;  and  soulless 
despotism,  when  it  has  choked  the  seeds  of  good, 
at  last  sinks  into  anarchy.  Nevertheless  it  is  the 
desire  of  every  state,  or  of  its  ruler,  to  attain  to 
a  permanent  condition  of  peace  in  this  very  way; 
that  is  to  say,  by  subjecting  the  whole  world  as 
far  as  possible  to  its  sway.  But  nature  wills  it 
otherwise.  She  employs  two  means  to  separate 
nations,  and  prevent  them  from  intermixing :  namely, 
the  differences  of  language  and  of  religion.  *  These 
differences  bring  with  them  a  tendency  to  mutual 
hatred,  and  furnish  pretexts  for  waging  war.  But, 
none  the  less,  with  the  growth  of  culture  and  the 
gradual  advance  of  men  to  greater  unanimity  of 
principle,  they  lead  to  concord  in  a  state  of  peace 
which,  unlike  the  despotism  we  have  spoken  of,  (the 
churchyard  of  freedom)  does  not  arise  from  the 
weakening  of  all  forces,  but  is  brought  into  being 
and  secured  through  the  equilibrium  of  these  forces 
in  their  most  active  rivalry. 

*  Difference  of  religion!  A  strange  expression,  M  if  one  were 
to  speak  of  different  kinds  of  morality.  There  may  indeed 
be  different  historical  forms  of  belief, — that  is  to  say,  the 
various  means  which  have  been  used  in  the  course  of  time 
to  promote  religion, — but  they  are  mere  subjects  of  learned  invest- 
igation, and  do  not  really  lie  within  the  sphere  of  religion.  In 
the  same  way  there  are  many  religious  works — the  Zendavesta, 
Vida)  Koran  etc. — but  there  is  only  one  religion,  binding  for 
all  men  and  for  all  times.  These  books  are  each  no  more  than 
the  accidental  mouthpiece  of  rtligion,  and  may  be  different  according 
to  diff«renc«  in  tim«  and  place. 

Suppltmmt  157 

3.  As  nature  wisely  separates  nations  which  the 
will  of  each  state,  sanctioned  even  by  the  principles 
of  international  law,  would  gladly  unite  under  its 
own  sway  by  stratagem  or  force  ;  in  the  same  way, 
on  the  other  hand,  she  unites  nations  whom  the 
principle  of  a  cosmopolitan  right  would  not  have 
secured  against  violence  and  war.  And  this  union 
she  brings  about  through  an  appeal  to  their  mutual 
interests.  The  commercial  spirit  cannot  co-exist  with 
war,  and  sooner  or  later  it  takes  possession  of  every 
nation.  For,  of  all  the  forces  which  lie  at  the  com- 
mand of  a  state,  the  power  of  money  is  probably  the 
most  reliable.  Hence  states  find  themselves  compelled 
—not,  it  is  true,  exactly  from  motives  of  morality  —  • 
to  further  the  noble  end  of  peace  and  to  avert  war, 
by  means  of  mediation,  wherever  it  threatens  to  break 
out,  just  as  if  they  had  made  a  permanent  league 
for  this  purpose.  For  great  alliances  with  a  view  to 
war  can,  from  the  nature  of  things,  only  very 
rarely  occur,  and  still  more  seldom  succeed. 

In  this  way  nature  guarantees  the  coming  of 
perpetual  peace,  through  the  natural  course  of 
human  propensities:  not  indeed  with  sufficient  cer- 
tainty to  enable  us  to  prophesy  the  future  of  this 
ideal  theoretically,  but  yet  clearly  enough  for  prac- 
tical purposes.  And  thus  this  guarantee  of  nature 
makes  it  a  duty  that  we  should  labour  for  this 
end,  an  end  which  is  no  mere  chimera. 



A  SECRET  article  in  negotiations  concerning  public 
right  is,  when  looked  at  objectively  or  with  regard 
to  the  meaning  of  the  term,  a  contradiction.  When 
we  view  it,  however,  from  the  subjective  standpoint, 
with  regard  to  the  character  and  condition  of  the 
person  who  dictates  it,  we  see  that  it  might  quite 
well  involve  some  private  consideration,  so  that  he 
would  regard  it  as  hazardous  to  his  dignity  to 
acknowledge  such  an  article  as  originating  from  him. 

The  only  article  of  this  kind  is  contained  in  the 
following  proposition: — "The ^opinions  of  philo- 
sophers, with  regard  to  the  conditions  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  public  peace,  shall  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration by  states  armed  for  war." 

It  seems,  however,  to  be  derogatory  to  the  dignity 
of  the  legislative  authority  of  a  state — to  which  we 
must  of  course  attribute  all  wisdom — to  ask  advice 
from  subjects  (among  whom  stand  philosophers) 
about  the  rules  of  its  behaviour  to  other  states. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  very  advisable  that  this 
should  be  done.  Hence  the  state  will  silently  invite 
suggestion  for  this  purpose,  while  at  the  same 
time  keeping  the  fact  secret.  This  amounts  to 

1  19 

faying  that  the  state  will  allow  philotophen  to 
discuss  freely  and  publicly  the  universal  principles 
governing  the  conduct  of  war  and  establishment 
of  peace  ;  for  they  will  do  this  of  their  own  accord, 
if  no  prohibition  is  laid  upon  them.  *  The  arrange- 
ment between  states,  on  this  point,  does  not  require 
that  a  special  agreement  should  be  made,  merely 
for  this  purpose;  for  it  is  already  involved  in 
the  obligation  imposed  by  the  universal  reason  of 
man  which  gives  the  moral  law.  We  would  not 
be  understood  to  say  that  the  state  must  give 
a  preference  to  the  principles  of  the  philosopher, 
rather  than  to  the  opinions  of  the  jurist,  the  repre- 
sentative of  state  authority  ;  but  only  that  he  should 
be  heard.  The  latter,  who  has  chosen  for  a  symbol 
the  scales  of  right  and  the  sword  of  justice,  f  generally 
uses  that  sword  not  merely  to  keep  off  all  outside 
influences  from  the  scales;  for,  when  one  pan  of 
the  balance  will  not  go  down,  he  throws  his  sword 
into  it  ;  and  then  V<z  victis  I  The  jurist,  not  being 

'  Montesquieu  speaks  thus  in  praise  of  the  English  state  :  —  "  As 
the  enjoyment  of  liberty,  and  even  its  support  and  preservation, 
consists  in  every  man's  being  allowed  to  speak  his  thoughts  and 
to  lay  open  his  sentiments,  a  citizen  in  this  state  will  say  or  write 
whatever  the  laws  do  not  expressly  forbid  to  be  said  or  written." 
(Esprit  des  Loit,  XIX.  Ch.  ay.)  Hobbes  is  opposed  to  all  free 
discussion  of  political  questions  and  to  freedom  as  a  source  of  danger 
to  the  state.  [Tr.] 

•f  Kant  U  thinking  here  not  of  the  sword  of  justice,  in  die 
moral  sense,  but  of  a  sword  which  i*  symbolical  of  ifce  executive 
pow«c  of  the  actMl  law.  [Tr.] 

160  Ptrpttutl  Ptact 


a  moral  philosopher,  is  under  the  greatest  temptation 

to  do  this,  because  it  is  his  business  only  to  apply 
existing  laws  and  not  to  investigate  whether  these 
are  not  themselves  in  need  of  improvement;  and 
this  actually  lower  function  of  his  profession  he 
looks  upon  as  the  nobler,  because  it  is  linked  to 
power  (as  is  the  case  also  in  both  the  other  faculties, 
theology  and  medicine).  Philosophy  occupies  a  very 
low  position  compared  with  this  combined  power.  So 
that  it  is  said,  for  example,  that  she  is  the  handmaid 
of  theology;  and  the  same  has  been  said  of  her 
position  with  regard  to  law  and  medicine.  It  is  not 
quite  clear,  however,  "  whether  she  bears  the  torch 
before  these  gracious  ladies,  or  carries  the  train." 
That  kings  should  philosophise,  or  philosophers 
become  kings,  is  not  to  be  expected.  But  neither 
is  it  to  be  desired;  for  the  possession  of  power  is 
inevitably  fatal  to  the  free  exercise  of  reason.  But  it 
is  absolutely  indispensable,  for  their  enlightenment 
as  to  the  full  significance  of  their  vocations,  that 
both  kings  and  sovereign  nations,  which  rule  them- 
selves in  accordance  with  laws  of  equality,  should  not 
allow  the  class  of  philosophers  to  disappear,  nor  forbid 
the  expression  of  their  opinions,  but  should  allow  them 
to  speak  openly.  And  since  this  class  of  men,  by 
their  very  nature,  are  incapable  of  instigating  rebellion 
or  forming  unions  for  purposes  of  political  agitation, 
they  should  not  be  suspected  of  propagandism. 



IN  an  objective  sense,  morals  is  a  practical 
science,  as  the  sum  of  laws  exacting  unconditional 
obedience,  in  accordance  with  which  we  ought  to 
act.  Now,  once  we  have  admitted  the  authority 
of  this  idea  of  duty,  it  is  evidently  inconsistent 
that  we  should  think  of  saying  that  we  cannot  act 
thus.  For,  in  this  case,  the  idea  of  duty  falls  to 
the  ground  of  itself;  "  ultra  posse  nemo  obligatur" 
Hence  there  can  be  no  quarrel  between  politics, 
as  the  practical  science  of  right,  and  morals,  which 
is  also  a  science  of  right,  but  theoretical.  That 
is,  theory  cannot  come  into  conflict  with  practice. 
For,  in  that  case,  we  would  need  to  understand 
under  the  term  "ethics"  or  "morals"  a  universal 
doctrine  of  expediency,  or,  in  other  words,  a  theory 
of  precepts  which  may  guide  us  in  choosing  the 
best  means  for  attaining  ends  calculated  for  our 
advantage.  This  is  to  deny  that  a  science  of 
morals  exists. 


1 62  Perpetual  Peace 

Politics  says,  "Be  wise  as  serpents";  morals  adds 
the  limiting  condition,  "  and  guileless  as  doves." 
If  these  precepts  cannot  stand  together  in  one 
command,  then  there  is  a  real  quarrel  between 
politics  and  morals.  *  But  if  they  can  be  com- 
pletely brought  into  accord,  then  the  idea  of  any 
antagonism  between  them  is  absurd,  and  the  question 
of  how  best  to  make  a  compromise  between  the 
two  points  of  view  ceases  to  be  even  raised. 
Although  the  saying,  "Honesty  is  the  best  policy," 

*  Cf.  Aristotle:  Politics,  (Welldon'i  trans.)  IV.  Ch.  XIV.  "The 
same  principles  of  morality  are  best  both  for  individuals  and  States." 

Among  the  ancients  the  connection  between  politics  and  morals 
was  never  questioned,  although  there  were  differences  of  opinion 
as  to  which  science  stood  first  in  importance.  Thus,  while  Plato 
put  politics  second  to  morals,  Aristotle  regarded  politics  as  the 
chief  science  and  ethics  as  a  part  of  politics.  This  connection 
between  the  sciences  was  denied  by  Machiavelli,  who  lays  down 
the  dictum  that,  in  the  relations  of  sovereigns  and  states,  the 
ordinary  rules  of  morality  do  not  apply.  See  Tht  Ftince,  Ch.  XVIII. 
"A  Prince,"  he  says,  "and  most  of  all  a  new  Prince,  cannot  observe 
all  those  rules  of  conduct  in  respect  of  which  men  are  accounted 
good,  being  frequently  obliged,  in  order  to  preserve  his  Princedom, 
to  act  in  opposition  to  good  faith,  charity,  humanity,  and  religion. 
He  must  therefore  keep  his  mind  ready  to  shift  as  the  winds  and 
tides  of  Fortune  turn,  and,  as  I  have  already  said,  he  ought  not 
to  quit  good  courses  if  he  can  help  it,  but  should  know  how  to 
follow  evil  courses  if  he  must." 

Hume  thought  that  laxer  principles  might  be  allowed  to  govern 
states  than  private  persons,  because  intercourse  between  them  was 
not  so  "necessary  and  advantageous"  as  between  individuals. 
"There  i*  a  system  of  morals,"  he  says,  "calculated  for  princes, 
much  more  free  than  that  which  ought  to  govern  private  persons," 
(Treatise,  HI.,  Part  IL,  Sect.  IX.)  JTr.J 

Appendix  I  163 

expresses  a  theory  which,  alas,  is  often  contradicted 
in  practice,  yet  the  likewise  theoretical  maxim, 
"Honesty  is  better  than  any  policy,"  is  exalted 
high  above  every  possible  objection,  is  indeed  the 
necessary  condition  of  all  politics. 

The  Terminus  of  morals  does  not  yield  to  Jupiter, 
the  Terminus  of  force ;  for  the  latter  remains  beneath 
the  sway  of  Fate.  In  other  words,  reason  is  not 
sufficiently  enlightened  to  survey  the  series  of  pre- 
determining causes  which  would  make  it  possible 
for  us  to  predict  with  certainty  the  good  or  bad 
results  of  human  action,  as  they  follow  from  the 
mechanical  laws  of  nature;  although  we  may  hope 
that  things  will  turn  out  as  we  should  desire.  But 
what  we  have  to  do,  in  order  to  remain  in  the 
path  of  duty  guided  by  the  rules  of  wisdom, 
reason  makes  everywhere  perfectly  clear,  and  does 
this  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  her  ultimate  ends. 

The  practical  man,  however,  for  whom  morals  is 
mere  theory,  even  while  admitting  that  what  ought 
to  be  can  be,  bases  his  dreary  verdict  against  our 
well-meant  hopes  really  on  this:  he  pretends  that 
he  can  foresee  from  his  observation  of  human 
nature,  that  men  will  never  be  willing  to  do  what 
is  required  in  order  to  bring  about  the  wished-for 
results  leading  to  perpetual  peace.  It  is  true  that 
the  will  of  all  individual  men  to  live  under  a  legal 
constitution  according  to  the  principles  of  liberty— 

164  Perpetual  Peace 

that  is  to  say,  the  distributive  unity  of  the  wills 
of  all — is  not  sufficient  to  attain  this  end.  We 
must  have  the  collective  unity  of  their  united 
will:  all  as  a  body  must  determine  these  new 
conditions.  The  solution  of  this  difficult  problem 
is  required  in  order  that  civil  society  should  be  a 
whole.  To  all  this  diversity  of  individual  wills  there 
must  come  a  uniting  cause,  in  order  to  produce  a 
common  will  which  no  distributive  will  is  able  to 
\  give.  Hence,  in  the  practical  realisation  of  that 
]  idea,  no  other  beginning  of  a  law-governed  society 
\  can  be  counted  upon  than  one  that  is  brought 
about  by  force:  upon  this  force,  too,  public  law 
^afterwards  rests.  This  state  of  things  certainly 
prepares  us  to  meet  considerable  deviation  in  actual 
experience  from  the  theoretical  idea  of  perpetual 
peace,  since  we  cannot  take  into  account  the  moral 
character  and  disposition  of  a  law-giver  in  this 
connection,  or  expect  that,  after  he  has  united  a 
wild  multitude  into  one  people,  he  will  leave  it  to 
them  to  bring  about  a  legal  constitution  by  their 
common  will. 

It  amounts  to  this.  Any  ruler  who  has  once 
got  the  power  in  his  hands  will  not  let  the  people 
dictate  laws  for  him.  A  state  which  enjoys  an 
independence  of  the  control  of  external  law  will 
not  submit  to  the  judgment  of  the  tribunals  of 
other  states,  when  it  has  to  consider  how  to  obtain 

Appendix  T  165 

its  rights  against  them.  And  even  a  continent, 
when  it  feels  its  superiority  to  another,  whether  this 
be  in  its  way  or  not,  will  not  fail  to  take  advantage 
of  an  opportunity  offered  of  strengthening  its  power 
by  the  spoliation  or  even  conquest  of  this  territory. 
Hence  all  theoretical  schemes,  connected  with  con- 
stitutional, international  or  cosmopolitan  law,  crum- 
ble away  into  empty  impracticable  ideals.  While, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  practical  science,  based  on 
the  empirical  principles  of  human  nature,  which 
does  not  disdain  to  model  its  maxims  on  an  ob- 
servation of  actual  life,  can  alone  hope  to  find  a 
sure  foundation  on  which  to  build  up  a  system  of 
national  policy. 

Now  certainly,  if  there  is  neither  freedom  nor  a 
moral  law  founded  upon  it,  and  every  actual  or 
possible  event  happens  in  the  mere  mechanical 
course  of  nature,  then  politics,  as  the  art  of  making 
use  of  this  physical  necessity  in  things  for  the 
government  of  men,  is  the  whole  of  practical  wisdom 
and  the  idea  of  right  is  an  empty  concept.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  find  that  this  idea  of  right 
is  necessarily  to  be  conjoined  with  politics  and  even 
to  be  raised  to  the  position  of  a  limiting  condition  of 
that  science,  then  the  possibility  of  reconciling  them 
must  be  admitted.  I  can  thus  imagine  a  moral 
politician,  that  is  to  say,  one  who  understands  the 
principles  of  statesmanship  to  be  such  as  do  not 

1 66  Perpetual  Ptace 

conflict  with  morali;  but  I  cannot  conceive  of  a 
political  moralist  who  fashions  for  himself  such  a 
system  of  ethics  as  may  serve  the  interest  of 

The  moral  politician  will  always  act  upon  the 
following  principle : — "  If  certain  defects  which  could 
not  have  been  avoided  are  found  in  the  political 
constitution  or  foreign  relations  of  a  state,  it  is  a 
duty  for  all,  especially  for  the  rulers  of  the  state, 
to  apply  their  whole  energy  to  correcting  them  as 
soon  as  possible,  and  to  bringing  the  constitution 
and  political  relations  on  these  points  into  conformity 
with  the  Law  of  Nature,  as  it  is  held  up  as  a  model 
before  us  in  the  idea  of  reason;  and  this  they 
should  do  even  at  a  sacrifice  of  their  own  interest." 
Now  it  is  contrary  to  all  politics — which  is,  in  this 
particular,  in  agreement  with  morals — to  dissever 
any  of  the  links  binding  citizens  together  in  the 
state  or  nations  in  cosmopolitan  union,  before  a 
better  constitution  is  there  to  take  the  place  of 
what  has  been  thus  destroyed.  And  hence  it  would 
be  absurd  indeed  to  demand  that  every  imperfec- 
tion in  political  matters  must  be  violently  altered 
on  the  spot.  But,  at  the  same  time,  it  may  be  re- 
quired of  a  ruler  at  least  that  he  should  earnestly 
keep  the  maxim  in  mind  which  points  to  the  ne- 
cessity of  such  a  change ;  so  that  he  may  go  on 
constantly  approaching  the  end  to  be  realised, 

Apptndix  I  i6f 

namely,  the  best  possible  constitution  according  to 
the  laws  of  right.  Even  although  it  is  still  under 
despotic  rule,  in  accordance  with  its  constitution  as 
then  existing,  a  state  may  govern  itself  on  republican 
lines,  until  the  people  gradually  become  capable  of 
being  influenced  by  the  mere  idea  of  the  authority 
of  law,  just  as  if  it  had  physical  power.  And  they 
become  accordingly  capable  of  self-legislation,  their 
faculty  for  which  is  founded  on  original  right.  But 
if,  through  the  violence  of  revolution,  the  product 
of  a  bad  government,  a  constitution  more  in  accord 
with  the  spirit  of  law  were  attained  even  by  un- 
lawful means,  it  should  no  longer  be  held  justifiable 
to  bring  the  people  back  to  the  old  constitution, 
although,  while  the  revolution  was  going  on,  every 
one  who  took  part  in  it  by  use  of  force  or  stratagem, 
may  have  been  justly  punished  as  a  rebel.  As 
regards  the  external  relations  of  nations,  a  state 
cannot  be  asked  to  give  up  its  constitution,  even 
although  that  be  a  despotism  (which  is,  at  the  same 
time,  the  strongest  constitution  where  foreign  enemies 
are  concerned),  so  long  as  it  runs  the  risk  of  being 
immediately  swallowed  up  by  other  states.  Hence, 
when  such  a  proposal  is  made,  the  state  whose 
constitution  is  in  question  must  at  least  be  allowed  to 
defer  acting  upon  it  until  a  more  convenient  time.  * 

*  These   are  per  missive  laws  of  reason  which  allow  us  to  leave 
a  system  of  public  law,  when  it  i«  tainted  by  injustice,  to  remain 

t68  FtretuAl  Ptace 

It  is  always  possible  that  moralists  who  rule 
despotically,  and  are  at  a  loss  in  practical  matters, 
will  come  into  collision  with  the  rules  of  political 
wisdom  in  many  ways,  by  adopting  measures  with- 
out sufficient  deliberation  which  show  themselves 
afterwards  to  have  been  overestimated.  When  they 
thus  offend  against  nature,  experience  must  gradu- 
ally lead  them  into  a  better  track.  But,  instead  of 
this  being  the  case,  politicians  who  are  fond  of 
moralising  do  all  they  can  to  make  moral  improve- 
ment impossible  and  to  perpetuate  violations  of  law, 
by  extenuating  political  principles  which  are  an- 
tagonistic to  the  idea  of  right,  on  the  pretext  that 
human  nature  is  not  capable  of  good,  in  the  sense 
of  the  ideal  which  reason  prescribes. 

These  politicians,  instead  of  adopting  an  open, 
straightforward  way  of  doing  things  (as  they  boast), 
mix  themselves  up  in  intrigue.  They  get  at  the 

just  as  it  is,  until  everything  is  entirely  revolutionised  through  an 
internal  development,  either  spontaneous,  or  fostered  and  matured 
by  peaceful  influences.  For  any  legal  constitution  whatsoever, 
even  although  it  conforms  only  slightly  with  the  spirit  of  law  is 
better  than  none  at  all — that  is  to  say,  anarchy,  which  is  the  fate 
of  a  precipitate  reform.  *•  Hence,  as  things  now  are,  the  wise 
politician  will  look  upon  it  as  his  duty  to  make  reforms  on  the 
lines  marked  out  by  the  ideal  of  public  law.  He  will  not  use 
revolutions,  when  these  have  been  brought  about  by  natural  causes, 
to  extenuate  still  greater  oppression  than  caused  them,  but  will 
regard  them  as  the  voice  of  nature,  calling  upon  him  to  make 
such  thorough  reforms  as  will  bring  about  the  only  lasting  consti- 
tution, a  lawful  constitution  based  on  the  principles  of  freedom. 

Appendix  /  169 

authorities  in  power  and  say  what  will  please  them ; 
their  sole  bent  is  to  sacrifice  the  nation,  or  even, 
if  they  can,  the  whole  world,  with  the  one  end  in 
view  that  their  own  private  interest  may  be  for- 
warded. This  is  the  manner  of  regular  jurists  (1 
mean  the  journeyman  lawyer  not  the  legislator), 
when  they  aspire  to  politics.  For,  as  it  is  not  their 
business  to  reason  too  nicely  over  legislation,  but 
only  to  enforce  the  laws  of  the  country,  every  legal 
constitution  in  its  existing  form  and,  when  this  is 
changed  by  the  proper  authorities,  the  one  which 
takes  its  place,  will  always  seem  to  them  the  best 
possible.  And  the  consequence  is  that  everything 
is  purely  mechanical.  But  this  adroitness  in  suiting 
themselves  to  any  circumstances  may  lead  them  to 
the  delusion  that  they  are  also  capable  of  giving 
an  opinion  about  the  principles  of  political  con- 
stitutions in  general,  in  so  far  as  they  conform  to 
ideas  of  right,  and  are  therefore  not  empirical,  but 
a  priori.  And  they  may  therefore  brag  about  their 
knowledge  of  men, — which  indeed  one  expects  to 
find,  since  they  have  to  deal  with  so  many— with- 
out really  knowing  the  nature  of  man  and  what 
can  be  made  of  it,  to  gain  which  knowledge  a 
higher  standpoint  of  anthropological  observation 
than  theirs  is  required.  -  Filled  with  ideas  of  this 
kind,  if  they  trespass  outside  their  own  sphere  on 
the  boundaries  of  political  and  international  law, 

170  Perpetual  Peace 

looked  upon  as  ideals  which  reason  holds  before 
us,  they  can  do  so  only  in  the  spirit  of  chicanery. 
For  they  will  follow  their  usual  method  of  making 
everything  conform  mechanically  to  compulsory 
laws  despotically  made  and  enforced,  even  here, 
where  the  ideas  of  reason  recognise  the  val- 
idity of  a  legal  compulsory  force,  only  when  it 
is  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  freedom 
through  which  a  permanently  valid  constitution 
becomes  first  of  all  possible.  The  would-be  prac- 
tical man,  leaving  out  of  account  this  idea  of  reason, 
thinks  that  he  can  solve  this  problem  empirically 
by  looking  to  the  way  in  which  those  constitutions 
which  have  best  survived  the  test  of  time  were 
established,  even  although  the  spirit  of  these  may 
have  been  generally  contrary  to  the  idea  of  right. 
The  principles  which  he  makes  use  of  here,  although 
indeed  he  does  not  make  them  public,  amount 
pretty  much  to  the  following  sophistical  maxims, 
i.  Fac  et  excusa.  Seize  the  most  favourable 
opportunity  for  arbitrary  usurpation — either  of  the 
authority  of  the  state  over  its  own  people  or  over 
a  neighbouring  people;  the  justification  of  the  act 
and  extenuation  of  the  use  of  force  will  come  much 
more  easily  and  gracefully,  when  the  deed  is  done, 
than  if  one  has  to  think  out  convincing  reasons  for 
taking  this  step  and  first  hear  through  all  the  ob- 
jections which  can  be  made  against  it.  This  is 

Apptndix  I  If  I 

•ipccially  true  ift  the  first  case  mentioned,  whera 
the  supreme  power  in  the  state  also  controls  the 
legislature  which  we  must  obey  without  any  reason- 
ing about  it.  Besides,  this  show  of  audacity  in  a 
statesman  even  lends  him  a  certain  semblance  of 
inward  conviction  of  the  justice  of  his  action ;  and 
once  he  has  got  so  far  the  god  of  success  (bonus 
eventus)  is  his  best  advocate. 

2.  Si  fecisti,  nega.     As  for  any  crime  you  have 
committed,  such  as  has,  for  instance,  brought  your 
people  to  despair  and  thence  to  insurrection,  deny 
that  it  has  happened  owing  to  any  fault  of  yours. 
Say   rather   that   it  is  all  caused  by  the  insubordi- 
nation  of  your   subjects,    or,   in   the    case  of  your 
having   usurped   a    neighbouring  state,  that  human 
nature   is  to  blame;    for,  if  a  man  is  not  ready  to 
use   force   and   steal   a  march  upon  his  neighbour, 
he   may   certainly   count   on   the  latter  forestalling 
him  and  taking  him  prisoner. 

3.  Divide    et  impera.     That  is  to  say,  if  there 
are    certain    privileged   persons,    holding   authority 
among   the    people,    who  have  merely  chosen  you 
for    their    sovereign    as  primus   inter  pares,   bring 
about   a   quarrel   among  them,  and  make  mischief 
between   them    and  the  people.    Now  back  up  the 
people  with  a  dazzling  promise  of  greater  freedom ; 
everything    will     now    depend    unconditionally    on 
your    will.    Or   again,    if  there    is    a  difficulty  with 

Perpetual  Ptace 

foreign  states,  then  to  stir  up  dissension  among 
them  is  a  pretty  sure  means  of  subjecting  first  one 
and  then  the  other  to  your  sway,  under  the  pretext 
of  aiding  the  weaker. 

It  is  true  that  nowadays  no  body  is  taken  in  by 
these  political  maxims,  for  they  are  all  familiar  to 
everyone.  Moreover,  there  is  no  need  of  being 
ashamed  of  them,  as  if  their  injustice  were  too 
patent.  For  the  great  Powers  never  feel  shame 
before  the  judgment  of  the  common  herd,  but  only 
before  one  another;  so  that  as  far  as  this  matter 
goes,  it  is  not  the  revelation  of  these  guiding 
principles  of  policy  that  can  make  rulers  ashamed, 
but  only  the  unsuccessful  use  of.  them.  For  as  to 
the  morality  of  these  maxims,  politicians  are  all 
agreed.  Hence  there  is  always  left  political  prestige 
on  which  they  can  safely  count;  and  this  means 
the  glory  of  increasing  their  power  by  any  means 
that  offer.  * 


In  all  these  twistings  and  turnings  of  an  immo- 
ral doctrine  of  expediency  which  aims  at  substi- 
tuting a  state  of  peace  for  the  warlike  conditions 
in  which  men  are  placed  by  nature,  so  much  at 
least  is  clear; — that  men  cannot  get  away  from 

t  *  It    is    still   sometimes   denied   that   we   find,   in  members  of  a 
civilised   community,   a  certain   depravity   rooted    in  the  nature  of 

Appendix  I  173 

the  idea  of  right  in  their  private  any  more  than 
in  their  public  relations;  and  that  they  do  not 
dare  (this  is  indeed  most  strikingly  seen  in  the 
concept  of  an  international  law)  to  base  politics 

man;  l  and  it  might,  indeed,  be  alleged  with  some  show  of  truth 
that  not  an  innate  corruptness  in  human  nature,  but  the  barbarism 
of  men,  the  defect  of  a  not  yet  sufficiently  developed  culture,  is 
the  cause  of  the  evident  antipathy  to  law  which  their  attitude 
indicates.^  In  the  external  relations  of  s  states,  however,  human 
wickedness  shows  itself  incontestably,  'without  any  attempt  at 
concealment.  Within  the  state,  it  is  covered  over  by  the  compelling 
authority  of  civil  laws.  For,  working  against  the  tendency  every 
citizen  has  to  commit  acts  of  violence  against  his  neighbour,  there 
is  the  much  stronger  force  of  the  government  which  not  only 
gives  an  appearance  of  morality  to  the  whole  state  (causae  non 
causae},  but,  by  checking  the  outbreak  of  lawless  propensities, 
actually  aids  the  moral  qualities  of  men  considerably,  in  their 
development  of  a  direct  respect  for  the  law.  For  every  individual 
thinks  that  he  himself  would  hold  the  idea  of  right  sacred  and 
follow  faithfully  what  it  prescribes,  if  only  he  could  expect  that 
everyone  else  would  do  the  same.  This  guarantee  is  in  part 
given  to  him  by  the  government;  and  a  great  advance  is  made 

1  This  depravity  of  human  nature  is  denied  by  Rousseau,  who 
held  that  the  inind  of  man  was  naturally  inclined  to  virtue,  and 
that  good  civil  and  social  institutions  are  all  that  is  required. 
(Discourse  OH  the  Sciences  and  Arts,  1750.)  Kant  here  takes  sides 
with  Hobbes  against  Rousseau.  See  Kant's  Theory  of  Ethics, 
Abbott's  trans.  (4th  ed.,  1889),  £>.  339  seq. — esp.  p.  341  and  note. 
Cf.  also  Hooker's  Ecclesiastical  Polity,  I.  §  10: — "Laws  politic, 
ordained  for  external  order  and  regiment  amongst  men,  are  never 
framed  as  they  should  be,  unless  presuming  the  will  of  man  to  be 
inwardly  obstinate,  rebellious,  and  averse  from  all  obedience  to 
the  sacred  laws  of  his  nature;  in  a  word,  unless  presuming  man 
to  be,  in  regard  of  his  depraved  mind,  little  better  than  a  wild 
beast,  they  do  accordingly  provide,  notwithstanding,  so  to  frame 
his  outward  actions,  that  they  be  uo  hindrance  unto  the  common 
good,  for  which  societies  are  instituted."  [Tr.J 

174  Perpetual  Peace 

merely  on  the  manipulations  of  expediency  and  there- 
fore to  refuse  all  obedience  to  the  idea  of  a  public 
right.  On  the  contrary,  they  pay  all  fitting  honour 
to  the  idea  of  right  in  itself,  even  although  they 
should,  at  the  same  time,  devise  a  hundred 
subterfuges  and  excuses  to  avoid  it  in  practice, 
and  should  regard  force,  backed  up  by  cunning, 
as  having  the  authority  which  comes  from  being  the 
source  and  unifying  principle  of  all  right.  It  will  be 
well  to  put  an  end  to  this  sophistry,  if  not  to  the 
injustice  it  extenuates,  and  to  bring  the  false  advo- 
cates of  the  mighty  of  the  earth  to  confess  that  it  is 
not  right  but  might  in  whose  interest  they  speak,  and 
that  it  is  the  worship  of  might  from  which  they  take 
their  cue,  as  if  in  this  matter  they  had  a  right  to 
command.  In  order  to  do  this,  we  must  first  ex- 
pose the  delusion  by  which  they  deceive  them- 

by  this  step  which  is  not  deliberately  moral,  towards  the  ideal  of 
fidelity  to  the  concept  of  duty  for  its  own  sake  without  thought 
of  return.  As,  however,  every  man's  good  opinion  of  himself 
presupposes  an  evil  disposition  in  everyone  else,  we  have  an 
expression  of  their  mutual  judgment  of  one  another,  namely,  that 
when  it  comes  to  hard  facts,  none  of  them  are  worth  much;  but 
whence  thi»  judgment  comes  remains  unexplained,  as  we  cannot 
lay  the  blame  on  the  nature  of  man,  since  he  is  a  being  ia  the 
possession  of  freedom.  The  respect  for  the  idea  of  right,  of 
which  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  man  to  divest  himself,  sanc- 
tions in  the  most  solemn  manner  the  theory  of  our  power  to 
conform  to  its  dictates.  And  hence  every  man  sees  himself  obliged 
to  act  in  accordance  with  what  the  idea  of  right  prescribes,  whether 
his  neighbour!  fulfil  their  obligation  or  not. 

Appendix  I  175 

selves  and  others ;  then  discover  the  ultimate  prin- 
ciple from  which  their  plans  for  a  perpetual  peace 
proceed;  and  thence  show  that  all  the  evil  which 
stands  in  the  way  of  the  realisation  of  that  ideal 
springs  from  the  fact  that  the  political  moralist  begins 
where  the  moral  politician  rightly  ends  and  that, 
by  subordinating  principles  to  an  end  or  putting 
the  cart  before  the  horse,  he  defeats  his  intention 
of  bringing  politics  into  harmony  with  morals. 

In  order  to  make  practical  philosophy  consistent 
with  itself,  we  must  first  decide  the  following 
question: — In  dealing  with  the  problems  of  practical 
reason  must  we  begin  from  its  material  principle — 
the  end  as  the  object  of  free  choice — or  from  its  formal 
principle  which  is  based  merely  on  freedom  in  its 
external  relation? — from  which  comes  the  following 
law: — "Act  so  that  thou  canst  will  that  thy  maxim 
should  be  a  universal  law,  be  the  end  of  thy  action 
what  it  will."* 

Without  doubt,  the  latter  determining  principle 
of  action  must  stand  first;  for,  as  a  principle  of 
right,  it  carries  unconditional  necessity  with  it, 
whereas  the  former  is  obligatory  only  if  we  assume 
the  empirical  conditions  of  the  end  set  before  us, 
—that  is  to  say,  that  it  is  an  end  capable  of  being 

*  With  regard  to  the  meaning  of  the  moral  law  and  its  signifi- 
cance in  the  Kantian  system  of  ethics,  see  Abbott's  translation  of 
the  Theory  of  Ethics  (1889),  pp.  38,  45,  54,  55,  119,  282.  [Tr,] 

176  Perpetual  Peace 

practically  realised.  And  if  this  end — as,  for  example, 
the  end  of  perpetual  peace — should  be  also  a  duty, 
this  same  duty  must  necessarily  have  been  deduced 
from  the  formal  principle  governing  the  maxims 
which  guide  external  action.  Now  the  first  prin- 
ciple is  the  principle  of  the  political  moralist;  the 
problems  of  constitutional,  international  and  cos- 
mopolitan law  are  mere  technical  problems  (problema 
technicum).  The  second  or  formal  principle,  on  the 
other  hand,  as  the  principle  of  the  moral  politician 
who  regards  it  as  a  moral  problem  (problema  morale), 
differs  widely  from  the  other  principle  in  its  methods 
of  bringing  about  perpetual  peace,  which  we 
desire  not  only  as  a  material  good,  but  also  as  a 
state  of  things  resulting  from  our  recognition  of 
the  precepts  of  duty.  * 

To  solve  the  first  problem — that,  namely,  of 
political  expediency — much  knowledge  of  nature  is 
required,  that  her  mechanical  laws  may  be  employed 
for  the  end  in  view.  And  yet  the  result  of  all 
knowledge  of  this  kind  is  uncertain,  as  far  as  per- 
petual peace  is  concerned.  This  we  find  to  be  so, 
whichever  of  the  three  departments  of  public  law 
we  take.  It  is  uncertain  whether  a  people  could 
be  better  kept  in  obedience  and  at  the  same  time 
prosperity  by  severity  or  by  baits  held  out  to  their 

*  See  Abbott's  trans.,  pp.  33,  34.     [Tr.j 

Apptndix  I 

vanity;  whether  they  would  be  better  governed 
under  the  sovereignty  of  a  single  individual  or  by 
the  authority  of  several  acting  together;  whether 
the  combined  authority  might  be  better  secured 
merely,  say,  by  an  official  nobility  or  by  the  power 
of  the  people  within  the  state ;  and,  finally,  whether 
such  conditions  could  be  long  maintained.  There 
are  examples  to  the  contrary  in  history  in  the  case 
of  all  forms  of  government,  with  the  exception  of 
the  only  true  republican  constitution,  the  idea  of 
which  can  occur  only  to  a  moral  politician.  Still 
more  uncertain  is  a  law  of  nations,  ostensibly 
established  upon  statutes  devised  by  ministers ;  for 
this  amounts  in  fact  to  mere  empty  words,  and 
rests  on  treaties  which,  in  the  very  act  of  ratification, 
contain  "a  secret  reservation  of  the  right  to  violate 
them.  On  the  other  hand,  the  solution  of  the 
second  problem — the  problem  of  political  wisdom — 
forces  itself,  we  may  say,  upon  us;  it  is  quite 
obvious  to  every  one,  and  puts  all  crooked  dealings 
to  shame;  it  leads,  too,  straight  to  the  desired 
end,  while  at  the  same  time,  discretion  warns  us 
not  to  drag  in  the  conditions  of  perpetual  peace 
by  force,  but  to  take  time  and  approach  this  ideal 
gradually  as  favourable  circumstances  permit. 

This  may  be  expressed  in  the  following  maxim  : — 
"  Seek  ye  first  the  kingdom  of  pure  practical  reason 
and  its  righteousness,  and  the  object  of  your  en- 


178  Ptrpttual  Ptact 

deavour,  the  blessing  of  perpetual  peace,  will  be 
added  unto  you."  For  the  science  of  morals 
generally  has  this  peculiarity, — and  it  has  it  also  with 
regard  to  the  moral  principles  of  public  law,  and 
therefore  with  regard  to  a  science  of  politics  know- 
able  a  priori, — that  the  less  it  makes  a  man's  conduct 
depend  on  the  end  he  has  set  before  him,  his 
purposed  material  or  moral  gain,  so  much  the 
more,  nevertheless,  does  it  conform  in  general  to 
this  end.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  it  is  just  the 
universal  will,  given  a  priori,  which  exists  in  a 
people  or  in  the  relation  of  different  peoples  to 
one  another,  that  alone  determines  what  is  lawful 
among  men.  This  union  of  individual  wills,  however, 
if  we  proceed  consistently  in  practice,  in  observance 
the  mechanical  laws  of  nature,  may  be  at  the 
saiii<:  time  the  cause  of  bringing  about  the  result 
intended  and  practically  realizing  the  idea  of  right. 
Hence  it  is,  for  example,  a  principle  of  moral 
politics  that  a  people  should  unite  into  a  state 
according  to  the  only  valid  concepts  of  right,  the 
ideas  of  freedom  and  equality;  and  this  principle  is 
not  based  on  expediency,  but  upon  duty.  Political 
moralists,  however,  do  not  deserve  a  hearing,  much 
and  sophistically  as  they  may  reason  about  the 
existence,  in  a  multitude  of  men  forming  a  society, 
of  certain  natural  tendencies  which  would  weaken 
those  principles  and  defeat  their  intention.  They 

Appendix  f  179 

may  endeavour  to  prove  their  assertion  by  giving 
instances  of  badly  organised  constitutions,  chosen 
both  from  ancient  and  modern  times,  (as,  for 
example,  democracies  without  a  representative 
system);  but  such  arguments  are  to  be  treated 
with  contempt,  all  the  more,  because  a  pernicious 
theory  of  this  kind  may  perhaps  even  bring  about 
the  evil  which  it  prophesies.  For,  in  accordance 
with  such  reasoning,  man  is  thrown  into  a  class 
with  all  other  living  machines  which  only  require 
the  consciousness  that  they  are  not  free  creatures 
to  make  them  in  their  own  judgment  the  most 
miserable  of  all  beings. 

Fiat  justitia,  pereat  mundus.  This  saying  has 
become  proverbial,  and  although  it  savours  a  little 
of  boastfulness,  is  also  true.  We  may  translate  it 
thus : — "  Let  justice  rule  on  earth,  although  all  the 
rogues  in  the  world  should  go  to  the  bottom."  It 
is  a  good,  honest  principle  of  right  cutting  off  all 
the  crooked  ways  made  by  knavery  or  violence. 
It  must  not,  however,  be  misunderstood  as  allowing 
anyone  to  exercise  his  own  rights  with  the  utmost 
seventy,  a  course  in  contradiction  to  our  moral  duty ; 
but  we  must  take  it  to  signify  an  obligation,  bind- 
ing upon  rulers,  to  refrain  from  refusing  to  yield 
anyone  his  rights  or  from  curtailing  them,  out  of 
personal  feeling  or  sympathy  for  other:..  For  this 
end,  in  particular,  we  require,  firstly,  that  a  state 

i8o  Perpetual  Peact 

should  have  an  internal  political  constitution,  es- 
tablished according  to  the  pure  principles  of  right; 
secondly,  that  a  union  should  be  formed  between 
this  state  and  neighbouring  or  distant  nations  for 
a  legal  settlement  of  their  differences,  after  the 
analogy  of  the  universal  state.  This  proposition 
means  nothing  more  than  this : — Political  maxims 
must  not  start  from  the  idea  of  a  prosperity  and 
happiness  which  are  to  be  expected  from  obser- 
vance of  such  precepts  in  every  state;  that  is,  not 
from  the  end  which  each  nation  makes  the  object 
of  its  will  as  the  highest  empirical  principle  of 
political  wisdom;  but  they  must  set  out  from  the 
pure  concept  of  the  duty  of  right,  from  the  "ought" 
whose  principle  is  given  a  priori  through  pure 
reason.  This  is  the  law,  whatever  the  material 
consequences  may  be.  The  world  will  certainly  not 
perish  by  any  means,  because  the  number  of 
wicked  people  in  it  is  becoming  fewer.  The  mo- 
rally bad  has  one  peculiarity,  inseparable  from  its 
nature ; — in  its  purposes,  especially  in  relation  to 
other  evil  influences,  it  is  in  contradiction  with 
itself,  and  counteracts  its  own  natural  effect,  and 
thus  makes  room  for  the  moral  principle  of  good, 
although  advance  in  this  direction  may  be  slow. 
Hence  objectively,  in  theory,  there  is  no  quarrel 
between  morals  and  politics.  But  subjectively,  in 
the  self-seeking  tendencies  of  men  (which  we  cannot 

Appendix  I  181 

actually  call  their  morality,  as  we  would  a  course 
of  action  based  on  maxims  of  reason,)  this  dis- 
agreement in  principle  exists  and  may  always  sur- 
vive; for  it  serves  as  a  whetstone  to  virtue.  Ac- 
cording to  the  principle,  Tu  ne  cede  malis,  sed 
contra  audentior  ito,  the  true  courage  of  virtue 
in  the  present  case  lies  not  so  much  in  facing  the 
evils  and  self-sacrifices  which  must  be  met  here 
as  in  firmly  confronting  the  evil  principle  in  our 
own  nature  and  conquering  its  wiles.  For  this  is  a 
principle  far  more  dangerous,  false,  treacherous 
and  sophistical  which  puts  forward  the  weakness 
in  human  nature  as  a  justification  for  every  trans- 

In  fact  the  political  moralist  may  say  that  a 
ruler  and  people,  or  nation  and  nation  do  ont 
another  no  wrong,  when  thy  enter  on  a  war  with 
violence  or  cunning,  although  they  do  wrong, 
generally  speaking,  in  refusing  to  respect  the  idea 
of  right  which  alone  could  establish  peace  for  all 
time.  For,  as  both  are  equally  wrongly  disposed 
to  one  another,  each  transgressing  the  duty  he 
owes  to  his  neighbour,  they  are  both  quite  rightly 
served,  when  they  are  thus  destroyed  in  war.  This 
mutual  destruction  stops  short  at  the  point  of  exter- 
mination, so  that  there  are  always  enough  of  the 
race  left  to  keep  this  game  going  on  through  all 
the  ages,  and  a  far-off  posterity  may  take  warning 

1 82  Perpetual  Peact 

by  them.  The  Providence  that  orders  the  course 
of  the  world  is  hereby  justified.  For  the  moral 
principle  in  mankind  never  becomes  extinguished, 
and  human  reason,  fitted  for  the  practical  reali- 
sation of  ideas  of  right  according  to  that  principle, 
grows  continually  in  fitness  for  that  purpose  with 
the  ever  advancing  march  of  culture;  while  at  the 
same  time,  it  must  be  said,  the  guilt  of  trans- 
gression increases  as  well.  But  it  seems  that,  by 
no  theodicy  or  vindication  of  the  justice  of  God, 
can  we  justify  Creation  in  putting  such  a  race  of 
corrupt  creatures  into  the  world  at  all,  if,  that  is, 
we  assume  that  the  human  race  neither  will  nor 
can  ever  be  in  a  happier  condition  than  it  is  now. 
This  standpoint,  however,  is  too  high  a  one  for  us 
to  judge  from,  or  to  theorise,  with  the  limited 
concepts  we  have  at  our  command,  about  the 
wisdom  of  that  supreme  Power  which  is  unknow- 
able by  us.  We  are  inevitably  driven  to  such 
despairing  conclusions  as  these,  if  we  do  not  admit 
that  the  pure  principles  of  right  have  objective 
reality — that  is  to  say,  are  capable  of  being  prac- 
tically realised — and  consequently  that  action  must 
be  taken  on  the  part  of  the  people  of  a  state  and, 
further,  by  states  in  relation  to  one  another,  whatever 
arguments  empirical  politics  may  bring  forward 
against  this  course.  Politics  in  the  real  sense  cannot 
take  a  step  forward  without  first  paying  homage 

.  Appendix  I  183 

to  the  principles  of  morals.  And,  although  politics, 
per  se,  is  a  difficult  art,  *  in  its  union  with  moral* 
no  art  is  required;  for  in  the  case  of  a  conflict 
arising  between  the  two  sciences,  the  moralist  can 
cut  asunder  the  knot  which  politics  is  unable  to 
untie.  Right  must  be  held  sacred  by  man,  however 
great  the  cost  and  sacrifice  to  the  ruling  power. 
Here  is  no  half-and-half  course.  We  cannot  devise 
a  happy  medium  between  right  and  expediency,  a 
right  pragmatically  conditioned.  But  all  politics  must 
bend  the  knee  to  the  principle  of  right,  and  may, 
in  that  way,  hope  to  reach,  although  slowly  per- 
haps, a  level  whence  it  may  shine  upon  men  for 
all  time. 

*  Matthew  Arnold  defines  politics  somewhere  as  the  art  of 
"making  reason  and  the  will  of  God  prty»il" — an  art,  ont  would 
say,  difficult  «DOugh.  [Tr.] 





IF  I  look  at  public  right  from  the  point  of  view 
of  most  professors  of  law,  and  abstract  from  its 
matter  or  its  empirical  elements,  varying  according 
to  the  circumstances  given  in  our  experience  of 
individuals  in  a  state  or  of  states  among  themselves, 
then  there  remains  the  form  of  publicity.  The 
possibility  of  this  publicity,  every  legal  title  implies. 
For  without  it  there  could  be  no  justice,  which  can 
only  be  thought  as  before  the  eyes  of  men;  and, 
without  justice,  there  would  be  no  right,  for,  from 
justice  only,  right  can  come. 

This  characteristic  of  publicity  must  belong  to 
every  legal  title.  Hence,  as,  in  any  particular  case 
that  occurs,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  deciding  whether 
this  essential  attribute  is  present  or  not,  (whether, 
that  is,  it  is  reconcilable  with  the  principles  of  the 
agent  or  not),  it  furnishes  an  easily  applied  criterion 

Appendix  II  185 

which  is  to  be  found  a  priori  in  the  reason,  so  that 

in  the  particular  case  we  can  at  once  recognise  the 

falsity  or  illegality  of  a  proposed  claim  (praetensio 

juris),  as  it  were  by  an  experiment  of  pure  reason. 

Having  thus,  as  it  were,  abstracted  from  all  the 
empirical  elements  contained  in  the  concept  of  a 
political  and  international  law,  such  as,  for  instance, 
the  evil  tendency  in  human  nature  which  makes 
compulsion  necessary,  we  may  give  the  following 
proposition  as  the  transcendental  formula  of  public 
right: — "All  actions  relating  to  the  rights  of  other 
men  are  wrong,  if  the  'maxims  from  which  they 
follow  are  inconsistent  with  publicity." 

This  principle  must  be  regarded  not  merely  as 
ethical,  as  belonging  to  the  doctrine  of  virtue,  but 
also  as  juridical,  referring  to  the  rights  of  men. 
For  there  is  something  wrong  in  a  maxim  of  con- 
duct which  I  cannot  divulge  without  at  once  defeating 
my  purpose,  a  maxim  which  must  therefore  be 
kept  secret,  if  it  is  to  succeed,  and  which  I  could 
not  publicly  ackowledge  without  infallibly  stirring 
up  the  opposition  of  everyone.  This  necessary 
and  universal  resistance  with  which  everyone  meets 
me,  a  resistance  therefore  evident  a  priori,  can  be 
due  to  no  other  cause  than  the  injustice  with  which 
such  a  maxim  threatens  everyone.  Further,  this 
testing  principle  is  merely  negative;  that  is,  it 
ssrve*  only  as  a  means  by  which  we  may  know 

1 86  Perpetual  Peace 

when  an  action  is  unjust  to  others.  Like  axioms, 
it  has  a  certainty  incapable  of  demonstration ;  it  is 
besides  easy  of  application  as  appears  from  the 
following  examples  of  public  right. 

I. — Constitutional  Law.  Let  us  take  in  the  first 
place  the  public  law  of  the  state  (jus  civitatis], 
particularly  in  its  application  to  matters  within  the 
state.  Here  a  question  arises  which  many  think 
difficult  to  answer,  but  which  the  transcendental 
principle  of  publicity  solves  quite  readily : — "  Is 
revolution  a  legitimate  means  for  a  people  to  adopt, 
for  the  purpose  of  throwing  off  the  oppressive  yoke 
of  a  so-called  tyrant  (non  titulo,  sed  ixercitio  talis)1" 
The  rights  of  a  nation  are  violated  in  a  government 
of  this  kind,  and  no  wrong  is  done  to  the  tyrant 
in  dethroning  him.  Of  this  there  is  no  doubt. 
None  the  less,  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  wrong  of 
the  subjects  to  prosecute  their  rights  in  this  way ; 
and  they  would  be  just  as  little  justified  in  com- 
plaining, if  they  happened  to  be  defeated  in  their 
attempt  and  had  to  endure  the  severest  punishment 
in  consequence. 

A  great  many  reasons  for  and  against  both  sides 
of  this  question  may  be  given,  if  we  seek  to  settle 
it  by  a  dogmatic  deduction  of  the  principles  of 
right.  But  the  transcendental  principle  of  the  publicity 
of  public  right  can  spare  itself  this  diffuse  argu- 
mentation. For,  according  to  that  principle,  the 

Appendix  II  187 

people  would  ask  themselves,  before  the  civil  con- 
tract was  made,  whether  they  could  venture  to 
publish  maxims,  proposing  insurrection  when  a 
favourable  opportunity  should  present  itself.  It  is 
quite  clear  that  if,  when  a  constitution  is  established, 
it  were  made  a  condition  that  force  may  be  exercised 
against  the  sovereign  under  certain  circumstances, 
the  people  would  be  obliged  to  claim  a  lawful 
authority  higher  than  his.  But  in  that  case,  the 
so-called  sovereign  would  be  no  longer  sovereign : 
or,  if  both  powers,  that  of  the  sovereign  and  that 
of  the  people,  were  made  a  condition  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  state,  then  its  establishment  (which 
was  the  aim  of  the  people)  would  be  impossible. 
The  wrongfulness  of  revolution  is  quite  obvious 
from  the  fact  that  openly  to  acknowledge  maxims 
which  justify  this  step  would  make  attainment  of 
the  end  at  which  they  aim  impossible.  We  are 
obliged  to  keep  them  secret.  But  this  secrecy 
would  not  be  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  head 
of  the  state.  He  may  say  quite  plainly  that  the 
ringleaders  of  every  rebellion  will  be  punished  by 
death,  even  although  they  may  hold  that  it  was 
he  who  first  transgressed  the  fundamental  law.  For, 
if  a  ruler  is  conscious  of  possessing  irresistible 
sovereign  power  (and  this  must  be  assumed  in 
every  civil  constitution,  because  a  sovereign  who 
has  not  power  to  protect  any  individual  membtr 

1 88  Perpetual  Peace 

of  the  nation  against  his  neighbour  has  also  not 
the  right  to  exercise  authority  over  him),  then  he 
need  have  no  fear  that  making  known  the  maxims 
which  guide  him  will  cause  the  defeat  of  his  plans. 
And  it  is  quite  consistent  with  this  view  to  hold 
that,  if  the  people  are  successful  in  their  insurrec- 
tion, the  sovereign  must  return  to  the  rank  of  a 
subject,  and  refrain  from  inciting  rebellion  with  a 
view  to  regaining  his  lost  sovereignty.  At  the  same 
time  he  need  have  no  fear  of  being  called  to 
account  for  his  former  administration.* 

*  "  When  a  king  has  dethroned  himself,"  says  Lock*,  (On  Civil 
Covet ftmfnt,  Ch.  XTX.  §  239)  "and  put  himself  in  a  state  of  war 
with  his  people,  what  shall  hinder  them  from  prosecuting  him  who 
is  no  king,  as  they  would  any  other  man,  who  has  put  himself  into 
a  state  of  war  with  them?"  ....  "The  legislative  being  only  a 
fiduciary  power  to  act  for  certain  ends,  there  remains  still  in  the 
people  a  supreme  power  to  remove  er  alter  the  legislate"  (Op. 
fit,.  Ch.  XIII.  §  149.)  And  again,  (op.  fit.,  Ch.  XI.  §  134.)  we 
find  the  words,  " .  .  .  ,  over  whom  [i.e.  society]  no  body  can  hare 
a  power  to  make  laws,  but  by  their  own  consent,  and  by  authority 
received  from  them."  Cf.  also  Ch.  XIX.  §  228  seq. 

Hobbes  represents  the  opposite  point  of  view.  "How  many 
kings,"  he  wrote,  (Preface  to  the  Philosophical  Rudiments  concerning 
Government  and  Society)  "and  those  good  men  too,  hath  this  one 
error,  that  a  tyrant  king  might  lawfully  be  put  to  death,  been  the 
slaughter  of!  How  many  throats  hath  this  false  position  cut,  that 
a  prince  for  some  causes  may  by  some  certain  men  be  deposed!  And 
what  bloodshed  hath  not  this  erroneous  doctrine  caused,  that  kings 
are  not  superiors  to,  but  administrators  for  the  multitude ! "  This 
"  erroneous  doctrine  "  Kant  received  from  Locke  through  Rousseau. 
He  advocated,  or  at  least  practised  as  a  citizen,  a  doctrine  of 
passive  obedience  to  the  state.  A  free  press,  he  held,  offered  the 
only  lawful  outlet  for  protest  against  tyranny.  But,  in  theory,  he 
wa%  an  enemy  to  ab«oiute  monarchy.  [Tr.] 

Appendix  II  189 

2. — International  Law.  There  can  be  no  ques- 
tion of  an  international  law,  except  on  the  assump- 
tion of  some  kind  of  a  law-governed  state  of  things, 
the  external  condition  under  which  any  right  can 
belong  to  man.  For  the  very  idea  of  interna- 
tional law,  as  public  right,  implies  the  publication  of 
a  universal  will  determining  the  rights  and  property 
of  each  individual  nation;  and  this  status juridicus 
must  spring  out  of  a  contract  of  some  sort  which 
may  not,  like  the  contract  to  which  the  state  owes 
its  origin,  be  founded  upon  compulsory  laws,  but 
may  be,  at  the  most,  the  agreement  of  a  permanent 
free  association  such  as  the  federation  of  the  differ- 
ent states,  to  which  we  have  alluded  above.  For, 
without  the  control  of  law  to  some  extent,  to  serve 
as  an  active  bond  of  union  among  different  merely 
natural  or  moral  individuals, — that  is  to  say,  in  a 
state  of  nature, — there  can  only  be  private  law. 
And  here  we  find  a  disagreement  between  morals, 
regarded  as  the  science  of  right,  and  politics.  The 
criterion,  obtained  by  observing  the  effect  of  pub- 
licity on  maxims,  is  just  as  easily  applied,  but 
only  when  we  understand  that  this  agreement  binds 
the  contracting  states  solely^-with  the  object  that 
peace  may  be  preserved  among  them,  and  between 
them  and  other  states;  in  no  sense  with  a  view 
to  the  acquisition  of  new  territory  or  power.  The 
following  instances  of  antinomy  occur  between 

190  Ptrpetual  Peact 

politics  and  morals,  which  are  given  here  with  the 
solution  in  each  case. 

a.  "When   either   of  these  states  has  promised 
something  to  another,  (as,  for  instance,  assistance, 
or  a  relinquishment  of  certain  territory,  or  subsidies 
and  such  like),  the  question  may  arise  whether,  in 
a   case   where   the  safety   of  the  state  thus  bound 
depends    on    its    evading  the  fulfilment  of  this  pro- 
mise,   it   can    do   so   by  maintaining  a  right  to  be 
regarded  as  a  double  person : — firstly,  as  sovereign 
and  accountable  to  no  one  in  the  state  of  which  that 
sovereign  power  is  head ;  and,  secondly,  merely  as  the 
highest   official  in  the  service  of  that  state,  who  is 
obliged  to  answer  to  the  state  for  every  action.  And 
the  result  of  this  is  that  the  state  is  acquitted  in  its 
second   capacity  of  any  obligation  to  which  it  has 
committed   itself  in  the  first."     But,  if  a  nation  or 
its  sovereign  proclaimed  these  maxims,  the  natural 
consequence  would  be  that  every  other  would  flee 
from  it,  or  unite  with  other  states  to  oppose  such 
pretensions.     And  this  is  a  proof  that  politics,  with 
all  its  cunning,  defeats  its  own  ends,  if  the  test  of 
making  principles  of  action  public,  which  we  have 
indicated,  be  applied.     Hence  the  maxim  we  have 
quoted  must  be  wrong. 

b.  "If  a   state   which   has    increased   its  power 
to  a   formidable   extent  (potentia  tremenda)  excites 
anxiety    in    its  neighbours,    is   it   right   to    assume 

Appendix  II  191 

that,  since  it  has  the  means,  it  will  also  have  the 
will  to  oppress  others;  and  does  that  give  less 
powerful  states  a  right  to  unite  and  attack  the 
greater  nation  without  any  definite  cause  of  offence?" 
A  state  which  would  here  answer  openly  in  the 
affirmative  would  only  bring  the  evil  about  more 
surely  and  speedily.  For  the  greater  power  would 
forestall  those  smaller  nations,  and  their  union 
would  be  but  a  weak  reed  of  defence  against  a 
state  which  knew  how  to  apply  the  maxim, 
divide  el  impera.  This  maxim  of  political  ex- 
pediency then,  when  openly  acknowledged,  neces- 
sarily defeats  the  end  at  which  it  aims,  and  is 
therefore  wrong. 

c.  "  If  a  smaller  state  by  its  geographical  posi- 
tion breaks  up  the  territory  of  a  greater,  so  as  to 
prevent  a  unity  necessary  to  the  preservation  of 
that  state,  is  the  latter  not  justified  in  subjugating 
its  less  powerful  neighbour  and  uniting  the  territory 
in  question  with  its  own?"  We  can  easily  see  that 
the  greater  state  dare  not  publish  such  a  maxim 
beforehand;  for  either  all  smaller  states  would 
without  loss  of  time  unite  against  it,  or  other  powers 
would  contend  for  this  booty.  '  Hence  the  im- 
practicability of  such  a  maxim  becomes  evident  under 
the  light  of  publicity.  And  this  is  a  sign  that  it 
is  wrong,  and  that  in  a  very  great  degree;  for, 
although  the  victim  of  an  act  of  injustice  may  be 

192  Ptrpttual  Peace 

of  small  account,  that  does  not  prevent  the  injustice 
done  from  being  very  great. 

3. — Cosmopolitan  Law.  We  may  pass  over  this 
department  of  right  in  silence,  for,  owing  to  its 
analogy  with  international  law,  its  maxims  arc 
easily  specified  and  estimated. 

In  this  principle  of  the  incompatibility  of  the 
maxims  of  international  law  with  their  publicity, 
we  have  a  good  indication  of  the  non-agreement 
between  politics  and  morals,  regarded  as  a  science 
of  right.  -  Now  we  require  to  know  under  what 
conditions  these  maxims  do  agree  with  the  law  of 
nations.  For  we  cannot  conclude  that  the  converse 
holds,  and  that  all  maxims  which  can  bear  publicity 
are  therefore  just.  For  anyone  who  has  a  decided 
supremacy  has  no  need  to  make  any  secret  about 
his  maxims.  The  condition  of  a  law  of  nations 
being  possible  at  all  is  that,  in  the  first  place, 
there  should  be  a  law-governed  state  of  things. 
If  this  is  not  so,  there  can  be  no  public  right,  and 
all  right  which  we  can  think  of  outside  the  law- 
governed  state,— that  is  to  say,  in  the  state  of 
nature, — is  mere  private  right.  Now  we  have  seen 

Appendix  II  193 

above  that  something  of  the  nature  of  a  federation 
between  nations,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  doing 
away  with  war,  is  the  only  rightful  condition  of 
things  reconcilable  with  their  individual  freedom. 
Hence  the  agreement  of  politics  and  morals  is  only 
possible  in  a  federative  union,  a  union  which  is 
necessarily  given  a  priori,  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  right.  And  the  lawful  basis  of  all  politics 
can  only  be  the  establishment  of  this  union  in  its 
widest  possible  extent.  Apart  from  this  end,  all 
political  sophistry  is  folly  and  veiled  injustice.  Now 
this  sham  politics  has  a  casuistry,  not  to  be  ex- 
celled in  the  best  Jesuit  school.  It  has  its  mental 
reservation  (reservatio  mentalis] :  as  in  the  drawing 
up  of  a  public  treaty  in  such  terms  as  we  can,  if 
we  will,  interpret  when  occasion  serves  to  our 
advantage ;  for  example,  the  distinction  between 
the  status  quo  in  fact  (de  fait)  and  in  right  (de  droit). 
Secondly,  it  has  its  probabilism;  when  it  pretends 
to  discover  evil  intentions  in  another,  or  makes 
the  probability  of  their  possible  future  ascendency 
a  lawful  reason  for  bringing  about  the  destruction 
of  other  peaceful  states.  Finally,  it  has  its  philo- 
sophical sin  (pe,-catum  phihsophicuin,  peccatillutn, 
baggatelle]  which  is  that  of  holding  it  a  trifle  easily 
pardoned  that  a  smaller  state  should  be  swallowed 
up,  if  this  be  to  the  gain  of  a  nation  much  more 
powerful;  for  such  an  increase  in  power  is 


IQ4  Perpetual  Peace 

supposed  to  tend  to  the  greater  prosperity  of  the 
whole  world.  * 

Duplicity  gives  politics  the  advantage  of  using 
one  branch  or  the  other  of  morals,  just  as  suits 
its  own  ends.  The  love  of  our  fellowmen  is  a 
duty:  so  too  is  respect  for  their  rights.  But  the 
former  is  only  conditional :  the  latter,  on  the  other 
hand,  an  unconditional,  absolutely  imperative  duty ; 
and  anyone  who  would  give  himself  up  to  the 
sweet  consciousness  of  well-doing  must  be  first  per- 
fectly assured  that  he  has  not  transgressed  its 
commands.  Politics  has  no  difficulty  in  agreeing 
with  morals  in  the  first  sense  of  the  term,  as  ethics, 
to  secure  that  men  should  give  to  superiors  their 
rights.  But  when  it  comes  to  morals,  in  its  second 
aspect,  as  the  science  of  right  before  which  politics 
must  bow  the  knee,  the  politician  finds  it  prudent 
to  have  nothing  to  do  with  compacts  and  rather 
to  deny  all  reality  to  morals  in  this  sense,  and 
reduce  all  duty  to  mere  benevolence.  Philosophy 
could  easily  frustrate  the  artifices  of  a  politics  like 

•  We  can  find  the  voucher  for  maxims  such  as  these  in  Herr 
Hofrichter  Garve's  essay,  On  the  Connection  of  Morals  with 
Politics,  1788.  This  worthy  scholar  confesses  at  the  very  beginning 
that  he  is  unable  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to  this  question. 
But  his  sanction  of  such  maxims,  even  when  coupled  with  the 
admission  that  he  cannot  altogether  clear  away  the  arguments 
raised  against  them,  seems  to  be  a  greater  concession  in  favour  of 
those  who  shew  considerable  inclination  to  abuse  them,  than  it 
might  perhaps  be  wise  to  admit. 

Appendix  II  19$ 

this,  which  shuns  the  light  of  criticism,  by  publishing 
its  maxims,  if  only  statesmen  would  have  the  courage  to 
grant  philosophers  the  right  to  ventilate  their  opinions. 

With  this  end  in  view,  I  propose  another  prin- 
ciple of  public  right,  which  is  at  once  transcendental 
and  affirmative.  Its  formula  would  be  as  follows: 
—  "All  maxims  which  require  publicity,  in  order 
that  they  may  not  fail  to  attain  their  end,  are  in 
agreement  both  with  right  and  politics." 

For,  if  these  maxims  can  only  attain  the  end  at 
which  they  aim  by  being  published,  they  must  be 
in  harmony  with  the  universal  end  of  mankind, 
which  is  happiness ;  and  to  be  in  sympathy  with 
this  (to  make  the  people  contented  with  their  lot) 
is  the  real  business  of  politics.  Now,  if  this  end 
should  be  attainable  only  by  publicity,  or  in  other 
words,  through  the  removal  of  all  distrust  of  the 
maxims  of  politics,  these  must  be  in  harmony  with 
the  right  of  the  people ;  for  a  union  of  the  ends 
of  all  is  only  possible  in  a  harmony  with  this  right. 

I  must  postpone  the  further  development  and 
discussion  of  this  principle  till  another  opportunity. 
That  it  is  a  transcendental  formula  is  quite  evident 
from  the  fact  that  all  the  empirical  conditions  of 
a  doctrine  of  happiness,  or  the  matter  of  law,  are 
absent,  and  that  it  has  regard  only  to  the  form 
of  universal  conformity  to  law. 

196  Perpetual  Peace 

If  it  is  our  duty  to  realise  a  state  of  public 
right,  if  at  the  same  time  there  are  good  grounds 
for  hope  that  this  ideal  may  be  realised,  although 
only  by  an  approximation  advancing  ad  infinitum, 
then  perpetual  peace,  following  hitherto  falsely 
so-called  conclusions  of  peace,  which  have  been  in 
reality  mere  cessations  of  hostilities,  is  no  mere 
empty  idea.  But  rather  we  have  here  a  problem 
which  gradually  works  out  its  own  solution  and, 
as  the  periods  in  which  a  given  advance  takes 
place  towards  the  realisation  of  the  ideal  of  per- 
petual peace  will,  we  hope,  become  with  the  passing 
of  time  shorter  and  shorter,  we  must  approach  ever 
nearer  to  this  goal. 


Absolutism;    of  Hobbes,  43,  441  of  Schopenhauer,  43;  according 

to  Kant,  43,  44,   125—128;  to  Locke,  44. 
Alexander  I.  of  Russia;  So. 
Alexander  the  Great;  31,   103. 
Alsace-Lorraine;  annexation  of,  90;  92,  95. 
Ambrose,  Saint;   15. 
Amphictyonic  League;  16,  22. 

Aquinas,  Thomas;  on  righting  clergy,  18;  on  war,  18,  19. 
Arbitration;  as  a  substitute  for  war,  79,  81,  87 ;  difficulties  settled 

by,  80 ;  where  it  is  useless,  82,  83,  86. 
Aristotle;   on  war,  7,  8;  and  rights  of  an  enemy,  id.-,  31;  on  the 

relation  between  politics  and  ethics,  162. 
Assyrians;  war  among  the,  9. 
Augustine,  Saint;  16. 


Balance  of  power;  26,  95. 
Bentham,  Jeremy ;  26,  79,  92. 
Bluntschli,  J.  K. ;  41,  73,  74,  So. 


Caird,  Edward;  3,  51. 

Calvin,  John;  19. 

Carnegie,  Andrew;  100. 

China;  a  danger  to  Europe,  92,  93 ;  140,  141, 

198  Index 

Cicero ;  on  the  conduct  of  war,  22;  41. 

Clement  of  Alexandria;  15. 

Clergy,   fighting;   Origen   on,    14,  15 ;  Wycliffe,  18;  Erasmus,  if». 

Aquinas,  ib. 
Cobclen,  Richard ;  64. 
Corvinus,  Matthias;   109. 
Cowper,  William;  5,  38,  123. 
Crusades,  wars  of  the;  16,  103. 

Dante,  Alighieri;  on  mediation,  46;  en  universal  monarchy,  68,  69. 
Disarmament;    88—93;   Czar's   proposal    of,   90;  practicability  »f, 

Dubois,  Cardinal ;  36. 

Empire;  of  Rome,  9,  2O,  68;  world-,  spiritual,  23,  32,  69;  of 
Alexander  the  Great,  31,  68;  Prankish,  69;  Holy  Roman  69, 
of  Napoleon  I.,  69. 

Erasmus,  Desiderius;  and  European  p«ace,  17;  on  war,  18,  19;  on 
fighting  clergy,  18;  32. 


Farrar,  J.  A. ;  18. 

Federation;  Kant's  idea  »f,  60,  68,  69,  128—137;  88,  92,  93,  95, 

97;  probable  results  of,  98,  99;  100,  134. 
Fichte,  J.  G. ;  69,  99. 
Finland;  92,  95. 
Fischer,  Kuno;  62,  67. 
Fleury,  Cardinal;  55. 
Frederick  the  Great;  66,  ia6. 

Index  199 

Gentilis,  Albericus;  21,  32. 

Golden  Age;  3,  41. 

Government;  origin  of,  according  to  Plato,  5;  according  to  Hnme, 

5,  52;  to  Cowper,  5,  6;  to  Hobbes,  40 — 42,   118,  119;  to  Kant, 

51—54,   152 — 154;  to  Rousseau,  52;  to  Locke,  53;  representative, 

65 — 68,  120,  121,  124—128. 
Greeks ;  their  attitude  to  other  nations,  7 ;  to  an  enemy,  ib.  \  their 

Sacred  Wars,   16;  the  Amphictyonic  League,   16. 
Grotius,    Hugo;    his  DC  Jure  Belli  et  Pacts,  24 — 27;  and  the  fus 

Gentium,   24,   25;    and   the   Law   of  Nature,  25;  on  peace,  27 1 

32,  40,  131. 

Hague  Conference  (1899);  86,  90. 

Hegel,  G.  W.  F.;  57;  on  war,  71,  72,  75. 

Henry  IV.  of  France ;  30,  32,  33,  36. 

Hobbes,  Thomas;  his  theory  of  the  state  of  nature  and  origin  of 

government,   4,   40—42,    51,    118,   119,    133;  6,  26,  27,  28,  37; 

his  influence  on  Kaat,  40,  46;  his  views  on  revolution,  41,  188; 

of    the    relations    between    states,    43 — 46,    128,    131;    on    the 

conduct  of  war,  45;  89,  120,  124,  159. 
Holls,  Fred.  W.;  86. 

Hooker,  Richard;  52;  on  the  depravity  of  man,  173. 
Hume,   David ;   on   the  origin  of  government,  5,  52 ;  on  the  state 

of  nature,   40,  41;  on  the  original  contract,  52;  108,  109,  162. 

International    Law;    the   development   of,   20 — 24;   its  connection 

with  the  Reformation,  21,  24;  in  Greece  and  Rome,  22,  23. 
Intervention  j  64,  93,  94,  112,  113. 

Jews;  war  among  the,  9 — II;  their  dream  of  peace,  32. 
Justin;  15. 

2OO  Index 

Kant,  Immanuel ;  26,  37 ;  his  indebtedness  to  earlier  political 
writers,  40,  46;  his  theory  of  human  development,  47 — 49;  and 
how  this  is  possible,  49 — 51,  54;  on  the  foundation  of  the  state, 
51 — 54,  152 — 154;  the  relations  between  states  and  individuals, 
54,  55,  117 — 120,  128,  173,  174;  the  necessity  for  reform  within 
the  state,  55,  56,  168;  the  political  and  social  conditions  of  his 
time,  57—59;  his  attitude  to  war,  58,  133,  135,  136,  137,  149— 
151  ;  on  the  growing  power  of  commerce,  59,  65,  142,  157;  his 
idea  of  federation,  60,  68,  69,  128 — 137,  192;  and  ideal  of 
perpetual  peace,  61,  129,  196;  the  conditions  of  its  realization, 
62 — 69;  on  representative  and  other  constitutions,  65 — 68,  120 — 
128,  152,  153,  167;  his  opinion  of  the  English  constitution,  66 ; 
his  disapproval  of  universal  monarchy,  68,  69,  155,  156;  79, 
83,  89,  100,  105;  on  the  right  of  way,  137 — 142;  on  nature's 
guarantee  of  a  perpetual  peace,  143—157;  on  the  relation 
between  politics  and  morals,  161 — 196;  on  revolution,  167,  168, 

Laveleye,  £mile  dc;  81. 

Lawrence,  T.  J. ;  9,  78,  81. 

Leibniz,  Gottfried  \V.;  36;  his  criticism  of  St.  Pierre,  37,  38;  58,  106. 

Locke,  John ;  and  the  golden  age,  3,  4 ;  on  the  original  contract, 

53;  on  revolution,  53,  188;  67,  133. 
Lorimcr,  James ;  34,  80. 
Louis  Philippe;  76. 
Luther,  Martin;  on  war,  19. 

Machiavelli,  Nicolo;  162. 

Maine,  Henry;  on  Grotius  and  the  Jus  Gentium,  24,  25. 

Maistrc,  Joseph  dc;  71. 

Martineau,  James;  IO2. 

Mtanonites;  and  war,  14. 

Index  201 

Military    service;    of  Christians,    14,    16,   18,  19;  compulsory    89; 

voluntary,   in. 
Mill,  John  Stuart;  80. 
Moltke,  Graf  von;  71,  73 — 75. 
Monarchy,  universal;  the  ideal  of  Dante,  68,  69;  disapproved    by 

Kant,  68,  69,  155,   156;  aud  Fichte,  69. 
Montesquieu,  Baron  de;  on  self-preservation,  83;  on  armed  peace, 

88;  159. 

More,  Thomas ;  32. 
Morley,  John;  3. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte;  Empire  of,  69;  71,  72.  76.  77. 

Napoleon,  Louis ;  80. 

National  Debt;  63,  64,  ill,   112. 

Origen;  on  military  service,  14,   15. 

Original  Contract;  40-,  as  understood  by  Rousseau,  52;  by  Hobbes, 
52,  53;  by  Hooker,  $2;  by  Hume,  ib.  •,  by  Kant,  il>.-  by  T.ocke,  53. 

Paris  Congress  (1856);  86. 

Faulsen,  Friedrich ;  43,   52,  53,  66,  78. 

Peace,  perpetual;  the  dream  of,  29 — 33:  projects  of,  by  Penn,  30; 
by  Henry  IV.,  30,  33,  34  :  by  St.  Pierre,  30,  32,  34 — 37 ;  Rousseau's 
attitude  to,  38 — 40;  106;  for  Kant  an  ideal,  61,  129;  the  articles 
of,  62—69;  107—142,  158—160;  the  guarantee  of,  143—157. 

Peace  Societies;  70,  75,  78,  79,  80,  86,  87;  and  disarmament,  88 ; 
96,  97,  loo,  loi,  102. 

Penn,  William ;  30. 

Plato ;  on  the  origin  of  the  state,  5  ;  on  war,  8;  41  j  on  the  relation 
between  ethics  and  politics,  162, 

Poland;  92,  93,  95. 

202  Index 

Politics;  and  morals,  according  to  Kant,  161 — 196;  to  Plato,  162 
to  Aristotle,  ib.  \  to  Hume,  ib.\  sophistical  maxims  of,  170 — 172. 
Pope,  Alexander;  4,   127. 
Puffendorf,  Samuel;  27;  on  intervention,  64;  131. 

Quakers ;  and  war,   14. 

Reformation;  and  military  service,  18;  and  international  law,  11,24 
Religion.   Roman,  and  war,  9-,  Jewish,  9 — n;  Mohammedan,  io; 

Buddhist,  and  conversion,   12  ;  Christian,  and  war,   12 — 20. 
Revolution,   right   of;  according  to  Hobbes,  41,  53;  and  Spinoza, 

41;    according    to   Locke,    53;    to  Rousseau,  ib.\  to  Kant,   167, 

1 86— 1 88. 

Right  of  \vay;  Vatu-1  on.  65,   138;  Kant  on,  65,   137—142. 
Ritchie,    U.    G. ;    on    Rousseau,  3;  on  Locke  and  the  golden  age, 

it.-,  52,  85,  98. 

Robertson,  William;  6,   17..   18,   19. 

Romans;  and  war,  7,  8,  9,  22,  23;  and  international  law,  22,  23. 
Rousseau,  J.  J.;    and    the   state   of  nature,    2,    3,   52;  26,  28;  his 

criticism  of  St.  Pierre,  38 — 40;  his  views  on  militarism,  39;  on 

the    original   contract,    52;  on  revolution,  53,  188;  61,  67,  100, 

132,    134;   on  democratic  and  republican  governments,  153;  ou 

the  depravity  of  man,  173. 
Russia;    Alexander    I.    of,    8o;    the    Czar    of,    90;    the   backward 

civilization  of,  92,  93;  94,  95. 


Schiller,  Friedrich  von;  on  war  and  peace,  71,  72,  73,  75. 

Schopenhauer,  Arthur;  43. 

Spencer,  Herbert;  76. 

Spinoza,  Benedict;  on  the  state  of  nature,  41;  and  revolution,  #. 

Standing  armies ;  63,  64,  89,   no 

Index  203 

State  of  nature ;  according  to  Rousseau,  t,  3 ;  and  the  golden  a§e, 
3;  Hobbea'  theory  of,  4,  40,  41,  n8;  according  to  Hume  a 
philosophical  fiction,  41;  according  to  Kant,  117 — -120. 

States;  transference  of,  63,  108,  109;  marriage  between,  109. 

St.  Pierre,  Castel  de ;  30,  32,  33 ;  his  Projtt,  34—37  ;  and  Leibnic, 
37,  38;  and  Rousseau,  38—40;  6l,  67,  79,  92,  106. 

Sully.  Duke  of;  30,  32,  33. 

Tennyson,  Lord ;  73,  74, 

Tertullian;  14,  15. 

Treaties  of  peace;  in  Greece,  7;  6j>  64,  107,  loS. 

Treitschke,  H.  von ;  75. 

Trendelenburg,  F.  A.;  7$, 

Vattel,  Emerich;  hi*  Droit  da  Gent,  28,  99;  on  intervention,  $4, 
113,  114;  on  the  right  of  way,  65;  of  self-prettfTfttion,  83 ;  ty, 
103;  on  treaties,  108;  131. 

Voltaire,  Francois  de;  33,  37,  38. 

War;  religious.  16;  private,  17,  2O,  29;  dynastic,  38,  57,  UJ; 
Kant's  attitude  to,  58,  133,  135,  136,  137,  149 — 151;  its  influence 
on  progress,  70,  96,  103;  views  of  Hegel  on,  71,  72,  75;  of 
Schiller,  71,  72,  73,  7$;  of  Moltke,  71,  73,  74,  7$;  under  altered 
conditions,  76,  77,  78;  when  just,  84,  85-,  future  probable  cause* 
°f.  94.  95;  honorable  conduct  of,  114,  115, 

Wycliffe,  John;  and  fighting  clergy,  18. 

Zwingli,  Huldreich,  19. 

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JUNDING  StCT.      -^r1  i  / 



So  PCant,   Iimanuel.  Zum  ewigen 

Kl65z  Frieden 

,2s  Perpetual  peace.     Tr.   by 

.    Campbell  Smith .